Files
mcp-nextcloud/nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/token_utils.py
T
Chris CoutinhoandClaude Opus 4.7 15dbb26349 fix(auth): harden OAuth/session for hosted multi-tenant deployment (#626)
Pre-launch hardening for the hosted Astrolabe Cloud offering. Addresses
all five findings raised in #626 (Tim Kaufmann, code review of v0.65.0).
Re-verified against master before fixing.

Finding 3 (LLM-controllable user_id) — drop user_id from the public
signatures of provision_nextcloud_access, revoke_nextcloud_access,
check_provisioning_status, check_logged_in. Tool wrappers now always
derive identity from the verified AccessToken; user_id is no longer
accepted as MCP input. Adds parameterized CI-guard test that locks the
schema.

Finding 2 (predictable session cookie) — replace mcp_session=<user_id>
cookie with a cryptographically random session_id mapped server-side
(new browser_sessions table, alembic 005). Cookie value is opaque,
expires, revocable. SessionAuthBackend looks up user_id via the new
mapping and additionally requires a refresh token to fail closed.

Finding 4 (logout doesn't revoke refresh token) — oauth_logout now
calls the IdP revocation_endpoint (RFC 7009) when advertised, deletes
the stored refresh token regardless, and clears the browser_sessions
row. Cleanup is best-effort: logout always 302s.

Finding 1 (unverified ID token decodes) — verify_id_token helper does
JWKS signature + issuer + audience + exp + nonce checks per OIDC core
3.1.3.7. Used by both OAuth callback handlers (browser + MCP). Removes
the four "verify_signature: False" decodes that previously trusted IdP
claims unconditionally. Drops dead-code _validate_token_audience in
token_broker. Refactors token_utils + provisioning_decorator to read
user_id from the verified AccessToken instead of re-decoding the JWT.

Finding 5 (hardcoded Fernet keys in docker-compose.yml) — replace the
three inline TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY values with required env var
interpolation; document in env.sample.

Test coverage: 4 new unit test modules (signature pinning, browser
sessions, ID-token verification, logout + revoke + session backend).
693 unit tests pass; ruff/format/ty clean.

Migration note: existing browser admin-UI sessions become invalid on
rollout (cookies are looked up against the new browser_sessions table,
which starts empty). Users re-login. MCP API access is unaffected.

Tracked on Astrolabe Cloud POC board card #37.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 17:03:57 +02:00

160 lines
5.4 KiB
Python

"""Token utility functions for extracting user identity from MCP access tokens.
Extracted from server/oauth_tools.py to break circular import dependencies
between server/ and auth/ layers.
"""
import logging
from typing import Any
import jwt
from jwt import PyJWKSet
from mcp.server.auth.middleware.auth_context import get_access_token
from mcp.server.auth.provider import AccessToken
from mcp.server.fastmcp import Context
from ..http import nextcloud_httpx_client
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class IdTokenVerificationError(Exception):
"""Raised when an OIDC ID token fails signature or claim verification."""
async def verify_id_token(
id_token: str,
*,
discovery_url: str,
expected_audience: str,
expected_nonce: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Verify an OIDC ID token's signature and standard claims.
Implements the verification steps required by OIDC core spec section
3.1.3.7 (ID Token Validation) for the authorization-code flow:
- Signature against JWKS (RS256)
- Issuer matches the OP that issued the token
- Audience contains the expected client_id
- Token is not expired (`exp`)
- `iat` is well-formed (PyJWT default)
- `nonce` matches when one was included in the auth request
Replaces the prior `jwt.decode(id_token, options={"verify_signature": False})`
pattern (issue #626 finding 1) on the OAuth callback paths.
Args:
id_token: Raw ID token (JWT) string.
discovery_url: OIDC `.well-known/openid-configuration` URL of the IdP.
expected_audience: The MCP-server-side OAuth client_id used for this
authorization request.
expected_nonce: When the auth request included a nonce, the same value
so it can be checked here. None disables the nonce check (callers
that didn't bind a nonce in the auth request).
Returns:
Decoded, verified ID-token claims.
Raises:
IdTokenVerificationError: On any verification failure.
"""
if not id_token:
raise IdTokenVerificationError("ID token missing from token response")
try:
async with nextcloud_httpx_client() as http_client:
discovery_response = await http_client.get(discovery_url)
discovery_response.raise_for_status()
discovery = discovery_response.json()
issuer = discovery.get("issuer")
jwks_uri = discovery.get("jwks_uri")
if not issuer or not jwks_uri:
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
"OIDC discovery response missing issuer or jwks_uri"
)
jwks_response = await http_client.get(jwks_uri)
jwks_response.raise_for_status()
jwks_data = jwks_response.json()
except IdTokenVerificationError:
raise
except Exception as e:
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
f"Failed to fetch OIDC discovery / JWKS: {e}"
) from e
try:
jwks = PyJWKSet.from_dict(jwks_data)
unverified_header = jwt.get_unverified_header(id_token)
kid = unverified_header.get("kid")
if not kid:
raise IdTokenVerificationError("ID token header missing 'kid'")
try:
signing_key = jwks[kid]
except KeyError as e:
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
f"No JWKS key matches ID token kid {kid!r}"
) from e
payload: dict[str, Any] = jwt.decode(
id_token,
signing_key.key,
algorithms=["RS256"],
audience=expected_audience,
issuer=issuer,
options={
"verify_signature": True,
"verify_exp": True,
"verify_iat": True,
"verify_aud": True,
"verify_iss": True,
"require": ["sub", "iss", "aud", "exp", "iat"],
},
)
except IdTokenVerificationError:
raise
except jwt.PyJWTError as e:
raise IdTokenVerificationError(f"ID token verification failed: {e}") from e
except Exception as e:
raise IdTokenVerificationError(
f"Unexpected error verifying ID token: {e}"
) from e
if expected_nonce is not None and payload.get("nonce") != expected_nonce:
raise IdTokenVerificationError("ID token nonce does not match request nonce")
return payload
async def extract_user_id_from_token(ctx: Context) -> str:
"""Extract user_id from the verified MCP access token.
Reads the `sub` claim from `AccessToken.resource`, which is populated by
`UnifiedTokenVerifier` after JWT signature verification (or token
introspection for opaque tokens). We never re-decode the raw token here:
the verifier has already validated the signature and extracted the
identity claim.
Args:
ctx: MCP context with access token (unused — kept for the public API)
Returns:
user_id from the verified token, or "default_user" when no token is
present (e.g. BasicAuth mode where this should not be called).
"""
access_token: AccessToken | None = get_access_token()
if not access_token:
logger.warning("No access token found via get_access_token()")
return "default_user"
user_id = access_token.resource
if not user_id:
logger.error(
"Access token has no resource (sub) claim — verifier should have rejected it"
)
return "default_user"
return user_id