Three findings from the latest review on #758 (1 medium, 2 low):
Medium:
- browser_oauth_routes.oauth_logout: move delete_browser_session into a
finally block so an error from delete_refresh_token can no longer leave
an orphan browser_sessions row. The orphan was not exploitable
(SessionAuthBackend rejects sessions without a live refresh token), but
it lingered until the hourly cleanup cron — a correctness gap. New
regression test pins the fix.
Low:
- oauth_callback_nextcloud: drop redundant ``or None`` from
``expected_nonce=nonce``. ``nonce`` is already ``str | None`` and
``secrets.token_urlsafe`` never produces an empty string, so the
coercion was a no-op that could mislead future readers into thinking
empty-string was a valid skip-the-check path.
- storage.RefreshTokenStorage.initialize: fail fast at startup when
SQLite < 3.35, since ``DELETE ... RETURNING`` (used in
``delete_browser_session``) needs that minimum. Ubuntu 20.04 ships
3.31 and would otherwise hit OperationalError on every logout.
Prerequisite also documented in docs/installation.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven findings from the latest review on #758 (3 medium, 4 low/nit):
Medium:
- storage.py: replace 5 ``assert self.cipher is not None`` sites with
explicit ``RuntimeError`` so missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY can't silently
become an AttributeError under ``python -O``
- session_backend.py: document the silent-invalidation invariant —
refresh-token TTL expiry without explicit logout deliberately makes
the browser session unusable; future readers must not relax it
- server/oauth_tools.py: drop user_id from the Flow 2 session_id
identifier — use ``flow2_{secrets.token_hex(16)}`` so audit logs and
DB rows don't carry user_id in the session_id field
Low / nit:
- token_utils.py: drop _fetch_locks dict entry in finally so a probed
deployment can't grow the lock dict without bound; coalescing test
now pins the invariant with len(_fetch_locks) == 0
- browser_oauth_routes.py: strip trailing slash from settings.nextcloud_host
before constructing the well-known URL so a host configured as
``https://cloud.example.com/`` doesn't produce a double-slash
- browser_oauth_routes.py: add comment explaining the three-layer CSRF
policy on the mcp_session cookie set (SameSite=Lax + POST-only logout
+ Origin/Referer check)
- oauth_routes.py: convert all 23 f-string log calls to lazy %-style
per the CLAUDE.md / memory feedback_lazy_logging convention
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seven findings from the latest review on #758, plus a regression test
catching the substance of the cache-stampede fix:
- verify_id_token: widen id_token annotation to str | None to match
callers passing nc_token_response.get("id_token")
- extract_user_id_from_token: use JSON-RPC reserved error code -32001
instead of -1
- _get_cached: per-URL anyio.Lock dict + meta-lock coalesces concurrent
cache misses into a single IdP fetch (mirrors token_broker.py idiom)
- delete_browser_session: collapse SELECT+DELETE into atomic
DELETE ... RETURNING user_id (SQLite >= 3.35)
- new test_origin_normalise.py: parametrized port/scheme/host equivalence
cases for the CSRF Origin guard
- browser_oauth_routes: correct misleading "PR #758 finding 5" cross-
references (finding 5 was Fernet-key hardening, not CSRF)
- ASProxySession.nonce: make required, drop spurious "legacy session"
default; reword the in-flight `or None` comment to reflect that
ASProxySession is purely in-memory
- new test_get_cached_coalesces_concurrent_misses: pins the
cache-stampede protection — fires 10 concurrent _get_cached calls and
asserts exactly one HTTP fetch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Flow 2 (oauth_authorize_nextcloud) now generates a nonce, stores it on
the oauth_session row, forwards it to the IdP, and verifies it via
expected_nonce in oauth_callback_nextcloud — closes the last replay-
protection gap (round-3 finding 1).
- _origin_matches_self fails closed when mcp_server_url is missing
instead of allowing the logout, and the diagnostic log is promoted
from warning to error so the misconfiguration is monitorable
(round-3 finding 2). New regression test pins the new behaviour.
- The five user_id-accepting helpers in oauth_tools.py (get_provisioning_status,
provision_nextcloud_access, revoke_nextcloud_access, check_provisioning_status,
check_logged_in) are renamed with leading underscores to make the
trust boundary structural rather than documentary
(round-3 finding 3).
- create_browser_session and delete_browser_session now emit audit_log
rows so session establishment / teardown match the pattern used by
the rest of the security-relevant storage operations
(round-3 nit 5). delete_browser_session selects user_id before delete
so the audit row is attributable.
- oauth_login_callback no longer reflects raw IdP-error text or
exception strings into the HTML failure page; users see a generic
"internal error occurred" message + a correlation ID, with the
detail logged server-side keyed by the same ID (round-3 nit 6).
The XSS regression test is updated to pin the stricter contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- oauth_login_callback's integrated-mode token-exchange branch now reuses
the shared discovery cache via get_oidc_discovery (round-2 finding 1).
- AS proxy flow now generates an OIDC nonce in oauth_authorize, stores it
on ASProxySession, forwards it to the IdP, and passes it as
expected_nonce to verify_id_token in _oauth_callback_as_proxy
(round-2 finding 2).
- Consolidate the two parallel discovery caches: oauth_routes' local
_discovery_cache and _get_cached_discovery are removed; all callers
now go through token_utils.get_oidc_discovery, which acquires the
follow_redirects=True knob it needs for Nextcloud installs without
pretty URLs (round-2 finding 3).
- Demote per-user INFO logs in oauth_tools.py (check_logged_in,
get_provisioning_status) to DEBUG; the elicitation auth URL is no
longer logged because it contains a sensitive state token
(round-2 finding 4).
Also pin nonce binding behaviour with a new unit test that asserts
_oauth_callback_as_proxy forwards session.nonce to verify_id_token, and
update test mocks to track the cache consolidation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blocking:
- AS proxy callback now calls verify_id_token before caching the proxy
code so a tampered IdP response can't smuggle identity claims.
Important:
- Browser OAuth flow generates and verifies an OIDC nonce; new alembic
migration 006 adds the nonce column to oauth_sessions.
- _origin_matches_self logs a warning when CSRF check is bypassed.
- oauth_tools.py uses get_shared_storage instead of fresh handles.
Nits:
- New token_utils.get_oidc_discovery shares the 5-minute cache with
verify_id_token; oauth_login (integrated) and _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp
now use it instead of issuing fresh discovery fetches.
- Drop typing.Optional from oauth_tools.py in favour of X | None.
CI:
- test.yml generates an ephemeral Fernet TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY per run
with openssl, removing the dependency on a missing repo secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the two remaining 🟡 findings from the PR #758 follow-up review:
1. extract_user_id_from_token previously fell back to "default_user" when
the verified access token had no sub claim. In a multi-tenant deployment
a malformed IdP token could have bucketed every request under a single
sentinel user, risking cross-tenant data exposure. The function now
raises McpError on that branch; the BasicAuth no-token sentinel path is
preserved.
2. oauth_callback_nextcloud (Flow 2) read the PKCE code_verifier from
oauth_sessions but never deleted the row, leaving the verifier valid for
the full 10-minute TTL. The row is now deleted eagerly inside the same
branch, mirroring oauth_login_callback in browser_oauth_routes.
Also wires TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY through the docker-compose step in the CI
test workflow so the integration matrix can boot — every job had been
failing fast on the ${TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY:?...} interpolation guard added
in PR #758 finding 5.
Tests pin both fixes (test_token_utils_user_id.py,
test_oauth_callback_session_cleanup.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-launch hardening for the hosted Astrolabe Cloud offering. Addresses
all five findings raised in #626 (Tim Kaufmann, code review of v0.65.0).
Re-verified against master before fixing.
Finding 3 (LLM-controllable user_id) — drop user_id from the public
signatures of provision_nextcloud_access, revoke_nextcloud_access,
check_provisioning_status, check_logged_in. Tool wrappers now always
derive identity from the verified AccessToken; user_id is no longer
accepted as MCP input. Adds parameterized CI-guard test that locks the
schema.
Finding 2 (predictable session cookie) — replace mcp_session=<user_id>
cookie with a cryptographically random session_id mapped server-side
(new browser_sessions table, alembic 005). Cookie value is opaque,
expires, revocable. SessionAuthBackend looks up user_id via the new
mapping and additionally requires a refresh token to fail closed.
Finding 4 (logout doesn't revoke refresh token) — oauth_logout now
calls the IdP revocation_endpoint (RFC 7009) when advertised, deletes
the stored refresh token regardless, and clears the browser_sessions
row. Cleanup is best-effort: logout always 302s.
Finding 1 (unverified ID token decodes) — verify_id_token helper does
JWKS signature + issuer + audience + exp + nonce checks per OIDC core
3.1.3.7. Used by both OAuth callback handlers (browser + MCP). Removes
the four "verify_signature: False" decodes that previously trusted IdP
claims unconditionally. Drops dead-code _validate_token_audience in
token_broker. Refactors token_utils + provisioning_decorator to read
user_id from the verified AccessToken instead of re-decoding the JWT.
Finding 5 (hardcoded Fernet keys in docker-compose.yml) — replace the
three inline TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY values with required env var
interpolation; document in env.sample.
Test coverage: 4 new unit test modules (signature pinning, browser
sessions, ID-token verification, logout + revoke + session backend).
693 unit tests pass; ruff/format/ty clean.
Migration note: existing browser admin-UI sessions become invalid on
rollout (cookies are looked up against the new browser_sessions table,
which starts empty). Users re-login. MCP API access is unaffected.
Tracked on Astrolabe Cloud POC board card #37.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lift NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL out of raw os.getenv reads into
Settings.nextcloud_public_issuer_url across all 8 production call sites
(app.py x2, oauth_routes.py x2, browser_oauth_routes.py,
provision_routes.py, userinfo_routes.py, elicitation.py). cli.py
remains the env-write source so the existing config-by-flag pipeline
still works.
Also addresses remaining PR #757 review nits:
- elicitation.py: align URL-present/absent wording on "open in your
browser" so users don't try clicking in the terminal
- test_scope_authorization_stored.py: lock in the deliberately-shared
fall-through branch with explicit declined/cancelled decorator tests
- test_elicitation.py: switch from monkeypatch.setenv to
patch(get_settings) since Settings is now the canonical surface
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nextcloud installs without pretty URLs return a 301 from
`/.well-known/openid-configuration` to
`/index.php/.well-known/openid-configuration` (e.g. Hetzner StorageShare).
`_get_cached_discovery` did not enable follow_redirects, so httpx raised
HTTPStatusError on the 301 and the AS-proxy authorize handler returned
500, breaking client connections (e.g. claude.ai).
Pass `follow_redirects=True` to the httpx client used for the discovery
fetch only — downstream OIDC endpoints (token, userinfo, etc.) are
absolute URLs read from the discovery doc and are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
AWS Cognito provides refresh tokens automatically with the authorization
code flow but does not list offline_access as a supported scope. Check
the IdP's scopes_supported discovery field before including it in
requests, and always accept refresh tokens from responses regardless.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flow 2 hardcoded offline_access in the scope string, but providers
like AWS Cognito don't support this scope (they handle refresh tokens
via client config). This caused invalid_scope errors on the Astrolabe
semantic search enablement flow.
Only include offline_access when enable_offline_access is explicitly
set, matching the behavior of DCR scope registration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use dynaconf (get_settings()) instead of os.getenv for OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ID
- Re-add Settings field, _field_map entry, and settings.toml default
- Add trailing-slash guard (.rstrip("/")) to prevent double-slash in scopes
- Add double-prefixing guard: skip scopes already carrying the prefix
- Add @pytest.mark.unit to test module
- Add test for already-prefixed scopes
- Document OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ID in docs/configuration.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add offline_access to OIDC standard scopes exclusion list to prevent it
from being incorrectly prefixed, which would break Cognito refresh token
flows. Extract scope transformation into testable _transform_scopes_for_idp()
helper, add debug logging for prefixed scopes, remove unused Settings field
(oauth_routes.py consistently uses os.getenv), and add unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When OIDC_RESOURCE_SERVER_ID is set, prefix resource scopes with the
identifier when forwarding to the IdP (e.g., calendar.read becomes
https://example.com/calendar.read). Required for IdPs like AWS Cognito
that mandate {resource_server_id}/{scope} format for custom scopes.
OIDC standard scopes (openid, profile, email) are forwarded as-is.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge ALLOWED_MCP_CLOUD_CLIENTS into a single ALLOWED_MCP_CLIENTS env var
that supports both simple client IDs and pipe-separated client_id|redirect_uri
entries. Enforce HTTPS for non-localhost redirect URIs, warn on malformed
entries, and use wildcard scopes for all static clients (upstream IdP enforces
actual scopes). Add deprecation warning for the old env var.
Also fixes DCR proxy error messages to reference only ALLOWED_MCP_CLIENTS and
use "Upstream" instead of "Nextcloud" for IdP-agnostic language. Enables
Login Flow v2 + DCR on the mcp-keycloak docker-compose service.
Adds 17 unit tests for ClientRegistry parsing/validation and 7 keycloak
integration tests for DCR lifecycle, AS metadata, and client authorization.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude AI (web) sends a Cognito-issued client_id with an HTTPS redirect
URI, but the client registry only supported localhost redirect URIs via
ALLOWED_MCP_CLIENTS. Add ALLOWED_MCP_CLOUD_CLIENTS env var for web-based
clients with format "client_id|redirect_uri".
Also fix the DCR proxy to return a clear error when the upstream IdP
(e.g. Cognito) doesn't support dynamic client registration, instead of
silently falling back to a Nextcloud-specific endpoint that fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Relax redirect_uri validation to accept HTTPS for remote hosts (e.g.,
cloud-hosted MCP clients like Claude AI) while keeping HTTP allowed
for localhost per RFC 8252 loopback exception.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Drop OIDC fork: comment out third_party/oidc mount, use upstream
v1.16.3 from app store (fixes consent redirect race, PR #631)
- Support client_secret_basic auth: add _extract_basic_auth() helper
so TS MCP SDK can authenticate at token endpoint (RFC 6749 §2.3.1)
- Multi-issuer JWT validation: accept tokens with internal Docker
issuer (http://app:80) or public URL (NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL)
since AS proxy obtains tokens server-to-server
- Introspection fallback: try token introspection when JWT verification
fails, supporting both JWT and opaque token types
- Register all tool scopes in DCR: add semantic:read, collectives:read,
collectives:write to OIDC client allowed_scopes so tokens include
them and semantic search tools are visible to authenticated clients
- Auto-create Astrolabe OAuth client: new app-hook creates OIDC client
and stores credentials in config.php so the "Authorize via OAuth"
button works without manual setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace `assert entry.code_challenge` with a proper if-guard returning a
500 JSON error in the token endpoint, since Python's -O flag strips
asserts and would silently disable PKCE enforcement.
Invalidate the scope cache immediately after Login Flow v2 provisioning
completes, so users no longer hit ProvisioningRequiredError for up to
5 minutes after successfully authenticating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Disable Nextcloud's bruteforce protection and rate limiting via a new
post-installation hook, preventing 429 errors during repeated DCR calls
in CI. Add warning-level logging to all 8 error paths in the AS proxy
token endpoint to make login-flow 400 errors diagnosable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add 429 retry with exponential backoff to register_client() (fixes CI
oauth matrix failures from parallel DCR requests)
- Make client_id, redirect_uri, and PKCE mandatory at token endpoint
- Add null-checks for discovery_url and OAuth credentials in proxy flows
- Add OIDC discovery document caching with 5-min TTL
- Add per-IP rate limiting on /oauth/register DCR proxy
- Discover DCR endpoint from OIDC discovery instead of hardcoding
- Extract extract_user_id_from_token to auth/token_utils.py (breaks
circular imports between server/ and auth/ layers)
- Add TTL scope cache in scope_authorization.py (avoids DB hit per tool)
- Add defense-in-depth scope validation in storage layer
- Broaden elicitation exception handling with graceful fallback
- Add idempotentHint to nc_auth_check_status, return "pending" status
after accepted elicitation, add polling interval to description
- Change ALL_SUPPORTED_SCOPES from tuple to frozenset for O(1) lookups
- Replace Optional[str] with str | None throughout config.py
- Use default_factory for ProxyCodeEntry/ASProxySession dataclasses
- Add proxy code/session cleanup to background loop
- Fix OIDC verification CI step to only run for oauth/login-flow modes
- Add unit tests for access.py REST endpoints (10 tests)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MCP clients like Claude Code were unable to use tools because tokens
obtained directly from Nextcloud had the wrong audience claim. The MCP
server now acts as its own OAuth Authorization Server, proxying auth
to Nextcloud with its own client_id so tokens have the correct audience.
New endpoints: /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, /oauth/token,
/oauth/register. Modified /oauth/authorize from pass-through to
intermediary pattern. PRM now points authorization_servers to the MCP
server instead of Nextcloud.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Enable ruff PLC0415 rule for all source files (tests excluded via
per-file-ignores). Move 136 inline imports to top-level across 33 files.
8 imports suppressed with noqa for legitimate reasons: circular
dependencies (client/__init__.py, context.py), optional dependency
guards (app.py document processors, auth/userinfo_routes.py), and
post-env-setup imports (smithery_main.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add NEXTCLOUD_VERIFY_SSL and NEXTCLOUD_CA_BUNDLE env vars to configure
TLS certificate verification for all outbound Nextcloud connections.
Centralizes SSL config via a new HTTP client factory (http.py) used by
all 27 Nextcloud-bound call sites, including API clients, OIDC endpoints,
OAuth flows, and health checks.
Closes#560
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements Alembic for managing token storage database schema versions.
Migrations run automatically on startup with full backward compatibility.
**Changes:**
- Add Alembic dependency (1.14.0+) and SQLAlchemy (auto-installed)
- Create migration infrastructure in alembic/ directory
- Add initial migration (001) capturing current schema
- Modify RefreshTokenStorage.initialize() to run migrations via anyio
- Add CLI commands: db upgrade, current, history, downgrade, migrate
- Add comprehensive migration documentation
**Backward Compatibility:**
- Pre-Alembic databases automatically stamped with revision 001
- No schema changes for existing databases
- Automatic upgrade on first startup after update
**Migration Strategy:**
Three scenarios handled:
1. New database → Run migrations from scratch
2. Pre-Alembic database → Stamp with 001 (no changes)
3. Alembic-managed → Upgrade to latest
**Architecture:**
- Uses anyio.to_thread.run_sync() for structured concurrency
- Alembic env.py runs with anyio.run() in worker thread
- SQLite-friendly migration patterns documented
- No ThreadPoolExecutor needed (anyio handles it)
**CLI Usage:**
```bash
nextcloud-mcp-server db upgrade # Upgrade to latest
nextcloud-mcp-server db current # Show version
nextcloud-mcp-server db history # View changelog
nextcloud-mcp-server db downgrade # Rollback (with confirmation)
nextcloud-mcp-server db migrate "description" # Create migration
```
**Testing:**
- All 13 webhook storage tests pass
- New/pre-Alembic database scenarios validated
- anyio integration tested
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refactored the storage system to use a unified SQLite database for both
webhook tracking and OAuth token storage, available in both BasicAuth
and OAuth modes.
Changes:
- Renamed refresh_token_storage.py → storage.py
- Made TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY optional (only required for OAuth token ops)
- Added registered_webhooks table with schema versioning
- Added webhook storage methods (store, get, delete, list, clear)
- Initialize storage in both BasicAuth and OAuth modes
- Updated webhook routes to persist registrations in database
- Database-first pattern for webhook status checks (performance)
- Updated all imports across codebase
Storage Behavior:
- Database created automatically at startup if needed
- Existing databases detected and reused
- Server fails fast if database initialization fails
- No migrations needed (OAuth feature is experimental)
Testing:
- Added 13 comprehensive unit tests for webhook storage
- All 118 unit tests pass
- All 5 smoke tests pass
- Verified fail-fast behavior on initialization errors
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit adds proper integration testing of the login elicitation flow
(ADR-006) using python-sdk's MCP client with actual elicitation callback
support, and fixes user_id extraction to support both JWT and opaque tokens.
## Changes
### 1. Enhanced create_mcp_client_session helper (tests/conftest.py)
- Added `elicitation_callback` parameter to function signature
- Pass callback to ClientSession constructor
- Added necessary imports: RequestContext, ElicitRequestParams,
ElicitResult, ErrorData from mcp package
- Allows fixtures to provide custom elicitation handlers
### 2. New fixture: nc_mcp_oauth_client_with_elicitation (tests/conftest.py)
- Creates MCP client with Playwright-based elicitation callback
- Callback implementation:
- Extracts OAuth URL from elicitation message using regex
- Uses Playwright browser to complete OAuth flow automatically
- Handles Nextcloud login form (username/password)
- Handles consent screen if present
- Waits for OAuth callback completion
- Returns ElicitResult(action="accept") on success
- Function-scoped to allow independent test state
- Tracks elicitation invocations via session.elicitation_triggered
### 3. Fixed user_id extraction for opaque tokens (oauth_tools.py)
- Created extract_user_id_from_token() helper to handle both JWT and
opaque tokens by calling userinfo endpoint when needed
- Fixed check_logged_in to use helper instead of broken ctx.authorization
- Fixed revoke_nextcloud_access to use helper instead of ctx.context.get()
- Both tools now properly extract user_id from access tokens
### 4. Enhanced integration tests (test_elicitation_integration.py)
- Updated tests to revoke refresh tokens via MCP tool
- All 4 tests now pass:
- test_check_logged_in_with_real_elicitation_callback: Complete flow
- test_elicitation_callback_url_extraction: URL extraction validation
- test_elicitation_stores_refresh_token: Token persistence verification
- test_second_check_logged_in_does_not_elicit: No redundant elicitations
### 5. Added diagnostic logging (oauth_routes.py)
- Track user_id extraction from ID tokens during OAuth callbacks
- Log refresh token storage with user_id and flow_type
## Test Results
✅ 4/4 tests pass
The test suite successfully validates:
- Elicitation callback is triggered when no refresh token exists
- Playwright automation completes OAuth flow
- Refresh token is stored after OAuth with correct user_id
- Tool returns "yes" after successful login
- Already-logged-in users don't get redundant elicitations
## Why This Matters
Previous tests (test_login_elicitation.py) only validated response
formats and acknowledged they couldn't test real elicitation protocol.
This test exercises the REAL MCP elicitation protocol end-to-end:
1. MCP server calls ctx.elicit()
2. python-sdk ClientSession invokes custom callback
3. Callback completes OAuth via Playwright
4. Client returns acceptance to server
5. Tool proceeds with authenticated state
This proves the python-sdk MCP client can handle elicitation in
production environments with both JWT and opaque tokens.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This PR fixes multiple OAuth-related issues:
## Unified OAuth Callback
- Consolidated `/oauth/callback-nextcloud` and `/oauth/login-callback` into single `/oauth/callback` endpoint
- Flow type determined by session lookup via state parameter (no query params in redirect_uri)
- Fixes redirect_uri validation issues with IdPs requiring exact match
- Legacy endpoints kept as aliases for backwards compatibility
## PKCE Implementation
- Implemented PKCE (RFC 7636) for Flow 2 (resource provisioning)
- Generate code_verifier and code_challenge
- Store code_verifier in session storage
- Retrieve and use in token exchange
- Fixed PKCE for browser login (integrated mode)
- Previously only worked for external IdP (Keycloak)
- Now works for both Nextcloud OIDC and external IdP
## Login Elicitation Fixes (ADR-006)
- Fixed elicitation URL to route through MCP server endpoint
- Changed from direct Nextcloud URL to `/oauth/authorize-nextcloud`
- Ensures PKCE is properly handled by server
- Fixed login detection after OAuth flow completes
- Look up refresh token by state parameter instead of user_id
- Works even when Flow 1 token not present
- Added `get_refresh_token_by_provisioning_client_id()` method
## Session Authentication
- Fixed `/user/page` redirect loop
- Shared oauth_context with mounted browser_app
- SessionAuthBackend can now validate sessions correctly
## Tests
- Added comprehensive login elicitation test suite
- Updated scope authorization test expectations
- All 43 OAuth tests passing
## Files Changed
- `app.py`: Shared oauth_context, unified callback route
- `oauth_routes.py`: Unified callback, PKCE for Flow 2
- `browser_oauth_routes.py`: PKCE for integrated mode
- `oauth_tools.py`: Fixed elicitation URL generation
- `refresh_token_storage.py`: Added lookup by provisioning_client_id
- `test_login_elicitation.py`: New test suite
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit completes the OAuth audience validation implementation per RFC 7519,
RFC 8707 (Resource Indicators), and RFC 9728 (Protected Resource Metadata).
## Key Changes
### OAuth Resource Parameters (RFC 8707)
- Add `resource` parameter to Flow 1 (MCP client auth) with MCP server audience
- Add `resource` parameter to Flow 2 (Nextcloud access) with Nextcloud audience
- Add `nextcloud_resource_uri` to oauth_context configuration
- Fix undefined variable error in starlette_lifespan
### PRM-Based Resource Discovery (RFC 9728)
- Update tests to fetch resource identifier from PRM endpoint
- Add fallback to hardcoded value if PRM fetch fails
- Demonstrate correct OAuth client implementation pattern
### ADR-005 Documentation Updates
- Update to reflect simplified RFC 7519 compliant implementation
- Document that MCP validates only its own audience (not Nextcloud's)
- Add section on OAuth resource parameters and PRM discovery
- Update implementation checklist to show completed items
- Mark status as "Implemented" with update date
## Implementation Details
The solution follows RFC 7519 Section 4.1.3: resource servers validate only
their own presence in the audience claim. This simplifies the logic while
maintaining security:
- MCP server validates MCP audience only
- Nextcloud independently validates its own audience
- No dual validation required at MCP layer
- Token reuse is allowed per RFC 8707 for multi-audience tokens
## Test Results
✅ test_mcp_oauth_server_connection - PASSED
✅ test_deck_board_view_permissions - PASSED
✅ test_prm_endpoint - PASSED
All OAuth flows now properly specify target resources, resulting in correct
audience validation throughout the system.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements Progressive Consent architecture with dual OAuth flows:
- Flow 1: Direct client authentication (aud: "mcp-server")
- Flow 2: Resource provisioning with refresh tokens
Components added:
- Client registry with validation (client_registry.py)
- Progressive token verifier (progressive_token_verifier.py)
- Token broker service integration
- Provisioning decorator for MCP tools
- OAuth provisioning tools (provision_nextcloud_access, etc.)
Configuration:
- Progressive Consent enabled by default (ENABLE_PROGRESSIVE_CONSENT=true)
- Client validation with pre-registered clients
- Audience separation framework
KNOWN ISSUE - Token Exchange Pattern Incorrect:
The current implementation does NOT properly implement token exchange.
MCP session tokens should be EXCHANGED for delegated Nextcloud tokens
during tool calls, not stored/reused. Critical corrections needed:
1. Session tokens: Flow 1 token → exchange → ephemeral Nextcloud token
- Generated on-demand per tool call
- Short-lived, not stored
- Scopes limited to tool requirements
2. Background tokens: Flow 2 refresh token → background Nextcloud token
- Only for offline/background jobs
- Potentially different scopes than session tokens
- Must NOT be used for MCP session tool calls
The token exchange mechanism needs to be implemented to properly
separate session-time delegation from background job authorization.
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement dual OAuth flows for Progressive Consent architecture:
Flow 1 (Client Authentication):
- Client authenticates directly to IdP with its own client_id
- Server validates client_id against ALLOWED_MCP_CLIENTS whitelist
- Issues tokens with aud: "mcp-server" for MCP authentication only
- Progressive mode detected via ENABLE_PROGRESSIVE_CONSENT env var
Flow 2 (Resource Provisioning):
- New endpoints: /oauth/authorize-nextcloud, /oauth/callback-nextcloud
- MCP server acts as OAuth client for delegated Nextcloud access
- Stores master refresh tokens with flow_type and audience metadata
- Returns success HTML page after provisioning completion
Scope Authorization Updates:
- Added ProvisioningRequiredError for missing Flow 2 provisioning
- Decorator checks if Nextcloud scopes require provisioning in Progressive mode
- Validates token has Nextcloud scopes before allowing access
Storage Schema Enhancements:
- Added flow_type, is_provisioning, requested_scopes to oauth_sessions
- Enhanced store_oauth_session to support Progressive Consent metadata
- Maintains backward compatibility with hybrid flow
This completes the Progressive Consent implementation, enabling:
- Explicit user consent for resource access
- Stateless server by default (no automatic provisioning)
- Clear separation between authentication and resource access
- Defense in depth with audience-specific tokens
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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
