fix(auth): address PR #758 review — XSS, CSRF, open redirect, JWKS cache
Addresses all 9 findings from the review on PR #758: Blocking: - _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp now reads config from oauth_ctx["config"] (the production-shaped nested dict). Previously read flat keys, causing IdP revocation to silently no-op in production. Test fixtures rebuilt to the realistic nested shape so the bug can't regress unnoticed. - HTML error responses in oauth_login_callback now wrap IdP-controlled error_body, str(e), and the attacker-controlled error/error_description query params in html_escape. New test_browser_oauth_xss.py pins this. Important: - New _safe_next_url helper validates the ?next= query param at write time (oauth_login), in oauth_logout, and on read from the session row in oauth_login_callback. Blocks https://, // (protocol-relative), and CRLF/whitespace injection. - verify_id_token now caches discovery + JWKS (5-min TTL) using the same pattern as oauth_routes._get_cached_discovery. New caching regression test pins to one fetch per URL across multiple calls. - /oauth/logout is now POST-only at the route layer (defeats passive CSRF via <img src>). oauth_logout also validates Origin/Referer against the configured mcp_server_url. Logout UI in user_info.html converted from <a href> to <form method="post">. - New storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions() called from the hourly cleanup loop in app.py — previously these rows accumulated for users who never explicitly logged out. Nits: - Demoted INFO logs that leaked oauth_config.keys() / client_id / token-storage state to DEBUG. Operator-relevant outcome lines (login successful, refresh token stored, logged out) stay INFO. - verify_id_token algorithms widened to RS256, PS256, ES256 — covers Azure AD (PS256) and Cognito/some Keycloak realms (ES256). Symmetric and "none" remain off the allowlist. - Migrated all Optional[X] usages in auth/storage.py to X | None per CLAUDE.md. Breaking change: GET /oauth/logout now returns 405. The in-tree logout UI was migrated to a POST form; any external bookmark or curl-based caller that relied on GET will need to switch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Opus 4.7
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931ee602eb
@@ -73,3 +73,27 @@ async def test_replace_existing_session_id(storage):
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await storage.create_browser_session(session_id=sid, user_id="bob")
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assert await storage.get_browser_session_user(sid) == "bob"
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async def test_cleanup_expired_browser_sessions(storage):
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"""Periodic cleanup removes expired rows but leaves fresh ones (PR #758 finding 6)."""
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fresh_sid = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
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expired_sid = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
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await storage.create_browser_session(
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session_id=fresh_sid, user_id="alice", ttl_seconds=3600
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)
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# ttl_seconds=-2 → expires_at strictly in the past (cleanup uses < now,
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# so it must be actually less, not equal).
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await storage.create_browser_session(
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session_id=expired_sid, user_id="bob", ttl_seconds=-2
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)
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deleted = await storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions()
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assert deleted == 1
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# Fresh row survives, expired row is gone
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assert await storage.get_browser_session_user(fresh_sid) == "alice"
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assert await storage.get_browser_session_user(expired_sid) is None
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# Calling again should be a no-op
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assert await storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions() == 0
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