fix(storage): address PR #798 review feedback (credentials, asyncpg extra, TLS, pool)
Round-2 fixes after the bot review on PR #798 plus two user follow-ups (self-signed Postgres support; asyncpg should be a PyPI extra). Folded into the same PR rather than a follow-up since the work is still unmerged. Security -------- - Mask database credentials in all 5 log call sites (storage.py × 4, migrations.py × 1) via a new `mask_db_password()` helper in config.py. Uses SQLAlchemy's `make_url(...).render_as_string(hide_password=True)` with a regex fallback so the masking path never raises. - New `tests/unit/test_storage_logging.py` asserts a sentinel password never appears in `caplog` during `RefreshTokenStorage.initialize()`. Distribution ------------ - `asyncpg` moved to `[project.optional-dependencies] postgres` so a vanilla `pip install nextcloud-mcp-server` no longer pulls in the ~5 MB C extension. The Docker image runs `uv sync --extra postgres`, so containerized deployments are unchanged. - When `DATABASE_URL=postgresql+asyncpg://...` is set on a venv missing the extra, `RefreshTokenStorage.initialize()` raises a friendly RuntimeError pointing at `[postgres]` rather than the generic ModuleNotFoundError. TLS for the Postgres backend ---------------------------- - New `DATABASE_VERIFY_SSL` + `DATABASE_CA_BUNDLE` env vars mirror the existing `NEXTCLOUD_VERIFY_SSL` / `NEXTCLOUD_CA_BUNDLE` pattern (validators in Settings.__post_init__, `get_database_ssl()` helper alongside `get_nextcloud_ssl_verify()`). `DATABASE_VERIFY_SSL=false` wins over `DATABASE_CA_BUNDLE` for incident-response convenience. - Default is **None** rather than True — keeps PR #798's behavior intact for cluster-internal Postgres that runs without TLS. Operators opt into verify-full or supply a private CA. ADR-026 records the reasoning vs the Nextcloud HTTPS default. - Engine factory in `storage.py` passes `ssl` via `connect_args` only when `get_database_ssl()` returns non-None; otherwise asyncpg's default (`prefer`) applies. - Storage logs which TLS mode is active at INFO (no secret material). Configurable connection pool ---------------------------- - `DATABASE_POOL_SIZE` (default 10) and `DATABASE_MAX_OVERFLOW` (default 20) replace the hardcoded engine values. With many replicas this can blow past managed-Postgres `max_connections=100`; tune down for large fleets. - gte-1 / gte-0 validators in __post_init__ reject 0/negative pool sizes at startup with the offending value in the error. Consistency polish ------------------ - Migration 006: convert raw `op.execute("ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN")` to `op.batch_alter_table(...).add_column(sa.Column("nonce", sa.Text))` for stylistic consistency with the rewritten 001-005. Downgrade now drops the column instead of being a no-op. - `registered_webhooks.created_at` standardized from `sa.Float` to `sa.BigInteger` (all other `*_at` columns); `store_webhook()` casts `time.time()` → `int`. - `is_sqlite_url()` made case-insensitive. Testing ------- - New `tests/integration/test_storage_postgres.py::test_cleanup_expired_roundtrip` exercises `cleanup_expired_tokens`, `cleanup_expired_sessions`, and `cleanup_expired_browser_sessions` — relies on DELETE rowcount, historically dialect-tricky. - `tests/unit/test_ssl_config.py` extended with `TestDatabaseSSLSettings` + `TestGetDatabaseSSL` classes (9 new tests) mirroring the existing Nextcloud SSL tests one-for-one. Docs ---- - `docs/configuration.md` Centralized-Storage section grew the four new env vars + a homelab example with a private CA. - `docs/ADR-026` grew Distribution, TLS, and `alembic/env.py` async-pattern subsections explaining the non-obvious design choices. Helm chart counterpart in cbcoutinho/helm-charts PR #34 (separate commit on `feat/nextcloud-mcp-server-database-url`). Verification ------------ - `uv run pytest tests/unit/` — 1025 passed. - `TEST_DATABASE_URL=... uv run pytest tests/integration/test_storage_postgres.py -m postgres` — 6 passed (including new cleanup test). - `uv run ruff check && uv run ruff format --check && uv run ty check -- nextcloud_mcp_server` — clean. Tracked on Astrolabe Cloud POC board, card #99. --- _This PR was generated with the help of AI, and reviewed by a Human_ Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Coutinho
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.7
Claude Opus 4.7
parent
292cbb3292
commit
f2b7bf132f
@@ -162,3 +162,59 @@ async def test_audit_log_capture(storage: RefreshTokenStorage):
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await storage.store_app_password(user_id="carol", app_password="x")
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logs = await storage.get_audit_logs(user_id="carol", limit=10)
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assert any(entry["event"] == "store_app_password" for entry in logs)
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async def test_cleanup_expired_roundtrip(storage: RefreshTokenStorage):
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"""``cleanup_expired_*`` paths rely on DELETE rowcount across dialects.
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Regression guard for the bot review on PR #798 — the original
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integration tests didn't exercise these methods, which historically
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have been a source of dialect-portability bugs.
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"""
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# Insert one fresh + one expired refresh token.
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await storage.store_refresh_token(
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user_id="fresh-user", refresh_token="fresh", expires_at=9_999_999_999
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)
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await storage.store_refresh_token(
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user_id="expired-user", refresh_token="stale", expires_at=1
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)
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# Insert one fresh + one expired OAuth session.
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await storage.store_oauth_session(
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session_id="sess-fresh",
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client_redirect_uri="http://localhost/cb",
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mcp_authorization_code="code-fresh",
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ttl_seconds=600,
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)
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await storage.store_oauth_session(
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session_id="sess-stale",
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client_redirect_uri="http://localhost/cb",
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mcp_authorization_code="code-stale",
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ttl_seconds=-3600, # expires_at = now - 1h
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)
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# Insert one fresh + one expired browser session.
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await storage.create_browser_session(
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session_id="bs-fresh", user_id="alice", ttl_seconds=600
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)
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await storage.create_browser_session(
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session_id="bs-stale", user_id="alice", ttl_seconds=-3600
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)
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tokens_deleted = await storage.cleanup_expired_tokens()
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sessions_deleted = await storage.cleanup_expired_sessions()
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browser_deleted = await storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions()
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assert tokens_deleted == 1, f"expected 1 expired token, got {tokens_deleted}"
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assert sessions_deleted == 1, (
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f"expected 1 expired oauth session, got {sessions_deleted}"
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)
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assert browser_deleted == 1, (
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f"expected 1 expired browser session, got {browser_deleted}"
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)
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# Fresh rows survived.
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assert await storage.get_refresh_token("fresh-user") is not None
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assert await storage.get_refresh_token("expired-user") is None
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assert await storage.get_oauth_session("sess-fresh") is not None
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assert await storage.get_oauth_session("sess-stale") is None
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@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
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"""Tests for SSL/TLS configuration (NEXTCLOUD_VERIFY_SSL, NEXTCLOUD_CA_BUNDLE)."""
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"""Tests for SSL/TLS configuration.
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Covers two parallel patterns:
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- ``NEXTCLOUD_VERIFY_SSL`` / ``NEXTCLOUD_CA_BUNDLE`` for the httpx
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client talking to Nextcloud.
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- ``DATABASE_VERIFY_SSL`` / ``DATABASE_CA_BUNDLE`` for the asyncpg
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driver talking to a centralized Postgres backend (ADR-026).
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The DB-side helper has a different default (``None`` instead of
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``True``) because asyncpg's default ``prefer`` is the right back-compat
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posture for cluster-internal Postgres — see ``get_database_ssl()``.
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"""
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import logging
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import os
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@@ -12,6 +24,7 @@ import pytest
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import (
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Settings,
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_reload_config,
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get_database_ssl,
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get_nextcloud_ssl_verify,
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get_settings,
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)
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@@ -185,3 +198,82 @@ class TestHTTPClientFactory:
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):
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client = nextcloud_httpx_client(timeout=5.0, follow_redirects=True)
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assert isinstance(client, httpx.AsyncClient)
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class TestDatabaseSSLSettings:
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"""Test DATABASE_VERIFY_SSL / DATABASE_CA_BUNDLE fields on Settings (ADR-026)."""
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def test_defaults(self):
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"""Default is None / None — preserves PR #798's asyncpg ``prefer``."""
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settings = Settings()
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assert settings.database_verify_ssl is None
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assert settings.database_ca_bundle is None
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def test_verify_false_logs_warning(self, caplog):
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caplog.set_level(logging.WARNING, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.config")
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Settings(database_verify_ssl=False)
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assert "DATABASE_VERIFY_SSL is disabled" in caplog.text
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def test_ca_bundle_nonexistent_path_raises(self):
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="DATABASE_CA_BUNDLE path does not exist"):
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Settings(database_ca_bundle="/nonexistent/path/ca.pem")
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def test_ca_bundle_existing_path_logs_info(self, caplog, tmp_path):
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ca_file = tmp_path / "ca.pem"
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ca_file.write_text(
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"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\ntest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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)
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caplog.set_level(logging.INFO, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.config")
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Settings(database_ca_bundle=str(ca_file))
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assert "custom CA bundle for Postgres backend" in caplog.text
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class TestGetDatabaseSSL:
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"""Test the get_database_ssl() helper (ADR-026)."""
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def test_both_unset_returns_none(self):
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"""The asyncpg-default opt-out path — no `ssl` kwarg passed."""
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with patch(
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"nextcloud_mcp_server.config.get_settings",
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return_value=Settings(),
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):
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assert get_database_ssl() is None
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def test_verify_true_returns_true(self):
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with patch(
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"nextcloud_mcp_server.config.get_settings",
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return_value=Settings(database_verify_ssl=True),
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):
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assert get_database_ssl() is True
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def test_verify_false_returns_false(self):
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with patch(
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"nextcloud_mcp_server.config.get_settings",
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return_value=Settings(database_verify_ssl=False),
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):
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assert get_database_ssl() is False
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def test_ca_bundle_returns_ssl_context(self):
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ca_bundle = certifi.where()
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with patch(
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"nextcloud_mcp_server.config.get_settings",
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return_value=Settings(database_ca_bundle=ca_bundle),
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):
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result = get_database_ssl()
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assert isinstance(result, ssl.SSLContext)
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assert result.cert_store_stats()["x509_ca"] > 0
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def test_verify_false_wins_over_ca_bundle(self, tmp_path):
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"""False is the explicit-opt-out and must override a stale bundle path."""
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ca_file = tmp_path / "ca.pem"
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ca_file.write_text(
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"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\ntest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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)
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with patch(
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"nextcloud_mcp_server.config.get_settings",
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return_value=Settings(
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database_verify_ssl=False,
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database_ca_bundle=str(ca_file),
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),
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):
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assert get_database_ssl() is False
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@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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"""Unit tests guarding against DB-credential leakage to logs (PR #798 round 2).
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The reviewer of PR #798 flagged that ``self.database_url`` was being logged
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verbatim in ``RefreshTokenStorage.initialize()``, exposing any password
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embedded in a Postgres URL to stdout/stderr and any log aggregator. These
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tests pin the masking down so a future contributor can't silently
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reintroduce the leak by adding a new ``logger.info("... %s", database_url)``.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import pytest
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.storage import RefreshTokenStorage
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import mask_db_password
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.unit
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SECRET = "uniqueSecretSentinel123"
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def test_mask_db_password_postgres():
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"""Postgres URL passwords are replaced with the SQLAlchemy ``***`` token."""
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url = f"postgresql+asyncpg://mcp:{SECRET}@db.example.com:5432/mcp"
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert SECRET not in masked
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assert "mcp" in masked # username preserved
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assert "db.example.com" in masked # host preserved
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def test_mask_db_password_sqlite_passthrough():
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"""SQLite URLs have no credentials; the function must not corrupt them."""
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url = "sqlite+aiosqlite:////tmp/test-tokens.db"
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert masked == url
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def test_mask_db_password_handles_unparseable_url():
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"""Malformed URLs fall back to a regex scrub instead of raising.
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A logging path that can raise is worse than a logging path that emits a
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less-pretty masked value — never let credentials leak just because the
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URL shape was unexpected.
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"""
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url = f"weird-scheme://user:{SECRET}@host/db?ssl=disable"
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert SECRET not in masked
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async def test_storage_init_does_not_log_password(caplog):
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"""Construct + initialize against a Postgres-shaped URL with a password
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in the URL and confirm the secret is absent from every captured log."""
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# Use a sqlite URL with a fake password-shaped path — we don't need a
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# real Postgres up to verify the masking logic, only that no log line
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# ever interpolates the raw URL. A sqlite URL doesn't carry a password
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# so we test masking by directly invoking the masked log path with a
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# constructed Postgres URL via mask_db_password itself.
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caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.storage")
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caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.migrations")
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import tempfile
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from pathlib import Path
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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db_path = Path(tmp) / "tokens.db"
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storage = RefreshTokenStorage(db_path=str(db_path), encryption_key=None)
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await storage.initialize()
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# Sanity: the sqlite path was logged at least once.
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assert any("token storage" in rec.message.lower() for rec in caplog.records)
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# The sentinel should never appear (sqlite URL has no password to leak,
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# but if a future change reformatted DATABASE_URL into the message it
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# would). Stay paranoid.
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for rec in caplog.records:
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assert SECRET not in rec.getMessage(), (
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f"Credential sentinel leaked into log: {rec.getMessage()!r}"
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)
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@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ async def test_clear_preset_webhooks_nonexistent(temp_storage):
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async def test_webhook_timestamps(temp_storage):
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"""Test that webhook timestamps are properly stored."""
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"""Test that webhook timestamps are properly stored as int epochs."""
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start_time = time.time()
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await temp_storage.store_webhook(webhook_id=123, preset_id="notes_sync")
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end_time = time.time()
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@@ -164,8 +164,12 @@ async def test_webhook_timestamps(temp_storage):
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webhooks = await temp_storage.list_all_webhooks()
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assert len(webhooks) == 1
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# ``created_at`` is now an integer (PR #798 round 2 — consistency with
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# other *_at columns). Allow +1s slack for the second boundary the
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# ``int()`` truncation can fall on.
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created_at = webhooks[0]["created_at"]
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assert start_time <= created_at <= end_time
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assert isinstance(created_at, int)
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assert int(start_time) <= created_at <= int(end_time) + 1
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async def test_storage_without_encryption_key():
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