The previous round of review feedback rested on a misunderstanding — that the MCP server is "the OAuth issuer" under Login Flow v2 and that NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET are external-IdP-only. Code says otherwise (app.py:619/625/703-717, unified_verifier.py:72): - The MCP server is an OIDC relying party of Nextcloud OIDC. Tokens are signed by Nextcloud and validated against Nextcloud's JWKS in all modes — the server has no private signing keys. - Static NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET are the preferred way to register the MCP server as that relying party; RFC 7591 DCR is a fallback when both are unset. - Login Flow v2 layers per-user app-password acquisition on top — it governs the MCP→Nextcloud data leg, not the relying-party setup. This commit reverts the inaccuracies introduced by35c115eand reframes the original `login-flow-v2.md` to match what the code does: - login-flow-v2.md: revise "How It Works" to describe the MCP server as an OIDC RP + OAuth facade (not a standalone issuer); rename "OAuth Issuer Endpoints" → "OAuth Endpoints" with a note that those endpoints front Nextcloud OIDC; add NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET to the required env vars with DCR documented as fallback. - running.md: restore the static-creds Docker example (deleted in35c115eon the wrong reasoning that it was tied to the retired direct-OAuth-to-Nextcloud flow); rewrite the OAuth Mode section intro to describe the actual relying-party + facade architecture. - configuration.md: fix Best Practices "For Production" to mention static creds as preferred / DCR as fallback; restore the .oauth Docker volume alongside data so DCR-registered MCP-client state and the encrypted app-password DB both persist. - auth-flows.md: drop the note added in35c115ethat wrongly claimed the MCP server validates Bearer tokens against its own JWKS under Login Flow v2 — it validates against Nextcloud's JWKS in all modes; reword the Login Flow v2 "Key characteristics" bullet that called the MCP server "the OAuth authorization server". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Login Flow v2 (Multi-User Mode)
This is the recommended multi-user deployment mode for the Nextcloud MCP Server. It works with stock Nextcloud 16+ (no upstream patches) and is the mode used by hosted offerings like Astrolabe Cloud.
For the design rationale, see ADR-022. For other deployment modes, see Authentication.
How It Works
Two authentication legs, each with a different mechanism:
┌─────────────────┐ OAuth/OIDC ┌──────────────────┐ App password ┌─────────────────┐
│ MCP Client │ ───────────────> │ MCP Server │ ────────────────> │ Nextcloud │
│ (Claude, etc.) │ (mcp:* scopes) │ (OIDC RP of NC, │ (Basic Auth) │ (NC 16+, │
│ │ │ OAuth facade, │ │ OIDC issuer) │
│ │ │ app-pwd holder) │ │ │
└─────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
- MCP client → MCP server: OAuth 2.1 with PKCE. The MCP server is not a standalone OAuth issuer — it acts as an OIDC relying party of Nextcloud OIDC and exposes an OAuth facade in front of it. Tokens are signed by Nextcloud's OIDC provider, validated by the MCP server against Nextcloud's JWKS, and carry
mcp:*scopes that gate which tools the user can call. - MCP server → Nextcloud (auth leg): The MCP server registers itself with Nextcloud's OIDC provider via static
NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET(preferred) or RFC 7591 DCR (fallback). This relationship is used for OIDC discovery, JWKS retrieval, and token validation — not for proxying client tokens to Nextcloud APIs. - MCP server → Nextcloud (data leg): Per-user app password obtained via Nextcloud's native Login Flow v2. Sent as HTTP Basic Auth.
App passwords appear in Settings → Security → Devices & Sessions in Nextcloud and can be revoked by the user at any time.
Why not forward OAuth bearer tokens to Nextcloud?
Earlier deployment modes forwarded the client's OAuth bearer token directly to Nextcloud APIs. That required upstream patches to user_oidc (Bearer-token validation on non-OCS endpoints) which were never merged. Nextcloud also doesn't enforce OAuth scopes on its app APIs even when Bearer tokens are accepted, so the security guarantees were weaker than they appeared. App passwords are the simplest mechanism that works on every supported Nextcloud version and surfaces user-revocable credentials in the standard UI.
Scope enforcement happens at the MCP server layer (defense-in-depth). See Scope Enforcement below.
Setup
Required Environment Variables
# Nextcloud connection
NEXTCLOUD_HOST=https://your.nextcloud.example.com
# OIDC client credentials for the MCP server's relying-party relationship with Nextcloud OIDC.
# Preferred path: register a client in Nextcloud admin → OIDC and set these. If both are unset
# and Nextcloud advertises a `registration_endpoint`, the server falls back to RFC 7591 DCR.
NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=<your-client-id>
NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=<your-client-secret>
# Enable Login Flow v2 (per-user app-password provisioning for the MCP→Nextcloud data leg)
ENABLE_LOGIN_FLOW=true
# App-password storage (required for persistence across restarts)
TOKEN_STORAGE_DB=/app/data/tokens.db
TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<fernet-key> # see "Generating an encryption key" below
# Public URLs (for browser redirects)
NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL=https://mcp.example.com
NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL=https://your.nextcloud.example.com # Public URL of Nextcloud
Generating an Encryption Key
App passwords are stored encrypted with Fernet. Generate a key once and reuse it:
python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"
Lose the key and stored app passwords become unrecoverable — users will need to re-provision.
Docker Compose
The repo ships with a working reference under the login-flow profile:
docker compose --profile login-flow up -d
# Server listens on http://localhost:8004
Excerpt from docker-compose.yml:
mcp-login-flow:
build: .
command: ["--transport", "streamable-http", "--oauth", "--port", "8004"]
ports:
- 127.0.0.1:8004:8004
environment:
- NEXTCLOUD_HOST=http://app:80
- NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL=http://localhost:8004
- NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL=http://localhost:8080
- ENABLE_LOGIN_FLOW=true
- TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<your-fernet-key>
- TOKEN_STORAGE_DB=/app/data/tokens.db
volumes:
- login-flow-data:/app/data
- login-flow-oauth-storage:/app/.oauth
The --oauth flag enables the OAuth/OIDC identity layer that Login Flow v2 builds on (user identity via OAuth session, Nextcloud access via app passwords).
Per-User Provisioning Flow
Each user goes through provisioning once, the first time they connect. Subsequent requests reuse the stored app password.
┌─────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ MCP Client │ │ MCP Server │ │ Nextcloud │
└──────┬──────┘ └────────┬─────────┘ └────────┬────────┘
│ 1. OAuth PKCE │ │
├─────────────────────────────────>│ │
│ ← access token (mcp:* scopes) │ │
│ │ │
│ 2. MCP request │ │
├─────────────────────────────────>│ │
│ │ │
│ 3. No stored app password → │ │
│ elicit URL or 401 │ │
│<─────────────────────────────────┤ │
│ "Visit <login-url> to grant │ │
│ access" │ │
│ │ 4. POST /index.php/login/v2 │
│ ├────────────────────────────────────>│
│ │ ← {login_url, poll_endpoint, token}│
│ │ │
│ 5. User opens login_url in browser, authenticates, clicks "Grant" │
│ ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────> │
│ │ │
│ │ 6. Poll endpoint (background) │
│ ├────────────────────────────────────>│
│ │ ← {loginName, appPassword} │
│ │ │
│ │ 7. Encrypt + store in SQLite │
│ │ │
│ 8. Retry MCP request │ │
├─────────────────────────────────>│ │
│ │ 9. GET /apps/notes/... │
│ ├────────────────────────────────────>│
│ │ Authorization: Basic <app-pwd> │
│ │ ← response │
│ 10. ← result │ │
Provisioning Endpoints
The server exposes browser endpoints for management UIs (Astrolabe, custom dashboards):
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|
GET /app/provision?redirect_uri=… |
Start Login Flow v2 and redirect to Nextcloud's grant page |
GET /app/provision/status?id=… |
Check whether the background poll has completed |
Both require a valid OAuth bearer token in the Authorization header (the user's identity is taken from the token, not from a query parameter).
Implementation: nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/provision_routes.py.
Provisioning via MCP Tools (Elicitation)
For MCP clients, the same flow is exposed as tools (nc_auth_provision_access, nc_auth_check_status). Clients that support URL elicitation (MCP spec 2025-11-25) get a clickable link automatically; clients without that capability fall back to a copy-paste URL in an error message. See ADR-022 §"MCP Elicitation for Login Flow v2" for the full capability matrix.
Scope Enforcement
Nextcloud's app passwords have no native scope support — they grant the user's full API access. The MCP server enforces scopes at the application layer.
Scope Reference
| Scope | Operations | Tool count |
|---|---|---|
mcp:notes.read |
Read access (get, list, search) across all Nextcloud apps | ~36 tools |
mcp:notes.write |
Write access (create, update, delete) across all Nextcloud apps | ~54 tools |
The historical
notes.read/notes.writenaming covers all Nextcloud apps, not just the Notes app — it's a project-wide read/write distinction.
Standard OIDC scopes (openid, profile, email) are also supported and have no effect on tool access.
How Scopes Are Enforced
Each MCP tool is decorated with @require_scopes(...):
@mcp.tool()
@require_scopes("mcp:notes.read")
async def nc_notes_get_note(note_id: int, ctx: Context):
...
When a client calls list_tools, the server returns only tools the user has granted scopes for (dynamic tool filtering). When a client calls a tool whose scope is missing, the server returns:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="insufficient_scope",
scope="mcp:notes.write",
resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
Clients can use this header to trigger step-up authorization — re-running the OAuth flow with additional scopes.
Implementation: nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/scope_authorization.py.
OAuth Endpoints
When --oauth is enabled, the MCP server exposes OAuth 2.1 endpoints. These endpoints front Nextcloud OIDC — discovery metadata, token issuance, and JWKS still come from Nextcloud; the MCP server is not a standalone OAuth issuer.
| Endpoint | RFC | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server |
RFC 8414 | Server metadata (advertises Nextcloud OIDC as the upstream issuer) |
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp |
RFC 9728 | PRM — advertises supported scopes (dynamically discovered from @require_scopes) |
POST /register |
RFC 7591 | Dynamic Client Registration (for MCP clients; see also NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/SECRET for the MCP server's own RP credentials) |
PUT/DELETE /register/{client_id} |
RFC 7592 | Client management with registration token |
GET /authorize |
RFC 6749 | Authorization endpoint (PKCE required, S256) |
POST /token |
RFC 6749 | Token endpoint |
Implementation: nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/oauth_routes.py, nextcloud_mcp_server/auth/client_registration.py.
PKCE with S256 is mandatory — required by the MCP specification and enforced at the authorization endpoint.
Token Format
The MCP server can issue or accept either JWT or opaque access tokens depending on configuration.
| JWT (recommended) | Opaque | |
|---|---|---|
| Validation | Signature check via JWKS (local, fast) | Introspection HTTP call |
| Scope claim | Embedded in scope claim |
Returned by introspection endpoint |
| Size | ~800-1200 chars | ~72 chars |
| Standard | RFC 9068 | RFC 7662 |
JWTs are preferred for production because validation is local and stateless. Opaque tokens are useful when you need server-side revocation without JWT blocklist infrastructure.
Troubleshooting
"Provisioning loop" — user keeps being asked to authorize
Check that TOKEN_STORAGE_DB is on a persistent volume. The default (/tmp or per-process tempfile) is wiped on container restart, so each restart loses every stored app password.
"Failed to start login flow" / 502 from /app/provision
The MCP server cannot reach Nextcloud at NEXTCLOUD_HOST. Verify network connectivity and that NEXTCLOUD_HOST uses an address reachable from the server (not the user's browser). For Docker Compose deployments, this is typically the internal service hostname (e.g. http://app:80).
"Login URL points to localhost in browser"
NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL is missing or wrong. Set it to the public URL of Nextcloud as the user's browser sees it. The server rewrites the login URL's origin from the internal NEXTCLOUD_HOST to NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL before redirecting the browser.
Stored app password rejected by Nextcloud (401)
The user revoked it from Settings → Security → Devices & Sessions. Delete the row from the storage DB (or call nc_auth_provision_access again) to trigger a fresh Login Flow.
cryptography.fernet.InvalidToken on startup
TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY changed since the DB was created — stored app passwords cannot be decrypted with a different key. Either restore the original key or wipe the DB and have users re-provision.
Multiple worker processes
The provisioning session store is in-memory; ENABLE_LOGIN_FLOW=true assumes a single worker. Running with uvicorn --workers N will cause provisioning sessions to randomly fail. For higher concurrency, scale horizontally (multiple containers behind a sticky-session load balancer) rather than within a single process.
Sticky-session keying: route on the user's OAuth bearer token (or a session cookie tied to the user) — not on source IP. MCP clients may not maintain stable IPs between the request that initiates provisioning and the polling request that completes it, so IP-based affinity will silently break the flow. A stable per-user identifier from the
Authorizationheader is the right key.
See Also
- ADR-022: Deployment Mode Consolidation — design rationale
- Authentication — overview of all deployment modes
- Authentication Flows — sequence diagrams per mode
- Configuration — full environment variable reference
- Nextcloud Login Flow v2 spec