fix(auth): address PR #758 round-4 review
Seven findings from the latest review on #758 (3 medium, 4 low/nit): Medium: - storage.py: replace 5 ``assert self.cipher is not None`` sites with explicit ``RuntimeError`` so missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY can't silently become an AttributeError under ``python -O`` - session_backend.py: document the silent-invalidation invariant — refresh-token TTL expiry without explicit logout deliberately makes the browser session unusable; future readers must not relax it - server/oauth_tools.py: drop user_id from the Flow 2 session_id identifier — use ``flow2_{secrets.token_hex(16)}`` so audit logs and DB rows don't carry user_id in the session_id field Low / nit: - token_utils.py: drop _fetch_locks dict entry in finally so a probed deployment can't grow the lock dict without bound; coalescing test now pins the invariant with len(_fetch_locks) == 0 - browser_oauth_routes.py: strip trailing slash from settings.nextcloud_host before constructing the well-known URL so a host configured as ``https://cloud.example.com/`` doesn't produce a double-slash - browser_oauth_routes.py: add comment explaining the three-layer CSRF policy on the mcp_session cookie set (SameSite=Lax + POST-only logout + Origin/Referer check) - oauth_routes.py: convert all 23 f-string log calls to lazy %-style per the CLAUDE.md / memory feedback_lazy_logging convention Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Claude Opus 4.7
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@@ -614,6 +614,12 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
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)
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response = RedirectResponse(next_url, status_code=302)
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# CSRF protection is layered: ``SameSite=Lax`` blocks cross-site POSTs
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# in modern browsers; ``oauth_logout`` is POST-only with an Origin /
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# Referer check (``_origin_matches_self``) to cover older browsers and
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# non-browser clients. ``HttpOnly`` blocks JS exfiltration on XSS;
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# ``Secure`` is gated to non-HTTP hosts in dev (PR #758 round-4 review
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# nit 6).
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response.set_cookie(
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key="mcp_session",
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value=session_id,
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@@ -705,8 +711,12 @@ async def _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp(oauth_ctx: dict, refresh_token: str) -> N
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try:
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discovery_url = cfg.get("discovery_url") or settings.oidc_discovery_url
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if not discovery_url and settings.nextcloud_host:
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# Strip trailing slash so a host configured as
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# ``https://cloud.example.com/`` doesn't produce a double-slash
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# in the well-known URL (PR #758 round-4 review nit 5).
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discovery_url = (
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f"{settings.nextcloud_host}/.well-known/openid-configuration"
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f"{settings.nextcloud_host.rstrip('/')}"
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"/.well-known/openid-configuration"
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)
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if not discovery_url:
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return
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