provision_app_password validated the supplied app password by calling the
OCS cloud/user endpoint with BasicAuth as the *path user_id* (the UID).
Nextcloud keys app-password BasicAuth on the loginName, which differs from
the UID for OIDC-provisioned accounts whose UID is their display name
(UID "Chris Coutinho", loginName "chris@coutinho.io"). Authenticating as
the UID is rejected with HTTP 401 ("App password validation failed"), so
provisioning never completes.
Parse the request body up front and authenticate the OCS validation as the
body's `username` (the Nextcloud loginName), falling back to the path
user_id for legacy callers where UID == loginName. The OCS-returned account
id is still checked against the path user_id (the UID), and the password is
still stored keyed by UID with the loginName alongside.
Note this is not an encoding issue: BasicAuth places the user-id literally
in the header (RFC 7617, no URL-encoding); %20/+/literal-space forms of the
UID all fail — only the loginName authenticates.
Adds a regression test asserting the OCS BasicAuth uses the loginName while
storage is keyed by the UID, plus a backward-compat assertion that callers
without a loginName fall back to the UID.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes surfaced while testing Login Flow v2 provisioning behind a split
internal/external host (Docker: server↔Nextcloud over http://app, browser
over http://localhost:8080):
1. login_url pointed at the internal host. Nextcloud builds the login URL
from the request host, so the browser-facing URL came back as
http://app/login/v2/flow/... — unreachable from the user's browser. The
poll endpoint was already rewritten to the internal host (correct, the
server polls it); now LoginFlowV2Client also rewrites the login_url origin
to settings.nextcloud_public_issuer_url when set (passed at all 5
construction sites). When unset, behaviour is unchanged.
2. The app-password format guard rejected raw session tokens. core/
getapppassword returns a long alphanumeric token, not the dashed 25-char
Security-settings format, so the dashed-only regex 400'd the one-click
opt-in handoff. Relax APP_PASSWORD_PATTERN to `^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,256}$`;
the authoritative validation is still the BasicAuth check against Nextcloud.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Unit test fixes:
- test_userinfo_routes: patch nextcloud_httpx_client instead of httpx.AsyncClient
- test_instrument_tool: patch trace_operation in metrics module (where imported)
- test_management_app_password_endpoints: patch nextcloud_httpx_client and
get_settings at correct import locations
- test_management_status_endpoint: patch detect_auth_mode and get_settings at
correct import locations (api.management, not config/config_validators)
- test_token_exchange: fix TokenBrokerService constructor args (client_id/
client_secret instead of encryption_key)
CI:
- Add Node.js setup and astrolabe build step (composer + npm ci + npm run build)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
httpx emits a DeprecationWarning when verify=<str> is passed, recommending
ssl.SSLContext instead. This affected both our httpx client factories and
the caldav library passthrough.
Changed get_nextcloud_ssl_verify() to return bool | ssl.SSLContext instead
of bool | str by constructing an SSLContext when NEXTCLOUD_CA_BUNDLE is set.
All downstream consumers (httpx, caldav) natively accept ssl.SSLContext.
Also fixed app password endpoint tests that used overly broad MagicMock
(auto-generated truthy nextcloud_ca_bundle attribute).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split the monolithic management.py (1988 lines) into 4 focused modules:
- management.py: Server status, user sessions, shared helpers (~520 lines)
- passwords.py: App password provisioning for BasicAuth mode (~300 lines)
- webhooks.py: Webhook registration management (~290 lines)
- visualization.py: Search and PDF preview endpoints (~810 lines)
Backward compatibility maintained via __init__.py re-exports.
Updated test imports to use new module paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security improvements:
- Add in-memory rate limiter for app password provisioning (5 attempts/hour/user)
- Returns 429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After header when limit exceeded
- Rate limiting is per-user to prevent cross-user DoS
Code quality improvements:
- Extract _extract_basic_auth() helper to reduce duplication across 3 endpoints
- Move base64, re imports to module level
- Add APP_PASSWORD_PATTERN constant for regex validation
- Add NEXTCLOUD_VALIDATION_TIMEOUT constant (10s)
Test coverage:
- Add test_provision_app_password_rate_limiting
- Add test_rate_limiting_is_per_user
- Add autouse fixture to clear rate limit state between tests
- Total: 15 tests for management API endpoints
Addresses reviewer feedback on PR #473.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
