"""Browser-based OAuth login routes for admin UI.
Separate from MCP OAuth flow - these routes establish browser sessions
for accessing admin UI endpoints like /app.
"""
import hashlib
import logging
import secrets
import time
from base64 import urlsafe_b64encode
from html import escape as html_escape
from urllib.parse import urlencode
from urllib.parse import urlparse as parse_url
import httpx
from starlette.requests import Request
from starlette.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.token_utils import (
IdTokenVerificationError,
get_oidc_discovery,
verify_id_token,
)
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.userinfo_routes import (
_get_userinfo_endpoint,
_query_idp_userinfo,
)
from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import get_settings
from ..http import nextcloud_httpx_client
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _normalise_origin(raw: str) -> tuple[str, str, int | None]:
"""Return (scheme, hostname, port) with default HTTP/HTTPS ports stripped.
Browsers omit default ports in Origin headers (RFC 6454 §6.2), so a
raw netloc string comparison falsely rejects requests whenever
``mcp_server_url`` is configured with an explicit ``:443`` / ``:80``
(or vice versa).
"""
parsed = parse_url(raw)
scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
hostname = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
port = parsed.port
if (scheme == "https" and port == 443) or (scheme == "http" and port == 80):
port = None
return (scheme, hostname, port)
def _origin_matches_self(request: Request, oauth_ctx: dict) -> bool:
"""Return True when Origin/Referer is missing or matches our own host.
Used to gate POST /oauth/logout against cross-origin form submissions
(PR #758 round-3 review hardening). Per OWASP CSRF cheat sheet, the
policy is:
- If neither Origin nor Referer is set, allow (same-origin POST in
privacy-conscious browsers may strip both).
- Otherwise, the (scheme, hostname, port) tuple of the first present
header must equal the same tuple of the configured
``mcp_server_url``. Default ports (80/443) are normalised away
before comparison so RFC-6454-compliant browsers — which omit
default ports in Origin — aren't rejected.
"""
cfg = oauth_ctx.get("config") or oauth_ctx
mcp_server_url = cfg.get("mcp_server_url")
if not mcp_server_url:
# Fail closed (PR #758 round-3 finding 2): a future code path that
# leaves ``mcp_server_url`` unset would otherwise silently disable
# CSRF protection on /oauth/logout. Blocking the logout is
# recoverable — the user just re-logs-in once the misconfiguration
# is fixed — and the error log makes the cause monitorable.
logger.error(
"CSRF check failed on /oauth/logout: mcp_server_url not "
"configured in oauth_context — set NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL"
)
return False
expected = _normalise_origin(mcp_server_url)
raw = request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer")
if not raw:
return True
return _normalise_origin(raw) == expected
def _safe_next_url(raw: str | None, default: str) -> str:
"""Return a path-only redirect target, falling back to *default*.
Blocks open-redirect abuse via the ``?next=`` query parameter on
``/oauth/login`` and ``/oauth/logout`` (and the round-tripped
``client_redirect_uri`` stored on the oauth_session). A safe target:
- starts with a single ``/`` (so it's a path on this server)
- does NOT start with ``//`` (which would be protocol-relative)
- has no whitespace or control characters that could trick browsers
Anything else returns *default*.
"""
if not raw or not raw.startswith("/") or raw.startswith("//"):
return default
if any(c.isspace() or ord(c) < 0x20 for c in raw):
return default
return raw
def _should_use_secure_cookies() -> bool:
"""Determine if cookies should have the Secure flag.
Reads ``settings.cookie_secure`` first (set via the ``COOKIE_SECURE``
env var). Falls back to auto-detecting from the MCP server's own URL
scheme — the cookie is issued by THIS server, so the Secure flag must
reflect THIS server's transport, not Nextcloud's. (Split-scheme
deployments — HTTPS Nextcloud + plain-HTTP MCP sidecar, or vice
versa — would otherwise get the wrong answer.)
"""
settings = get_settings()
if settings.cookie_secure is not None:
# Dynaconf auto-coerces "true"/"false" → bool but "1"/"0" → int;
# bool() normalises both.
return bool(settings.cookie_secure)
mcp_server_url = settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url or ""
return mcp_server_url.startswith("https://")
async def oauth_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
"""Browser OAuth login endpoint - redirects to IdP for authentication.
This is separate from the MCP OAuth flow (/oauth/authorize).
Creates a browser session with refresh token for admin UI access.
Query parameters:
next: Optional URL to redirect to after login (default: /user/page)
Returns:
302 redirect to IdP authorization endpoint
"""
oauth_ctx = request.app.state.oauth_context
if not oauth_ctx:
# BasicAuth mode - no login needed, redirect to app
return RedirectResponse("/app", status_code=302)
storage = oauth_ctx["storage"]
oauth_client = oauth_ctx["oauth_client"]
oauth_config = oauth_ctx["config"]
# Demoted to DEBUG (PR #758 nit a) — these previously leaked the
# full set of config keys + the client_id at INFO on every login.
logger.debug("oauth_login called - oauth_config keys: %s", oauth_config.keys())
logger.debug("oauth_login called - client_id: %s", oauth_config.get("client_id"))
logger.debug("oauth_login called - oauth_client: %s", oauth_client is not None)
# Get redirect URL from query params (default to /app). Validated at
# write-time so we never store an attacker-controlled absolute URL on
# the oauth_session row (issue #758 finding 3).
next_url = _safe_next_url(request.query_params.get("next"), "/app")
logger.debug("oauth_login - next_url: %s", next_url)
# Generate state for CSRF protection
state = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
# Generate OIDC nonce so the ID token returned on callback can be bound
# to THIS auth request (PR #758 finding 2). Without a nonce, an attacker
# who acquired a separate valid ID token could replay it inside this
# flow.
nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
# Build OAuth authorization URL
mcp_server_url = oauth_config["mcp_server_url"]
callback_uri = f"{mcp_server_url}/oauth/callback"
# Request only basic OIDC scopes for browser session.
# offline_access is added conditionally below based on IdP discovery.
# Note: Nextcloud app scopes (notes.read, etc.) are for MCP client access tokens,
# not for the MCP server's own browser authentication
scopes = "openid profile email"
# Generate PKCE values for ALL modes (both external and integrated IdP require PKCE)
code_verifier = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
digest = hashlib.sha256(code_verifier.encode()).digest()
code_challenge = urlsafe_b64encode(digest).decode().rstrip("=")
# Store code_verifier + nonce in session for retrieval during callback
# (using state as key)
await storage.store_oauth_session(
session_id=state, # Use state as session ID
client_id="browser-ui",
client_redirect_uri=next_url, # Store the redirect URL for after auth
state=state,
code_challenge=code_challenge,
code_challenge_method="S256",
mcp_authorization_code=code_verifier, # Store code_verifier here temporarily
nonce=nonce,
flow_type="browser",
ttl_seconds=600, # 10 minutes
)
if oauth_client:
# External IdP mode (Keycloak)
if not oauth_client.authorization_endpoint:
await oauth_client.discover()
# Check if IdP supports offline_access via server metadata from discovery
idp_metadata = getattr(oauth_client, "server_metadata", None) or {}
idp_scopes = idp_metadata.get("scopes_supported")
if idp_scopes is None or "offline_access" in idp_scopes:
scopes += " offline_access"
# Get Nextcloud resource URI for audience (background sync needs Nextcloud-scoped tokens)
nextcloud_resource_uri = oauth_config.get(
"nextcloud_resource_uri", oauth_config.get("nextcloud_host")
)
idp_params = {
"client_id": oauth_client.client_id,
"redirect_uri": callback_uri,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": scopes,
"state": state,
"nonce": nonce,
"code_challenge": code_challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"prompt": "consent", # Ensure refresh token
"resource": nextcloud_resource_uri, # Request tokens for Nextcloud API access
}
auth_url = f"{oauth_client.authorization_endpoint}?{urlencode(idp_params)}"
logger.debug("Redirecting to external IdP login: %s", auth_url.split("?")[0])
else:
# Integrated mode (Nextcloud OIDC)
discovery_url = oauth_config.get("discovery_url")
if not discovery_url:
return JSONResponse(
{
"error": "server_error",
"error_description": "OAuth discovery URL not configured",
},
status_code=500,
)
# Fetch authorization endpoint via the shared 5-minute discovery
# cache (PR #758 nit 5) so each browser login doesn't hit the IdP's
# discovery endpoint.
discovery = await get_oidc_discovery(discovery_url)
authorization_endpoint = discovery["authorization_endpoint"]
# Include offline_access only if the IdP advertises it (or if
# scopes_supported is absent from the discovery document).
# IdPs like AWS Cognito provide refresh tokens automatically without
# supporting the offline_access scope.
idp_scopes = discovery.get("scopes_supported")
if idp_scopes is None or "offline_access" in idp_scopes:
scopes += " offline_access"
# Replace internal Docker hostname with public URL
public_issuer = get_settings().nextcloud_public_issuer_url
if public_issuer:
internal_parsed = parse_url(oauth_config["nextcloud_host"])
auth_parsed = parse_url(authorization_endpoint)
if auth_parsed.hostname == internal_parsed.hostname:
public_parsed = parse_url(public_issuer)
authorization_endpoint = (
f"{public_parsed.scheme}://{public_parsed.netloc}{auth_parsed.path}"
)
# Get Nextcloud resource URI for audience (background sync needs Nextcloud-scoped tokens)
nextcloud_resource_uri = oauth_config.get(
"nextcloud_resource_uri", oauth_config.get("nextcloud_host")
)
idp_params = {
"client_id": oauth_config["client_id"],
"redirect_uri": callback_uri,
"response_type": "code",
"scope": scopes,
"state": state,
"nonce": nonce,
"code_challenge": code_challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"prompt": "consent", # Ensure refresh token
"resource": nextcloud_resource_uri, # Request tokens for Nextcloud API access
}
logger.debug("Building Nextcloud OIDC auth URL with params: %s", idp_params)
auth_url = f"{authorization_endpoint}?{urlencode(idp_params)}"
logger.debug("Redirecting to Nextcloud OIDC login: %s", auth_url)
return RedirectResponse(auth_url, status_code=302)
async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLResponse:
"""Browser OAuth callback - IdP redirects here after authentication.
Exchanges authorization code for tokens, stores refresh token,
sets session cookie, and redirects to original destination.
Query parameters:
code: Authorization code from IdP
state: State parameter
error: Error code (if authorization failed)
Returns:
302 redirect to next URL with session cookie
"""
# Check for errors
error = request.query_params.get("error")
if error:
error_description = request.query_params.get(
"error_description", "Authorization failed"
)
logger.error("OAuth login error: %s - %s", error, error_description)
login_url = str(request.url_for("oauth_login"))
# html_escape: error / error_description come from attacker-controlled
# query parameters and would otherwise reflect into the failure page.
return HTMLResponse(
f"""
Login Failed
Login Failed
Error: {html_escape(error)}
{html_escape(error_description)}
Try again
""",
status_code=400,
)
# Extract code and state
code = request.query_params.get("code")
state = request.query_params.get("state")
if not code or not state:
return HTMLResponse(
"""
Invalid Request
Invalid Request
Missing code or state parameter
""",
status_code=400,
)
# Get OAuth context
oauth_ctx = request.app.state.oauth_context
storage = oauth_ctx["storage"]
oauth_client = oauth_ctx["oauth_client"]
oauth_config = oauth_ctx["config"]
# Retrieve code_verifier, nonce, and redirect URL from session storage
code_verifier = ""
nonce: str | None = None
next_url = "/app" # Default redirect
oauth_session = await storage.get_oauth_session(state)
if oauth_session:
# code_verifier was stored in mcp_authorization_code field
code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
# nonce bound to this auth request — verified against the ID token
# below (PR #758 finding 2).
nonce = oauth_session.get("nonce")
# next_url was stored in client_redirect_uri field — re-validate at
# read-time as defense-in-depth (issue #758 finding 3). The session
# row could have been written by an older code path or reused.
next_url = _safe_next_url(oauth_session.get("client_redirect_uri"), "/app")
# One-time-use session: delete eagerly so a replayed callback can't
# be processed and so the oauth_sessions table doesn't accumulate
# completed-but-not-yet-expired browser-login rows.
await storage.delete_oauth_session(state)
# Exchange authorization code for tokens
mcp_server_url = oauth_config["mcp_server_url"]
callback_uri = f"{mcp_server_url}/oauth/callback"
try:
if oauth_client:
# External IdP mode (Keycloak)
# Use PKCE if we have a code_verifier
if not oauth_client.token_endpoint:
await oauth_client.discover()
token_params = {
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": code,
"redirect_uri": callback_uri,
"client_id": oauth_client.client_id,
"client_secret": oauth_client.client_secret,
}
# Add code_verifier if we have one (PKCE)
if code_verifier:
token_params["code_verifier"] = code_verifier
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
response = await http_client.post(
oauth_client.token_endpoint,
data=token_params,
)
response.raise_for_status()
token_data = response.json()
else:
# Integrated mode (Nextcloud OIDC)
discovery_url = oauth_config.get("discovery_url")
# Use the shared 5-minute discovery cache; oauth_login() above
# has already populated it for this discovery_url so the
# callback should hit the cache rather than re-fetching.
discovery = await get_oidc_discovery(discovery_url)
token_endpoint = discovery["token_endpoint"]
token_params = {
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": code,
"redirect_uri": callback_uri,
"client_id": oauth_config["client_id"],
"client_secret": oauth_config["client_secret"],
}
# Add code_verifier for PKCE (required by Nextcloud OIDC)
if code_verifier:
token_params["code_verifier"] = code_verifier
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
response = await http_client.post(
token_endpoint,
data=token_params,
)
response.raise_for_status()
token_data = response.json()
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as e:
# Correlation IDs let the user reference a specific failure in the
# server logs without us having to reflect raw exception/IdP text
# back into the HTML page (PR #758 round-3 nit 6).
correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
error_body = (
e.response.text if hasattr(e.response, "text") else str(e.response.content)
)
logger.error(
"Token exchange failed (correlation_id=%s): HTTP %s - %s",
correlation_id,
e.response.status_code,
error_body,
)
return HTMLResponse(
f"""
Login Failed
Login Failed
An internal error occurred while exchanging the authorization code.
Correlation ID: {html_escape(correlation_id)}
Please try again, or contact your administrator if the problem persists.
""",
status_code=500,
)
except Exception as e:
correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
logger.error("Token exchange failed (correlation_id=%s): %s", correlation_id, e)
return HTMLResponse(
f"""
Login Failed
Login Failed
An internal error occurred while exchanging the authorization code.
Correlation ID: {html_escape(correlation_id)}
Please try again, or contact your administrator if the problem persists.
""",
status_code=500,
)
refresh_token = token_data.get("refresh_token")
id_token = token_data.get("id_token")
# Demoted to DEBUG (PR #758 nit a) — these were previously logged at
# INFO on every login.
logger.debug("Token exchange response keys: %s", token_data.keys())
logger.debug("Refresh token present: %s", refresh_token is not None)
logger.debug("ID token present: %s", id_token is not None)
# Resolve the discovery URL + audience used for THIS auth request so
# we can verify the ID token signature + claims (issue #626 finding 1).
if oauth_client:
# External IdP path
verification_audience = oauth_client.client_id
verification_discovery_url = getattr(oauth_client, "discovery_url", None)
else:
# Integrated Nextcloud OIDC path
verification_audience = oauth_config["client_id"]
verification_discovery_url = oauth_config.get("discovery_url")
if not verification_discovery_url:
logger.error("Cannot verify ID token: no discovery_url available")
return HTMLResponse(
"Login Failed
OIDC discovery URL not configured
",
status_code=500,
)
try:
userinfo = await verify_id_token(
id_token,
discovery_url=verification_discovery_url,
expected_audience=verification_audience,
expected_nonce=nonce,
)
except IdTokenVerificationError as e:
# Same correlation-ID pattern as token-exchange failures
# (PR #758 round-3 nit 6) — log the detail server-side and only
# show a generic message + correlation ID in the browser.
correlation_id = secrets.token_hex(8)
logger.error(
"ID token verification failed (correlation_id=%s): %s",
correlation_id,
e,
)
return HTMLResponse(
f"Login Failed
"
f"The ID token failed verification.
"
f"Correlation ID: {html_escape(correlation_id)}
",
status_code=400,
)
user_id = userinfo["sub"]
username = userinfo.get("preferred_username") or userinfo.get("email")
logger.info("Browser login successful: %s (sub=%s)", username, user_id)
# Calculate refresh token expiration from token response
refresh_expires_in = token_data.get("refresh_expires_in")
refresh_expires_at = None
if refresh_expires_in:
refresh_expires_at = int(time.time()) + refresh_expires_in
logger.debug(
"Refresh token expires in %ss (at timestamp %s)",
refresh_expires_in,
refresh_expires_at,
)
# Extract granted scopes
granted_scopes = (
token_data.get("scope", "").split() if token_data.get("scope") else None
)
# Store refresh token (for background jobs ONLY)
if refresh_token:
logger.debug(
"Storing refresh token for user_id=%s state=%s... scopes=%s expires_at=%s",
user_id,
state[:16],
granted_scopes,
refresh_expires_at,
)
await storage.store_refresh_token(
user_id=user_id,
refresh_token=refresh_token,
expires_at=refresh_expires_at,
flow_type="browser", # Browser-based login flow
provisioning_client_id=state, # Store state for unified session lookup
scopes=granted_scopes,
)
logger.info(
"Refresh token stored for user %s (lookup key: %s...)",
user_id,
state[:16],
)
else:
logger.warning("No refresh token in token response - cannot store session")
# Query and cache user profile (for browser UI display)
access_token = token_data.get("access_token")
if access_token:
try:
# Get the OAuth context to determine correct userinfo endpoint
oauth_ctx = getattr(request.app.state, "oauth_context", {})
userinfo_endpoint = await _get_userinfo_endpoint(oauth_ctx)
if userinfo_endpoint:
# Query userinfo endpoint with fresh access token
profile_data = await _query_idp_userinfo(
access_token, userinfo_endpoint
)
if profile_data:
# Cache profile for browser UI (no token needed to display)
await storage.store_user_profile(user_id, profile_data)
logger.debug("User profile cached for %s", user_id)
else:
logger.warning("Failed to query userinfo endpoint for %s", user_id)
else:
logger.warning("Could not determine userinfo endpoint")
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Error caching user profile: %s", e)
# Continue anyway - profile cache is optional for browser UI
# Create a server-side browser session: a random opaque session_id is
# mapped to the verified user_id in `browser_sessions`. The cookie value
# is the session_id (never the raw user_id — see issue #626 finding 2).
session_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
session_ttl = 86400 * 30 # 30 days
await storage.create_browser_session(
session_id=session_id, user_id=user_id, ttl_seconds=session_ttl
)
response = RedirectResponse(next_url, status_code=302)
# CSRF protection is layered: ``SameSite=Lax`` blocks cross-site POSTs
# in modern browsers; ``oauth_logout`` is POST-only with an Origin /
# Referer check (``_origin_matches_self``) to cover older browsers and
# non-browser clients. ``HttpOnly`` blocks JS exfiltration on XSS;
# ``Secure`` is gated to non-HTTP hosts in dev (PR #758 round-4 review
# nit 6).
response.set_cookie(
key="mcp_session",
value=session_id,
max_age=session_ttl,
httponly=True,
secure=_should_use_secure_cookies(),
samesite="lax",
)
logger.info("Session cookie set for user %s (sid=%s…)", username, session_id[:8])
return response
async def oauth_logout(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
"""Browser OAuth logout — invalidate session and revoke refresh token.
Issue #626 finding 4: prior implementation only cleared the cookie,
leaving the refresh token in storage (valid up to 90 days). This now:
1. Resolves the user_id for the current browser session_id.
2. Calls the IdP `revocation_endpoint` for the stored refresh token
when the IdP advertises one.
3. Deletes the stored refresh token regardless of revocation success.
4. Deletes the browser_sessions row so the cookie is unusable even
if it leaks.
5. Clears the cookie on the response.
Method is POST-only at the route layer to defeat passive CSRF (PR #758
round-3 review hardening). Origin / Referer headers are also validated
against the configured ``mcp_server_url`` when present, blocking
same-method-but-cross-origin form submissions.
Query parameters:
next: Optional URL to redirect to after logout (default: /oauth/login)
"""
next_url = _safe_next_url(request.query_params.get("next"), "/oauth/login")
session_id = request.cookies.get("mcp_session")
oauth_ctx = getattr(request.app.state, "oauth_context", None)
# CSRF check: when Origin or Referer is present, host must match the
# MCP server's own host. Per OWASP CSRF cheat sheet, we allow the
# request through when neither header is present (some user agents
# strip both for privacy on same-origin POST).
if oauth_ctx and not _origin_matches_self(request, oauth_ctx):
logger.warning(
"Logout blocked: cross-origin request from %s",
request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer"),
)
return JSONResponse({"error": "forbidden"}, status_code=403)
storage = oauth_ctx.get("storage") if oauth_ctx else None
if session_id and storage and oauth_ctx:
try:
user_id = await storage.get_browser_session_user(session_id)
if user_id:
token_data = await storage.get_refresh_token(user_id)
refresh_token = token_data.get("refresh_token") if token_data else None
if refresh_token:
await _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp(oauth_ctx, refresh_token)
await storage.delete_refresh_token(user_id)
logger.info("Refresh token revoked + deleted for user %s", user_id)
except Exception as e:
# Logout must always succeed locally; log and continue.
logger.warning("Logout cleanup failed (continuing): %s", e)
finally:
# Always drop the browser_sessions row, even when the
# refresh-token cleanup above failed — otherwise an orphan
# row lingers until the hourly cleanup cron (PR #758 round-5
# review medium 1). Not exploitable (SessionAuthBackend
# already rejects sessions without a live refresh token), but
# a correctness gap worth closing here.
try:
await storage.delete_browser_session(session_id)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(
"Failed to delete browser session %s…: %s", session_id[:8], e
)
response = RedirectResponse(next_url, status_code=302)
response.delete_cookie("mcp_session")
logger.info("User logged out, session cookie cleared")
return response
async def _revoke_refresh_token_at_idp(oauth_ctx: dict, refresh_token: str) -> None:
"""Best-effort RFC 7009 revocation against the IdP.
Silent on failure: revoking remotely is a defense-in-depth step on top
of deleting the local copy, and we don't want logout to error if the
IdP is unreachable or doesn't advertise a revocation endpoint.
"""
# Production oauth_context nests config under "config" (see app.py
# starlette_lifespan). A flat shape is also accepted for tests and
# historical callers.
cfg = oauth_ctx.get("config") or oauth_ctx
settings = get_settings()
try:
discovery_url = cfg.get("discovery_url") or settings.oidc_discovery_url
if not discovery_url and settings.nextcloud_host:
# Strip trailing slash so a host configured as
# ``https://cloud.example.com/`` doesn't produce a double-slash
# in the well-known URL (PR #758 round-4 review nit 5).
discovery_url = (
f"{settings.nextcloud_host.rstrip('/')}"
"/.well-known/openid-configuration"
)
if not discovery_url:
return
# Re-use the shared 5-minute discovery cache (PR #758 nit 6) so a
# burst of logouts doesn't hammer the IdP's discovery endpoint.
discovery = await get_oidc_discovery(discovery_url)
revocation_endpoint = discovery.get("revocation_endpoint")
if not revocation_endpoint:
logger.debug("IdP advertises no revocation_endpoint; skipping")
return
client_id = cfg.get("client_id") or settings.oidc_client_id
client_secret = cfg.get("client_secret") or settings.oidc_client_secret
if not (client_id and client_secret):
logger.debug("No OIDC client credentials available for revocation")
return
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
response = await http_client.post(
revocation_endpoint,
data={
"token": refresh_token,
"token_type_hint": "refresh_token",
},
auth=(client_id, client_secret),
)
if response.status_code >= 400:
logger.warning(
"Refresh token revocation returned HTTP %s", response.status_code
)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Refresh token revocation failed: %s", e)