Chris CoutinhoandClaude Opus 4.7
d717c64750
Addresses all 8 items in the round-4 bot review plus 4 remaining SonarQube OPEN issues that were silently broken by round 3's malformed NOSONAR markers. NOSONAR syntax fix (clears the remaining 4 OPEN SQ issues) ---------------------------------------------------------- Round 3 used ``# NOSONAR S<rule_key>`` form. SonarQube Python doesn't recognize the rule-key suffix — it treats the whole thing as a malformed suppression directive (S7632) AND lets the underlying rule keep firing (S7503 on ``_Cursor.__aenter__/__aexit__``). Switch every marker to bare ``# NOSONAR``, with the rationale moved into a preceding comment block. Affected sites: - storage.py: ``_Cursor.__aenter__``, ``_Cursor.__aexit__`` - config.py: ``get_database_ssl()`` ``return False`` + ``ssl.create_default_context()`` - test_storage_logging.py: ``SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT`` constant - test_storage_postgres.py: three ``bob_pw_v1`` / ``bob_pw_v2`` / ``carol_pw`` literals Bot 🔴#1 — defensive NOSONAR on get_database_ssl `return False` -------------------------------------------------------------- Bot predicted S4830 fires on the operator-opt-out path. SQ output shows it doesn't currently fire, but bare NOSONAR added defensively with rationale comment. Bot 🔴#2 — defensive NOSONAR on f-string SQL -------------------------------------------- ``update_oauth_session`` builds its SET clause via ``f"{', '.join(update_fields)}"``; ``get_audit_logs`` builds its WHERE clause via string concatenation. Both are safe (the fragments only come from this function's own branches, no user input), but the patterns trip taint analysers. Annotated both with bare NOSONAR + safety comment explaining the hardcoded-fragments invariant. Note: S2077 doesn't currently fire on these; defensive. Bot 🟡#3 — pg_advisory_lock for concurrent migrations ----------------------------------------------------- Without coordination, two pods rolling-updating simultaneously can both observe ``has_alembic=False`` and both try to apply migrations from scratch — the second crashes with "relation already exists". New ``_migration_lock()`` async context manager: - On Postgres: ``SELECT pg_advisory_lock(:lock_id)`` on a fresh connection (separate from the engine pool so it survives the ``to_thread.run_sync`` worker), held across BOTH the schema-inspect AND the migration call. Without that span, two pods could each observe "no alembic_version" before either started migrating, defeating the lock. - On SQLite: yields immediately (file-level locking serializes writes natively). Lock ID derived from ``sha256(b"nextcloud-mcp-server:migrations")[:8]`` as a stable signed int64 so we can't collide with other apps sharing the same Postgres. Bot 🟡#4 — RefreshTokenStorage.close() + lifespan wiring -------------------------------------------------------- New idempotent ``close()`` method calls ``await engine.dispose()``, nulls the engine, resets ``_initialized``. Wired into both ``app_lifespan_basic`` (BasicAuth) and the OAuth lifespan teardown, each wrapped in ``try/except Exception`` with ``logger.warning`` so a buggy dispose can't block SIGTERM. Without this, pooled asyncpg connections leak server-side slots until ``idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`` reaps them — with small pool defaults and frequent k8s rolling restarts this can starve ``max_connections``. Bot 🟢#5 — is_sqlite_url docstring on :memory: ---------------------------------------------- Updated docstring to note both file-backed and in-memory forms are recognized; caller is responsible for ``:memory:`` magic. Bot 🟢#6 — db_path via make_url(...).database --------------------------------------------- Replaced ``database_url.split("///", 1)[1]`` hack with SQLAlchemy's own URL parsing. Naturally handles in-memory (``.database is None`` → falls back to ``""``). Same lazy-import pattern as the existing ``mask_db_password`` to avoid module-import-time cost. Bot 🟢#7 — _to_sync_url unrecognized-driver guard ------------------------------------------------- Pulled ``_KNOWN_ASYNC_DRIVERS = ("aiosqlite", "asyncpg")`` into a module constant. When an unrecognized ``+<driver>`` token survives the strip, emits ``logger.warning`` with the known-supported list. Behavior unchanged for valid URLs. Bot 🟢#8 — get_audit_logs SELECT * → explicit columns ----------------------------------------------------- Replaced ``SELECT *`` with explicit column list. Future schema additions stay out of the dict return. New tests --------- - ``test_close_disposes_engine``: pins the public contract — engine nulled, state reset, second call is a no-op. - ``test_concurrent_initialize_serialized_by_advisory_lock``: spawns 3 concurrent inits against a fresh schema; asserts no "relation already exists" and exactly one ``alembic_version`` row at the end. Without the lock, this reliably fails on the second concurrent task. Docs ---- - ADR-026: new "Concurrent migrations across pods" subsection documents the advisory-lock approach + lock-ID derivation. Verification ------------ - ``uv run pytest tests/unit/`` — 1025 passed. - ``TEST_DATABASE_URL=… uv run pytest tests/integration/test_storage_postgres.py -m postgres`` — 9 passed (was 7). - ``ruff check && ruff format --check && ty check`` — clean. Expected post-push: SQ scan reports 0 OPEN issues (was 4). Tracked on Astrolabe Cloud POC board, card #99. --- _This PR was generated with the help of AI, and reviewed by a Human_ Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
86 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
"""Unit tests guarding against DB-credential leakage to logs (PR #798 round 2).
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The reviewer of PR #798 flagged that ``self.database_url`` was being logged
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verbatim in ``RefreshTokenStorage.initialize()``, exposing any password
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embedded in a Postgres URL to stdout/stderr and any log aggregator. These
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tests pin the masking down so a future contributor can't silently
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reintroduce the leak by adding a new ``logger.info("... %s", database_url)``.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import pytest
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.storage import RefreshTokenStorage
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import mask_db_password
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.unit
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# Synthetic leak-detection sentinel — embedded into test-only URLs so we
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# can grep ``caplog`` and prove the masking path never emits the literal
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# password substring. Not a real credential.
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SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT = "uniqueSecretSentinel123" # NOSONAR
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def test_mask_db_password_postgres():
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"""Postgres URL passwords are replaced with the SQLAlchemy ``***`` token."""
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url = (
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f"postgresql+asyncpg://mcp:{SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT}@db.example.com:5432/mcp"
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)
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT not in masked
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assert "mcp" in masked # username preserved
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assert "db.example.com" in masked # host preserved
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def test_mask_db_password_sqlite_passthrough():
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"""SQLite URLs have no credentials; the function must not corrupt them."""
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url = "sqlite+aiosqlite:////tmp/test-tokens.db"
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert masked == url
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def test_mask_db_password_handles_unparseable_url():
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"""Malformed URLs fall back to a regex scrub instead of raising.
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A logging path that can raise is worse than a logging path that emits a
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less-pretty masked value — never let credentials leak just because the
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URL shape was unexpected.
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"""
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url = f"weird-scheme://user:{SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT}@host/db?ssl=disable"
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masked = mask_db_password(url)
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assert SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT not in masked
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async def test_storage_init_does_not_log_password(caplog):
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"""Construct + initialize against a Postgres-shaped URL with a password
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in the URL and confirm the secret is absent from every captured log."""
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# Use a sqlite URL with a fake password-shaped path — we don't need a
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# real Postgres up to verify the masking logic, only that no log line
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# ever interpolates the raw URL. A sqlite URL doesn't carry a password
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# so we test masking by directly invoking the masked log path with a
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# constructed Postgres URL via mask_db_password itself.
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caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.storage")
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caplog.set_level(logging.DEBUG, logger="nextcloud_mcp_server.migrations")
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import tempfile
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from pathlib import Path
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
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db_path = Path(tmp) / "tokens.db"
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storage = RefreshTokenStorage(db_path=str(db_path), encryption_key=None)
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await storage.initialize()
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# Sanity: the sqlite path was logged at least once.
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assert any("token storage" in rec.message.lower() for rec in caplog.records)
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# The sentinel should never appear (sqlite URL has no password to leak,
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# but if a future change reformatted DATABASE_URL into the message it
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# would). Stay paranoid.
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for rec in caplog.records:
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assert SENTINEL_PASSWORD_FRAGMENT not in rec.getMessage(), (
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f"Credential sentinel leaked into log: {rec.getMessage()!r}"
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)
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