Files
mcp-nextcloud/tests/integration/test_acl_shared_search.py
T
Chris CoutinhoandClaude Opus 4.8 8cae7d1708 fix(search): address PR #834 review findings
Resolve the latest PR-review comment on the verify-on-read tag-gate work:

- tests: stringify note IDs in test_verify_on_read.py so SearchResult.id
  matches production (scanner stringifies all IDs on write) — helper and the
  keeps/deleted/mixed/dedupe assertions (blocking).
- tests: make the unshared-file negative control a PDF so the drop is
  unambiguously "unshared", not a mime_type_filter mismatch.
- config: add Validator("VECTOR_SYNC_PDF_TAG", len_min=1) — an empty tag name
  would make find_files_by_tag("") misbehave in the verifier and scanner.
- verification: correct the _verify_files comment — two batch fetches (tag
  REPORT + EXCLUDED_TAGS lookup) are held under one semaphore slot; the
  pure-Python intersection runs outside it.
- tests: de-duplicate the minimal-PDF constant into a shared PDF_BYTES in
  tests/integration/conftest.py, imported by both integration modules.

Verified: ruff/format/ty/unit all green; the two integration modules
(10 tests) pass against a local Nextcloud (app-only, no MCP profile needed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-02 23:09:46 +02:00

295 lines
11 KiB
Python

"""End-to-end ACL-aware semantic search against a real Nextcloud (PR #813).
This is the card-120 acceptance criterion exercised across the *new* code
paths together:
1. ``list_accessible_owners`` resolves the querying user's real OCS shares into
the set of owner UIDs they may search.
2. ``SemanticSearchAlgorithm`` applies the expanded ownership filter in Qdrant.
3. ``verify_search_results`` re-checks each hit against real Nextcloud
(ACL-aware, by global file id).
Qdrant is in-memory and seeded directly with one point owned by *alice* — this
deliberately stands in for the background scanner (whose only relevant change
is writing ``owner_id`` into the payload, covered separately). Nextcloud itself
is real, so the share lookup (step 1) and the verification (step 3) exercise
the live OCS Sharing + WebDAV APIs. The result: bob, with whom alice shared the
file, finds it without having indexed anything; diana, with no share, does not.
The pure-filter matrix lives in ``test_acl_owner_filter.py`` and the
verification layer in ``test_verify_on_read.py``; this test is the glue that
proves the real share → accessible_owners → filter → verify chain.
"""
import os
import uuid
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
import pytest
from httpx import BasicAuth
from qdrant_client import AsyncQdrantClient
from qdrant_client.models import Distance, PointStruct, VectorParams
from nextcloud_mcp_server.client import NextcloudClient
from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import get_settings
from nextcloud_mcp_server.embedding import SimpleEmbeddingProvider
from nextcloud_mcp_server.search.access_filter import (
clear_accessible_owners_cache,
list_accessible_owners,
)
from nextcloud_mcp_server.search.context import get_chunk_with_context
from nextcloud_mcp_server.search.semantic import SemanticSearchAlgorithm
from nextcloud_mcp_server.search.verification import verify_search_results
from tests.integration.conftest import PDF_BYTES
pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _reset_owners_cache():
"""Reset the process-global accessible-owners cache around each test so a
real OCS share created in a fixture isn't masked by a stale cached entry."""
clear_accessible_owners_cache()
yield
clear_accessible_owners_cache()
_DOC_TEXT = "Confidential quarterly infrastructure budget and capacity plan"
def _user_client(username: str, password: str) -> NextcloudClient:
return NextcloudClient(
base_url=os.environ["NEXTCLOUD_HOST"],
username=username,
auth=BasicAuth(username, password),
password=password,
)
@pytest.fixture
async def acl_users(test_users_setup):
"""alice (owner), bob (recipient), diana (no access) direct clients."""
clients = {
name: _user_client(name, test_users_setup[name]["password"])
for name in ("alice", "bob", "diana")
}
try:
yield clients
finally:
for c in clients.values():
await c._client.aclose()
@pytest.fixture
async def shared_file(acl_users):
"""alice creates a nested PDF, tags it ``vector-index``, and shares it with
bob (not diana).
The vector-index tag is required because verify-on-read now gates file
results on current tag membership (in addition to ACL access). The tag is
created userVisible so the owner's assignment surfaces in the recipient's
systemtag REPORT — this fixture is the live check of that assumption.
Yields (file_id, owner_relative_path); cleans up the directory after.
"""
alice = acl_users["alice"]
suffix = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
test_dir = f"acl_e2e_{suffix}"
nested = f"{test_dir}/reports"
path = f"{nested}/budget.pdf"
await alice.webdav.create_directory(test_dir)
await alice.webdav.create_directory(nested)
await alice.webdav.write_file(path, PDF_BYTES, "application/pdf")
file_id = (await alice.webdav.get_file_info(path))["id"]
tag = await alice.webdav.get_or_create_tag(
name=get_settings().vector_sync_pdf_tag,
user_visible=True,
user_assignable=True,
)
await alice.webdav.assign_tag_to_file(file_id, tag["id"])
await alice.sharing.create_share(
path=f"/{path}", share_with="bob", share_type=0, permissions=1
)
try:
yield file_id, path
finally:
try:
await alice.webdav.remove_tag_from_file(file_id, tag["id"])
except Exception:
pass
await alice.webdav.delete_resource(test_dir)
@pytest.fixture
async def seeded_semantic(monkeypatch, shared_file):
"""In-memory Qdrant carrying alice's file point, wired into the algorithm.
Stands in for the background scanner: the point carries ``owner_id=alice``
exactly as the scanner now writes it.
"""
file_id, path = shared_file
provider = SimpleEmbeddingProvider(dimension=384)
client = AsyncQdrantClient(":memory:")
collection = get_settings().get_collection_name()
await client.create_collection(
collection_name=collection,
vectors_config={"dense": VectorParams(size=384, distance=Distance.COSINE)},
)
await client.upsert(
collection_name=collection,
points=[
PointStruct(
id=int(file_id),
vector={"dense": await provider.embed(_DOC_TEXT)},
payload={
"doc_id": str(file_id),
"doc_type": "file",
"owner_id": "alice",
"user_id": "alice",
"is_placeholder": False,
"file_path": path,
"title": "budget.pdf",
"excerpt": _DOC_TEXT,
"chunk_index": 0,
"total_chunks": 1,
},
)
],
wait=True,
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.search.semantic.get_qdrant_client",
AsyncMock(return_value=client),
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.search.semantic.get_embedding_service",
lambda: provider,
)
# The cached-chunk lookups (get_chunk_with_context) read the client from the
# context module — point it at the same in-memory Qdrant.
monkeypatch.setattr(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.search.context.get_qdrant_client",
AsyncMock(return_value=client),
)
yield file_id
await client.close()
async def _search_as(user_client, file_id_unused) -> list:
"""Run the full new chain (share lookup → filter → verify) as a user."""
accessible_owners = await list_accessible_owners(
user_client.sharing, user_client.username
)
algo = SemanticSearchAlgorithm(score_threshold=0.0)
unverified = await algo.search(
query=_DOC_TEXT,
user_id=user_client.username,
limit=10,
doc_type="file",
accessible_owners=accessible_owners,
)
kept, _dropped = await verify_search_results(user_client, unverified)
return kept
async def test_recipient_finds_shared_file_without_indexing(acl_users, seeded_semantic):
"""Bob finds alice's shared file end-to-end: real share lookup expands his
accessible owners to include alice, the filter surfaces her point, and
real verification confirms both his ACL access AND that the file is still
in the vector-index tag set — all without bob indexing.
This also exercises the strict tag-gate's key assumption: a vector-index
tag alice assigned (userVisible) surfaces in bob's systemtag REPORT for a
file shared into his tree. If a future Nextcloud version stops surfacing an
owner's tag to a recipient, this assertion is where it fails first."""
file_id = seeded_semantic
# Sanity: the live OCS lookup really does expand bob to include alice.
owners = await list_accessible_owners(acl_users["bob"].sharing, "bob")
assert "alice" in owners, "OCS shared-with-me must surface alice as an owner"
kept = await _search_as(acl_users["bob"], file_id)
assert [r.id for r in kept] == [str(file_id)], (
"bob must find alice's shared file via semantic search"
)
async def test_non_recipient_does_not_find_file(acl_users, seeded_semantic):
"""Diana, with no share, never sees the file: her accessible-owners set
excludes alice, so the ownership filter drops the point before verification."""
owners = await list_accessible_owners(acl_users["diana"].sharing, "diana")
assert "alice" not in owners
kept = await _search_as(acl_users["diana"], seeded_semantic)
assert kept == [], "diana (no share) must not find alice's file"
async def test_file_accessible_by_id_resolves_shares(acl_users, shared_file):
"""Lock the verify-on-read contract directly on ``file_accessible_by_id``.
The WebDAV SEARCH-by-fileid with ``scope=""`` must resolve a file that the
caller does NOT own but which is shared with them. This is the exact check
verify-on-read depends on for shared, nested files; a Nextcloud change to
how ``scope=""`` is interpreted would otherwise silently break ACL-aware
verification. The file lives in a subfolder, so a path-based check would
404 for the recipient — only the by-id SEARCH gets it right.
"""
file_id, _path = shared_file
fid = int(file_id)
# Owner and share recipient can both reach it...
assert await acl_users["alice"].webdav.file_accessible_by_id(fid) is True
assert await acl_users["bob"].webdav.file_accessible_by_id(fid) is True
# ...the non-recipient cannot.
assert await acl_users["diana"].webdav.file_accessible_by_id(fid) is False
async def test_cross_user_file_chunk_context(acl_users, seeded_semantic):
"""End-to-end cross-user FILE chunk context: Bob (a share recipient) gets
Alice's cached chunk text, Diana (no share) gets None.
Exercises the full secure path: the ACL-aware Qdrant cached-chunk lookup
(owner_id=alice surfaces for Bob) gated by a real per-file
``file_accessible_by_id`` check against live Nextcloud. Diana fails the gate
and is denied even though the chunk is cached. Per-user types are covered by
the self-only behaviour elsewhere — this is the file path the feature adds.
"""
file_id = seeded_semantic
bob = acl_users["bob"]
diana = acl_users["diana"]
bob_owners = await list_accessible_owners(bob.sharing, "bob")
assert "alice" in bob_owners
ctx = await get_chunk_with_context(
nc_client=bob,
user_id="bob",
doc_id=str(file_id),
doc_type="file",
chunk_start=0,
chunk_end=len(_DOC_TEXT),
chunk_index=0,
total_chunks=1,
accessible_owners=bob_owners,
)
assert ctx is not None, "Bob (share recipient) must get Alice's cached chunk"
assert ctx.chunk_text == _DOC_TEXT
# Diana has no share → per-file gate denies even though the chunk is cached.
diana_owners = await list_accessible_owners(diana.sharing, "diana")
denied = await get_chunk_with_context(
nc_client=diana,
user_id="diana",
doc_id=str(file_id),
doc_type="file",
chunk_start=0,
chunk_end=len(_DOC_TEXT),
chunk_index=0,
total_chunks=1,
accessible_owners=diana_owners,
)
assert denied is None, "Diana (no share) must not get cross-user chunk context"