fix(auth): address PR #758 review — XSS, CSRF, open redirect, JWKS cache
Addresses all 9 findings from the review on PR #758: Blocking: - _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp now reads config from oauth_ctx["config"] (the production-shaped nested dict). Previously read flat keys, causing IdP revocation to silently no-op in production. Test fixtures rebuilt to the realistic nested shape so the bug can't regress unnoticed. - HTML error responses in oauth_login_callback now wrap IdP-controlled error_body, str(e), and the attacker-controlled error/error_description query params in html_escape. New test_browser_oauth_xss.py pins this. Important: - New _safe_next_url helper validates the ?next= query param at write time (oauth_login), in oauth_logout, and on read from the session row in oauth_login_callback. Blocks https://, // (protocol-relative), and CRLF/whitespace injection. - verify_id_token now caches discovery + JWKS (5-min TTL) using the same pattern as oauth_routes._get_cached_discovery. New caching regression test pins to one fetch per URL across multiple calls. - /oauth/logout is now POST-only at the route layer (defeats passive CSRF via <img src>). oauth_logout also validates Origin/Referer against the configured mcp_server_url. Logout UI in user_info.html converted from <a href> to <form method="post">. - New storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions() called from the hourly cleanup loop in app.py — previously these rows accumulated for users who never explicitly logged out. Nits: - Demoted INFO logs that leaked oauth_config.keys() / client_id / token-storage state to DEBUG. Operator-relevant outcome lines (login successful, refresh token stored, logged out) stay INFO. - verify_id_token algorithms widened to RS256, PS256, ES256 — covers Azure AD (PS256) and Cognito/some Keycloak realms (ES256). Symmetric and "none" remain off the allowlist. - Migrated all Optional[X] usages in auth/storage.py to X | None per CLAUDE.md. Breaking change: GET /oauth/logout now returns 405. The in-tree logout UI was migrated to a POST form; any external bookmark or curl-based caller that relied on GET will need to switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Coutinho
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.7
Claude Opus 4.7
parent
15dbb26349
commit
931ee602eb
@@ -1354,13 +1354,16 @@ def get_app(transport: str = "streamable-http", enabled_apps: list[str] | None =
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storage = await get_shared_storage()
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count = await storage.delete_expired_login_flow_sessions()
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if count:
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logger.info(f"Cleaned up {count} expired login flow sessions")
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logger.info("Cleaned up %s expired login flow sessions", count)
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# Browser session rows are otherwise only cleaned up lazily
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# when a user revisits — PR #758 finding 6.
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await storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions()
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# Also clean up expired AS proxy codes/sessions
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_cleanup_expired_proxy_codes()
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# Clean up expired web provision sessions
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_cleanup_expired_provision_sessions()
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning(f"Login flow cleanup error: {e}")
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logger.warning("Login flow cleanup error: %s", e)
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await anyio.sleep(3600) # Every hour
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@asynccontextmanager
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@@ -2242,8 +2245,10 @@ def get_app(transport: str = "streamable-http", enabled_apps: list[str] | None =
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name="oauth_login_callback",
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)
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)
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# POST-only: defends against passive CSRF (e.g. <img src="…/logout">)
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# — see PR #758 finding 5.
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routes.append(
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Route("/oauth/logout", oauth_logout, methods=["GET"], name="oauth_logout")
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Route("/oauth/logout", oauth_logout, methods=["POST"], name="oauth_logout")
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)
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logger.info(
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"Browser OAuth routes enabled: /oauth/login, /oauth/login-callback (legacy), /oauth/logout"
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@@ -32,6 +32,48 @@ from ..http import nextcloud_httpx_client
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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def _origin_matches_self(request: Request, oauth_ctx: dict) -> bool:
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"""Return True when Origin/Referer is missing or matches our own host.
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Used to gate POST /oauth/logout against cross-origin form submissions
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(PR #758 finding 5). Per OWASP CSRF cheat sheet, the policy is:
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- If neither Origin nor Referer is set, allow (same-origin POST in
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privacy-conscious browsers may strip both).
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- Otherwise, the netloc of the first present header must equal the
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netloc of the configured ``mcp_server_url``.
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"""
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cfg = oauth_ctx.get("config") or oauth_ctx
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mcp_server_url = cfg.get("mcp_server_url")
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if not mcp_server_url:
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# Mis-configured deployment — fail open rather than break logout.
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return True
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expected = parse_url(mcp_server_url).netloc.lower()
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raw = request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer")
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if not raw:
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return True
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return parse_url(raw).netloc.lower() == expected
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def _safe_next_url(raw: str | None, default: str) -> str:
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"""Return a path-only redirect target, falling back to *default*.
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Blocks open-redirect abuse via the ``?next=`` query parameter on
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``/oauth/login`` and ``/oauth/logout`` (and the round-tripped
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``client_redirect_uri`` stored on the oauth_session). A safe target:
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- starts with a single ``/`` (so it's a path on this server)
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- does NOT start with ``//`` (which would be protocol-relative)
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- has no whitespace or control characters that could trick browsers
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Anything else returns *default*.
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"""
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if not raw or not raw.startswith("/") or raw.startswith("//"):
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return default
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if any(c.isspace() or ord(c) < 0x20 for c in raw):
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return default
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return raw
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def _should_use_secure_cookies() -> bool:
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"""Determine if cookies should have secure flag.
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@@ -73,14 +115,17 @@ async def oauth_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
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oauth_client = oauth_ctx["oauth_client"]
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oauth_config = oauth_ctx["config"]
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# Debug: Log oauth_config contents
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logger.info(f"oauth_login called - oauth_config keys: {oauth_config.keys()}")
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logger.info(f"oauth_login called - client_id: {oauth_config.get('client_id')}")
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logger.info(f"oauth_login called - oauth_client: {oauth_client is not None}")
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# Demoted to DEBUG (PR #758 nit a) — these previously leaked the
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# full set of config keys + the client_id at INFO on every login.
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logger.debug("oauth_login called - oauth_config keys: %s", oauth_config.keys())
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logger.debug("oauth_login called - client_id: %s", oauth_config.get("client_id"))
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logger.debug("oauth_login called - oauth_client: %s", oauth_client is not None)
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# Get redirect URL from query params (default to /app)
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next_url = request.query_params.get("next", "/app")
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logger.info(f"oauth_login - next_url: {next_url}")
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# Get redirect URL from query params (default to /app). Validated at
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# write-time so we never store an attacker-controlled absolute URL on
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# the oauth_session row (issue #758 finding 3).
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next_url = _safe_next_url(request.query_params.get("next"), "/app")
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logger.debug("oauth_login - next_url: %s", next_url)
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# Generate state for CSRF protection
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state = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
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@@ -142,7 +187,7 @@ async def oauth_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
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}
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auth_url = f"{oauth_client.authorization_endpoint}?{urlencode(idp_params)}"
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logger.info(f"Redirecting to external IdP login: {auth_url.split('?')[0]}")
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logger.debug("Redirecting to external IdP login: %s", auth_url.split("?")[0])
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else:
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# Integrated mode (Nextcloud OIDC)
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discovery_url = oauth_config.get("discovery_url")
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@@ -199,11 +244,10 @@ async def oauth_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
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"resource": nextcloud_resource_uri, # Request tokens for Nextcloud API access
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}
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# Debug: Log full parameters
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logger.info(f"Building Nextcloud OIDC auth URL with params: {idp_params}")
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logger.debug("Building Nextcloud OIDC auth URL with params: %s", idp_params)
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auth_url = f"{authorization_endpoint}?{urlencode(idp_params)}"
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logger.info(f"Redirecting to Nextcloud OIDC login: {auth_url}")
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logger.debug("Redirecting to Nextcloud OIDC login: %s", auth_url)
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return RedirectResponse(auth_url, status_code=302)
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@@ -228,8 +272,10 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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error_description = request.query_params.get(
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"error_description", "Authorization failed"
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)
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logger.error(f"OAuth login error: {error} - {error_description}")
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logger.error("OAuth login error: %s - %s", error, error_description)
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login_url = str(request.url_for("oauth_login"))
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# html_escape: error / error_description come from attacker-controlled
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# query parameters and would otherwise reflect into the failure page.
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return HTMLResponse(
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f"""
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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@@ -237,9 +283,9 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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<head><title>Login Failed</title></head>
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<body>
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<h1>Login Failed</h1>
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<p>Error: {error}</p>
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<p>{error_description}</p>
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<p><a href="{login_url}">Try again</a></p>
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<p>Error: {html_escape(error)}</p>
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<p>{html_escape(error_description)}</p>
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<p><a href="{html_escape(login_url)}">Try again</a></p>
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</body>
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</html>
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""",
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@@ -278,8 +324,10 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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if oauth_session:
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# code_verifier was stored in mcp_authorization_code field
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code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
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# next_url was stored in client_redirect_uri field
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next_url = oauth_session.get("client_redirect_uri", "/app")
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# next_url was stored in client_redirect_uri field — re-validate at
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# read-time as defense-in-depth (issue #758 finding 3). The session
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# row could have been written by an older code path or reused.
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next_url = _safe_next_url(oauth_session.get("client_redirect_uri"), "/app")
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# Clean up the temporary session
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# Note: We don't have delete_oauth_session method, but it will expire after TTL
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@@ -347,8 +395,10 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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e.response.text if hasattr(e.response, "text") else str(e.response.content)
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)
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logger.error(
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f"Token exchange failed: HTTP {e.response.status_code} - {error_body}"
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"Token exchange failed: HTTP %s - %s", e.response.status_code, error_body
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)
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# html_escape: error_body originates from the IdP and could contain
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# markup that would be reflected into the failure page otherwise.
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return HTMLResponse(
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f"""
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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@@ -357,14 +407,14 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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<body>
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<h1>Login Failed</h1>
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<p>Failed to exchange authorization code for tokens</p>
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<p>HTTP {e.response.status_code}: {error_body}</p>
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<p>HTTP {e.response.status_code}: {html_escape(error_body)}</p>
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</body>
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</html>
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""",
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status_code=500,
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)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Token exchange failed: {e}")
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logger.error("Token exchange failed: %s", e)
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return HTMLResponse(
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f"""
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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@@ -373,7 +423,7 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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<body>
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<h1>Login Failed</h1>
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<p>Failed to exchange authorization code for tokens</p>
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<p>Error: {e}</p>
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<p>Error: {html_escape(str(e))}</p>
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</body>
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</html>
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""",
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@@ -383,9 +433,11 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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refresh_token = token_data.get("refresh_token")
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id_token = token_data.get("id_token")
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logger.info(f"Token exchange response keys: {token_data.keys()}")
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logger.info(f"Refresh token present: {refresh_token is not None}")
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logger.info(f"ID token present: {id_token is not None}")
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# Demoted to DEBUG (PR #758 nit a) — these were previously logged at
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# INFO on every login.
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logger.debug("Token exchange response keys: %s", token_data.keys())
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logger.debug("Refresh token present: %s", refresh_token is not None)
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logger.debug("ID token present: %s", id_token is not None)
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# Resolve the discovery URL + audience used for THIS auth request so
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# we can verify the ID token signature + claims (issue #626 finding 1).
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@@ -431,8 +483,10 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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refresh_expires_at = None
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if refresh_expires_in:
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refresh_expires_at = int(time.time()) + refresh_expires_in
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logger.info(
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f"Refresh token expires in {refresh_expires_in}s (at timestamp {refresh_expires_at})"
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logger.debug(
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"Refresh token expires in %ss (at timestamp %s)",
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refresh_expires_in,
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refresh_expires_at,
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)
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# Extract granted scopes
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@@ -442,10 +496,13 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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# Store refresh token (for background jobs ONLY)
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if refresh_token:
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logger.info(f"Storing refresh token for user_id: {user_id}")
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logger.info(f" State parameter (provisioning_client_id): {state[:16]}...")
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logger.info(f" Granted scopes: {granted_scopes}")
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logger.info(f" Expires at: {refresh_expires_at}")
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logger.debug(
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"Storing refresh token for user_id=%s state=%s... scopes=%s expires_at=%s",
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user_id,
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state[:16],
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granted_scopes,
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refresh_expires_at,
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)
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await storage.store_refresh_token(
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user_id=user_id,
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refresh_token=refresh_token,
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@@ -454,9 +511,10 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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provisioning_client_id=state, # Store state for unified session lookup
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scopes=granted_scopes,
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)
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logger.info(f"✓ Refresh token stored successfully for user_id: {user_id}")
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logger.info(
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f" Token can now be found via provisioning_client_id={state[:16]}..."
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"Refresh token stored for user %s (lookup key: %s...)",
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user_id,
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state[:16],
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)
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else:
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logger.warning("No refresh token in token response - cannot store session")
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@@ -478,13 +536,13 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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if profile_data:
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# Cache profile for browser UI (no token needed to display)
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await storage.store_user_profile(user_id, profile_data)
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logger.info(f"✓ User profile cached for {user_id}")
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logger.debug("User profile cached for %s", user_id)
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else:
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logger.warning(f"Failed to query userinfo endpoint for {user_id}")
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logger.warning("Failed to query userinfo endpoint for %s", user_id)
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else:
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logger.warning("Could not determine userinfo endpoint")
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Error caching user profile: {e}")
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logger.error("Error caching user profile: %s", e)
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# Continue anyway - profile cache is optional for browser UI
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# Create a server-side browser session: a random opaque session_id is
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@@ -510,7 +568,7 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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return response
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async def oauth_logout(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse:
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async def oauth_logout(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
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"""Browser OAuth logout — invalidate session and revoke refresh token.
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Issue #626 finding 4: prior implementation only cleared the cookie,
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@@ -523,13 +581,30 @@ async def oauth_logout(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse:
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if it leaks.
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5. Clears the cookie on the response.
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Method is POST-only at the route layer to defeat passive CSRF (PR #758
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finding 5). Origin / Referer headers are also validated against the
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configured ``mcp_server_url`` when present, blocking same-method-but-
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cross-origin form submissions.
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Query parameters:
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next: Optional URL to redirect to after logout (default: /oauth/login)
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"""
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next_url = request.query_params.get("next", "/oauth/login")
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next_url = _safe_next_url(request.query_params.get("next"), "/oauth/login")
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session_id = request.cookies.get("mcp_session")
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oauth_ctx = getattr(request.app.state, "oauth_context", None)
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# CSRF check: when Origin or Referer is present, host must match the
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# MCP server's own host. Per OWASP CSRF cheat sheet, we allow the
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# request through when neither header is present (some user agents
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# strip both for privacy on same-origin POST).
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if oauth_ctx and not _origin_matches_self(request, oauth_ctx):
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logger.warning(
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"Logout blocked: cross-origin request from %s",
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request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer"),
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)
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return JSONResponse({"error": "forbidden"}, status_code=403)
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storage = oauth_ctx.get("storage") if oauth_ctx else None
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if session_id and storage and oauth_ctx:
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@@ -563,8 +638,12 @@ async def _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp(oauth_ctx: dict, refresh_token: str) -> N
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of deleting the local copy, and we don't want logout to error if the
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IdP is unreachable or doesn't advertise a revocation endpoint.
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"""
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# Production oauth_context nests config under "config" (see app.py
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# starlette_lifespan). A flat shape is also accepted for tests and
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# historical callers.
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cfg = oauth_ctx.get("config") or oauth_ctx
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try:
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discovery_url = oauth_ctx.get("discovery_url") or os.getenv(
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discovery_url = cfg.get("discovery_url") or os.getenv(
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"OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL",
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f"{os.getenv('NEXTCLOUD_HOST', '')}/.well-known/openid-configuration",
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)
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@@ -580,10 +659,8 @@ async def _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp(oauth_ctx: dict, refresh_token: str) -> N
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logger.debug("IdP advertises no revocation_endpoint; skipping")
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return
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client_id = oauth_ctx.get("client_id") or os.getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_ID")
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client_secret = oauth_ctx.get("client_secret") or os.getenv(
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"OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"
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)
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client_id = cfg.get("client_id") or os.getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_ID")
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client_secret = cfg.get("client_secret") or os.getenv("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET")
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if not (client_id and client_secret):
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logger.debug("No OIDC client credentials available for revocation")
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return
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@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import os
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import socket
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import time
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any, Optional
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from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import aiosqlite
|
||||
import anyio
|
||||
@@ -205,11 +205,11 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
self,
|
||||
user_id: str,
|
||||
refresh_token: str,
|
||||
expires_at: Optional[int] = None,
|
||||
expires_at: int | None = None,
|
||||
flow_type: str = "hybrid",
|
||||
token_audience: str = "nextcloud",
|
||||
provisioning_client_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
scopes: Optional[list[str]] = None,
|
||||
provisioning_client_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
scopes: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Store encrypted refresh token for user.
|
||||
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Cached user profile for {user_id}")
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_user_profile(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
async def get_user_profile(self, user_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve cached user profile data.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
return profile_data
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_refresh_token(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
|
||||
async def get_refresh_token(self, user_id: str) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve and decrypt refresh token for user.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_refresh_token_by_provisioning_client_id(
|
||||
self, provisioning_client_id: str
|
||||
) -> Optional[dict]:
|
||||
) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve and decrypt refresh token by provisioning_client_id (state parameter).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -617,8 +617,8 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
client_id_issued_at: int,
|
||||
client_secret_expires_at: int,
|
||||
redirect_uris: list[str],
|
||||
registration_access_token: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
registration_client_uri: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
registration_access_token: str | None = None,
|
||||
registration_client_uri: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Store encrypted OAuth client credentials.
|
||||
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
auth_method="oauth",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_oauth_client(self) -> Optional[dict]:
|
||||
async def get_oauth_client(self) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve and decrypt OAuth client credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -827,9 +827,9 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
self,
|
||||
event: str,
|
||||
user_id: str,
|
||||
resource_type: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
resource_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
auth_method: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
resource_type: str | None = None,
|
||||
resource_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
auth_method: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Log operation to audit log.
|
||||
@@ -866,8 +866,8 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_audit_logs(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
user_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
since: Optional[int] = None,
|
||||
user_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
since: int | None = None,
|
||||
limit: int = 100,
|
||||
) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
@@ -909,14 +909,14 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
self,
|
||||
session_id: str,
|
||||
client_redirect_uri: str,
|
||||
state: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
code_challenge: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
code_challenge_method: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
mcp_authorization_code: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
client_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
state: str | None = None,
|
||||
code_challenge: str | None = None,
|
||||
code_challenge_method: str | None = None,
|
||||
mcp_authorization_code: str | None = None,
|
||||
client_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
flow_type: str = "hybrid",
|
||||
is_provisioning: bool = False,
|
||||
requested_scopes: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
requested_scopes: str | None = None,
|
||||
ttl_seconds: int = 600, # 10 minutes
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
logger.debug(f"Stored OAuth session {session_id} (expires in {ttl_seconds}s)")
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_oauth_session(self, session_id: str) -> Optional[dict]:
|
||||
async def get_oauth_session(self, session_id: str) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve OAuth session by session ID.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1001,7 +1001,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_oauth_session_by_mcp_code(
|
||||
self, mcp_authorization_code: str
|
||||
) -> Optional[dict]:
|
||||
) -> dict | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve OAuth session by MCP authorization code.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1037,9 +1037,9 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
async def update_oauth_session(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
session_id: str,
|
||||
user_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
idp_access_token: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
idp_refresh_token: Optional[str] = None,
|
||||
user_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
idp_access_token: str | None = None,
|
||||
idp_refresh_token: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Update OAuth session with IdP token data.
|
||||
@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
ttl_seconds,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_browser_session_user(self, session_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
async def get_browser_session_user(self, session_id: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Look up the user_id bound to a browser session_id, or None.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns None when the session is unknown or expired. Expired rows
|
||||
@@ -1217,6 +1217,31 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
logger.debug("Deleted browser session %s", session_id[:8])
|
||||
return deleted
|
||||
|
||||
async def cleanup_expired_browser_sessions(self) -> int:
|
||||
"""Remove expired ``browser_sessions`` rows.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the number of rows deleted. Called by the periodic cleanup
|
||||
task in ``app.py``. Without this users who never explicitly log out
|
||||
leave session rows behind that only get deleted lazily on lookup
|
||||
(PR #758 finding 6).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not self._initialized:
|
||||
await self.initialize()
|
||||
|
||||
now = int(time.time())
|
||||
|
||||
async with aiosqlite.connect(self.db_path) as db:
|
||||
cursor = await db.execute(
|
||||
"DELETE FROM browser_sessions WHERE expires_at < ?", (now,)
|
||||
)
|
||||
await db.commit()
|
||||
deleted = cursor.rowcount
|
||||
|
||||
if deleted > 0:
|
||||
logger.info("Cleaned up %s expired browser session(s)", deleted)
|
||||
|
||||
return deleted
|
||||
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# Webhook Registration Tracking (both BasicAuth and OAuth modes)
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -1396,7 +1421,7 @@ class RefreshTokenStorage:
|
||||
auth_method="app_password",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_app_password(self, user_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
|
||||
async def get_app_password(self, user_id: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Retrieve and decrypt app password for a user.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -285,14 +285,18 @@
|
||||
<ul class="app-navigation__settings">
|
||||
<li class="app-navigation-entry">
|
||||
<div class="app-navigation-entry__wrapper">
|
||||
<a href="{{ logout_url }}" class="app-navigation-entry-link">
|
||||
<span class="app-navigation-entry-icon">
|
||||
<svg class="nav-icon" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
|
||||
<path d="M16,17V14H9V10H16V7L21,12L16,17M14,2A2,2 0 0,1 16,4V6H14V4H5V20H14V18H16V20A2,2 0 0,1 14,22H5A2,2 0 0,1 3,20V4A2,2 0 0,1 5,2H14Z" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
</span>
|
||||
<span class="app-navigation-entry__name">Logout</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
{# Logout is POST-only to defeat CSRF (PR #758 finding 5).
|
||||
Style this <button> like the surrounding link entries. #}
|
||||
<form method="post" action="{{ logout_url }}" class="app-navigation-entry-link" style="display:contents;">
|
||||
<button type="submit" class="app-navigation-entry-link" style="background:none;border:0;padding:0;font:inherit;color:inherit;cursor:pointer;display:flex;align-items:center;width:100%;">
|
||||
<span class="app-navigation-entry-icon">
|
||||
<svg class="nav-icon" viewBox="0 0 24 24">
|
||||
<path d="M16,17V14H9V10H16V7L21,12L16,17M14,2A2,2 0 0,1 16,4V6H14V4H5V20H14V18H16V20A2,2 0 0,1 14,22H5A2,2 0 0,1 3,20V4A2,2 0 0,1 5,2H14Z" />
|
||||
</svg>
|
||||
</span>
|
||||
<span class="app-navigation-entry__name">Logout</span>
|
||||
</button>
|
||||
</form>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</li>
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ between server/ and auth/ layers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import jwt
|
||||
@@ -18,10 +19,37 @@ from ..http import nextcloud_httpx_client
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# OIDC discovery + JWKS caches keyed by URL → (expires_at, data). Mirrors the
|
||||
# pattern in oauth_routes._get_cached_discovery so that ID-token verification
|
||||
# during the OAuth callback doesn't make two extra round-trips per login (PR
|
||||
# #758 finding 4). 5-minute TTL matches oauth_routes.
|
||||
_discovery_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = {}
|
||||
_jwks_cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = {}
|
||||
_OIDC_CACHE_TTL = 300
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class IdTokenVerificationError(Exception):
|
||||
"""Raised when an OIDC ID token fails signature or claim verification."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _get_cached(
|
||||
cache: dict[str, tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]], url: str
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return cached JSON response for *url* or fetch + cache on miss/expiry."""
|
||||
now = time.time()
|
||||
entry = cache.get(url)
|
||||
if entry is not None:
|
||||
expires_at, data = entry
|
||||
if now < expires_at:
|
||||
return data
|
||||
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
|
||||
response = await http_client.get(url)
|
||||
response.raise_for_status()
|
||||
data = response.json()
|
||||
cache[url] = (now + _OIDC_CACHE_TTL, data)
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def verify_id_token(
|
||||
id_token: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -62,21 +90,16 @@ async def verify_id_token(
|
||||
raise IdTokenVerificationError("ID token missing from token response")
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
|
||||
discovery_response = await http_client.get(discovery_url)
|
||||
discovery_response.raise_for_status()
|
||||
discovery = discovery_response.json()
|
||||
discovery = await _get_cached(_discovery_cache, discovery_url)
|
||||
|
||||
issuer = discovery.get("issuer")
|
||||
jwks_uri = discovery.get("jwks_uri")
|
||||
if not issuer or not jwks_uri:
|
||||
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
|
||||
"OIDC discovery response missing issuer or jwks_uri"
|
||||
)
|
||||
issuer = discovery.get("issuer")
|
||||
jwks_uri = discovery.get("jwks_uri")
|
||||
if not issuer or not jwks_uri:
|
||||
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
|
||||
"OIDC discovery response missing issuer or jwks_uri"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
jwks_response = await http_client.get(jwks_uri)
|
||||
jwks_response.raise_for_status()
|
||||
jwks_data = jwks_response.json()
|
||||
jwks_data = await _get_cached(_jwks_cache, jwks_uri)
|
||||
except IdTokenVerificationError:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
@@ -97,10 +120,18 @@ async def verify_id_token(
|
||||
f"No JWKS key matches ID token kid {kid!r}"
|
||||
) from e
|
||||
|
||||
# PyJWT verifies the JWT with the algorithm declared in its header,
|
||||
# cross-checked against this allowlist (so an attacker can't downgrade
|
||||
# to ``none`` or HMAC). The allowlist covers the OIDC algorithms
|
||||
# most cloud IdPs ship by default:
|
||||
# - RS256: Nextcloud user_oidc, Keycloak default, Auth0, Google.
|
||||
# - PS256: Azure AD on newer keys.
|
||||
# - ES256: some Keycloak realms, AWS Cognito user pools.
|
||||
# Symmetric (HSxxx) and ``none`` are intentionally absent.
|
||||
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
|
||||
id_token,
|
||||
signing_key.key,
|
||||
algorithms=["RS256"],
|
||||
algorithms=["RS256", "PS256", "ES256"],
|
||||
audience=expected_audience,
|
||||
issuer=issuer,
|
||||
options={
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user