Seven findings from the latest review on #758 (3 medium, 4 low/nit):
Medium:
- storage.py: replace 5 ``assert self.cipher is not None`` sites with
explicit ``RuntimeError`` so missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY can't silently
become an AttributeError under ``python -O``
- session_backend.py: document the silent-invalidation invariant —
refresh-token TTL expiry without explicit logout deliberately makes
the browser session unusable; future readers must not relax it
- server/oauth_tools.py: drop user_id from the Flow 2 session_id
identifier — use ``flow2_{secrets.token_hex(16)}`` so audit logs and
DB rows don't carry user_id in the session_id field
Low / nit:
- token_utils.py: drop _fetch_locks dict entry in finally so a probed
deployment can't grow the lock dict without bound; coalescing test
now pins the invariant with len(_fetch_locks) == 0
- browser_oauth_routes.py: strip trailing slash from settings.nextcloud_host
before constructing the well-known URL so a host configured as
``https://cloud.example.com/`` doesn't produce a double-slash
- browser_oauth_routes.py: add comment explaining the three-layer CSRF
policy on the mcp_session cookie set (SameSite=Lax + POST-only logout
+ Origin/Referer check)
- oauth_routes.py: convert all 23 f-string log calls to lazy %-style
per the CLAUDE.md / memory feedback_lazy_logging convention
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven findings from the latest review on #758, plus a regression test
catching the substance of the cache-stampede fix:
- verify_id_token: widen id_token annotation to str | None to match
callers passing nc_token_response.get("id_token")
- extract_user_id_from_token: use JSON-RPC reserved error code -32001
instead of -1
- _get_cached: per-URL anyio.Lock dict + meta-lock coalesces concurrent
cache misses into a single IdP fetch (mirrors token_broker.py idiom)
- delete_browser_session: collapse SELECT+DELETE into atomic
DELETE ... RETURNING user_id (SQLite >= 3.35)
- new test_origin_normalise.py: parametrized port/scheme/host equivalence
cases for the CSRF Origin guard
- browser_oauth_routes: correct misleading "PR #758 finding 5" cross-
references (finding 5 was Fernet-key hardening, not CSRF)
- ASProxySession.nonce: make required, drop spurious "legacy session"
default; reword the in-flight `or None` comment to reflect that
ASProxySession is purely in-memory
- new test_get_cached_coalesces_concurrent_misses: pins the
cache-stampede protection — fires 10 concurrent _get_cached calls and
asserts exactly one HTTP fetch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Six findings from the latest claude-bot review on PR #758:
- JWKS cache had no kid-miss refresh path (Medium): on IdP key
rotation every login failed for up to _OIDC_CACHE_TTL. Evict
and refetch once before raising, per OIDC core §10.1.1.
- _should_use_secure_cookies fell back to nextcloud_host scheme,
but the cookie is issued by the MCP server. Switch to
settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url so split-scheme deployments
get the right Secure flag.
- _origin_matches_self compared raw netloc strings, which include
the port. Browsers omit default ports per RFC 6454 §6.2; an
mcp_server_url like :443 falsely 403'd every legitimate logout.
Normalise (scheme, host, port) tuples with default ports stripped.
- delete_oauth_session exists in storage.py — drop the stale
"we don't have this method" comment and call it eagerly so
replays can't be processed and the table doesn't accumulate
completed-but-not-yet-expired browser-login rows.
- extract_user_id_from_token's unused ctx param renamed to _ctx
to signal "intentionally unused" at the signature level.
- provisioning_decorator instantiated RefreshTokenStorage per
call. Switch to get_shared_storage() for the lock-protected
process-wide singleton.
Plus pre-push self-review catch: lazy-logging on the unchanged
except arm in session_backend.py.
Adds 5 regression tests:
- JWKS rotation: success on refetch
- JWKS rotation: still-missing-kid surfaces original error
- JWKS rotation: network error during refresh wrapped as
IdTokenVerificationError
- default-port CSRF: explicit :443 in config + portless Origin
- default-port CSRF: portless config + explicit :443 in Origin
- scheme-mismatch CSRF: same host, different scheme rejected
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses all 9 findings from the review on PR #758:
Blocking:
- _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp now reads config from oauth_ctx["config"]
(the production-shaped nested dict). Previously read flat keys, causing
IdP revocation to silently no-op in production. Test fixtures rebuilt
to the realistic nested shape so the bug can't regress unnoticed.
- HTML error responses in oauth_login_callback now wrap IdP-controlled
error_body, str(e), and the attacker-controlled error/error_description
query params in html_escape. New test_browser_oauth_xss.py pins this.
Important:
- New _safe_next_url helper validates the ?next= query param at write
time (oauth_login), in oauth_logout, and on read from the session row
in oauth_login_callback. Blocks https://, // (protocol-relative), and
CRLF/whitespace injection.
- verify_id_token now caches discovery + JWKS (5-min TTL) using the
same pattern as oauth_routes._get_cached_discovery. New caching
regression test pins to one fetch per URL across multiple calls.
- /oauth/logout is now POST-only at the route layer (defeats passive
CSRF via <img src>). oauth_logout also validates Origin/Referer
against the configured mcp_server_url. Logout UI in user_info.html
converted from <a href> to <form method="post">.
- New storage.cleanup_expired_browser_sessions() called from the hourly
cleanup loop in app.py — previously these rows accumulated for users
who never explicitly logged out.
Nits:
- Demoted INFO logs that leaked oauth_config.keys() / client_id /
token-storage state to DEBUG. Operator-relevant outcome lines
(login successful, refresh token stored, logged out) stay INFO.
- verify_id_token algorithms widened to RS256, PS256, ES256 — covers
Azure AD (PS256) and Cognito/some Keycloak realms (ES256). Symmetric
and "none" remain off the allowlist.
- Migrated all Optional[X] usages in auth/storage.py to X | None per
CLAUDE.md.
Breaking change: GET /oauth/logout now returns 405. The in-tree logout
UI was migrated to a POST form; any external bookmark or curl-based
caller that relied on GET will need to switch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-launch hardening for the hosted Astrolabe Cloud offering. Addresses
all five findings raised in #626 (Tim Kaufmann, code review of v0.65.0).
Re-verified against master before fixing.
Finding 3 (LLM-controllable user_id) — drop user_id from the public
signatures of provision_nextcloud_access, revoke_nextcloud_access,
check_provisioning_status, check_logged_in. Tool wrappers now always
derive identity from the verified AccessToken; user_id is no longer
accepted as MCP input. Adds parameterized CI-guard test that locks the
schema.
Finding 2 (predictable session cookie) — replace mcp_session=<user_id>
cookie with a cryptographically random session_id mapped server-side
(new browser_sessions table, alembic 005). Cookie value is opaque,
expires, revocable. SessionAuthBackend looks up user_id via the new
mapping and additionally requires a refresh token to fail closed.
Finding 4 (logout doesn't revoke refresh token) — oauth_logout now
calls the IdP revocation_endpoint (RFC 7009) when advertised, deletes
the stored refresh token regardless, and clears the browser_sessions
row. Cleanup is best-effort: logout always 302s.
Finding 1 (unverified ID token decodes) — verify_id_token helper does
JWKS signature + issuer + audience + exp + nonce checks per OIDC core
3.1.3.7. Used by both OAuth callback handlers (browser + MCP). Removes
the four "verify_signature: False" decodes that previously trusted IdP
claims unconditionally. Drops dead-code _validate_token_audience in
token_broker. Refactors token_utils + provisioning_decorator to read
user_id from the verified AccessToken instead of re-decoding the JWT.
Finding 5 (hardcoded Fernet keys in docker-compose.yml) — replace the
three inline TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY values with required env var
interpolation; document in env.sample.
Test coverage: 4 new unit test modules (signature pinning, browser
sessions, ID-token verification, logout + revoke + session backend).
693 unit tests pass; ruff/format/ty clean.
Migration note: existing browser admin-UI sessions become invalid on
rollout (cookies are looked up against the new browser_sessions table,
which starts empty). Users re-login. MCP API access is unaffected.
Tracked on Astrolabe Cloud POC board card #37.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
