fix(infra): address PR review feedback on tf modules
Deployer role: - Add servicediscovery actions; module always creates Cloud Map namespace and service so the policy must grant CreatePrivateDnsNamespace etc. - Make Route53 + ACM permissions unconditional. The server module always issues an ACM cert and writes Route53 records (no CloudFront default-cert path exists), so gating these on route53_zone_ids was broken. Split Route53 into hosted-zone management (always) plus record-set mutation (scoped to caller-supplied zones, falls back to *). - Remove unused cloudfront:* statement; no CloudFront resources in module. - Replace acm:* wildcard with explicit cert-management action set. Server module: - qdrant_image_tag is now nullable with default null and validated against use_external_qdrant, so external-qdrant callers can omit it instead of passing a sentinel "unused" value. - task_role_arn and efs_id outputs marked sensitive; qdrant_dns_name returns null when use_external_qdrant = true. - ALB SG now has matching IPv6 egress rule (was v4-only). - nextcloud_url validates the https:// scheme. - random_pet.subdomain keeper includes zone_name so a zone migration that preserves zone_id still triggers regeneration. - Pin required_version >= 1.9 on both modules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Coutinho
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.7
Claude Opus 4.7
parent
ccf4b91bf9
commit
e4c552cd19
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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terraform {
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required_version = ">= 1.9"
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required_providers {
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aws = {
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source = "hashicorp/aws"
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@@ -71,13 +72,29 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "deployer" {
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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# --- Edge: CloudFront ---
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# --- Service Discovery / Cloud Map ---
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#
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# CloudFront has no resource-ARN scoping for distribution create. Cache /
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# origin-request policies the module ships are also account-wide objects.
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# Module always creates `aws_service_discovery_private_dns_namespace` (in
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# service_discovery.tf) and `aws_service_discovery_service` (in qdrant.tf).
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# Cloud Map APIs don't accept resource-ARN scoping at create time; the
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# blast radius is bounded by the SG/account boundary already.
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statement {
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sid = "CloudFrontService"
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actions = ["cloudfront:*"]
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sid = "ServiceDiscoveryService"
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actions = [
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"servicediscovery:CreatePrivateDnsNamespace",
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"servicediscovery:DeleteNamespace",
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"servicediscovery:GetNamespace",
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"servicediscovery:ListNamespaces",
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"servicediscovery:GetOperation",
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"servicediscovery:CreateService",
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"servicediscovery:DeleteService",
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"servicediscovery:GetService",
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"servicediscovery:UpdateService",
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"servicediscovery:ListServices",
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"servicediscovery:TagResource",
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"servicediscovery:UntagResource",
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"servicediscovery:ListTagsForResource",
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]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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@@ -246,44 +263,74 @@ data "aws_iam_policy_document" "deployer" {
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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# --- Route53 + ACM (custom-domain mode only) ---
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# --- Route53 ---
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#
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# Default mode (CloudFront with `*.cloudfront.net` cert) needs neither.
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# Opt in by passing `route53_zone_ids` for the zones the deployer is
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# allowed to mutate.
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dynamic "statement" {
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for_each = length(var.route53_zone_ids) > 0 ? [1] : []
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content {
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sid = "Route53RecordsForZones"
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actions = [
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"route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets",
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"route53:ListResourceRecordSets",
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"route53:GetHostedZone",
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]
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resources = [
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for zone_id in var.route53_zone_ids :
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"arn:${local.partition}:route53:::hostedzone/${zone_id}"
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]
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}
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# The server module always creates ACM cert + Route53 records (alias to ALB
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# and DNS-01 validation), so these statements are unconditional. Cloud Map's
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# CreatePrivateDnsNamespace also creates a Route53 private hosted zone
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# under the caller's identity, which needs the hosted-zone management
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# actions below.
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# Hosted-zone CRUD (private zones for Cloud Map, public-zone reads for the
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# caller-supplied zone). ChangeResourceRecordSets is the destructive action
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# and is split into a separate statement scoped to caller-supplied zones.
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statement {
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sid = "Route53HostedZoneManage"
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actions = [
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"route53:CreateHostedZone",
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"route53:GetHostedZone",
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"route53:DeleteHostedZone",
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"route53:ListHostedZones",
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"route53:ListHostedZonesByVPC",
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"route53:AssociateVPCWithHostedZone",
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"route53:DisassociateVPCFromHostedZone",
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"route53:ChangeTagsForResource",
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"route53:ListTagsForResource",
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"route53:ListResourceRecordSets",
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]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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# ChangeResourceRecordSets is scoped to caller-supplied public zones when
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# `route53_zone_ids` is set. Falls back to `*` only as a convenience for
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# callers who haven't enumerated their zones — strongly recommend setting
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# the variable.
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statement {
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sid = "Route53RecordsForZones"
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actions = ["route53:ChangeResourceRecordSets"]
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resources = (
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length(var.route53_zone_ids) > 0
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? [for zone_id in var.route53_zone_ids : "arn:${local.partition}:route53:::hostedzone/${zone_id}"]
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: ["*"]
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)
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}
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# GetChange takes a change-id, not a zone ARN — must be `*`.
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dynamic "statement" {
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for_each = length(var.route53_zone_ids) > 0 ? [1] : []
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content {
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sid = "Route53GetChange"
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actions = ["route53:GetChange"]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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statement {
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sid = "Route53GetChange"
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actions = ["route53:GetChange"]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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dynamic "statement" {
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for_each = length(var.route53_zone_ids) > 0 ? [1] : []
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content {
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sid = "AcmService"
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actions = ["acm:*"]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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# --- ACM ---
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#
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# The server module always issues an ACM cert. ACM cert ARNs are only
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# known after RequestCertificate, so the destructive actions can't be
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# scoped further at policy-write time. Restrict the action set instead of
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# granting `acm:*`.
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statement {
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sid = "AcmManageCertificates"
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actions = [
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"acm:RequestCertificate",
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"acm:DescribeCertificate",
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"acm:DeleteCertificate",
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"acm:ListCertificates",
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"acm:ListTagsForCertificate",
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"acm:AddTagsToCertificate",
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"acm:RemoveTagsFromCertificate",
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"acm:UpdateCertificateOptions",
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]
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resources = ["*"]
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}
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# --- KMS describe (AWS-managed keys for default EFS / Secrets encryption) ---
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