fix(auth): address PR #758 round-7 medium/minor review

- Gate browser session creation on a successful refresh token. When the
  IdP returns no refresh token, SessionAuthBackend would silently reject
  every subsequent request and bounce the user back to /oauth/login in a
  loop. The callback now bails with a 400 + correlation ID + actionable
  hint about offline_access *before* writing browser_sessions or setting
  the cookie. Pinned by a new end-to-end unit test.
- Evict orphaned browser_sessions rows in SessionAuthBackend when the
  associated refresh token is gone, instead of letting them accumulate
  until TTL cleanup. Best-effort; deletion errors stay non-fatal.
- Demote identity-bearing logs in the Flow 2 OAuth callback (user_id,
  scopes, audience, expires_at) from INFO to DEBUG so they don't leak
  into multi-tenant log aggregation on every provision.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Coutinho
2026-05-03 14:21:12 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.7
parent 27fcf05d3a
commit b875eaf069
5 changed files with 221 additions and 35 deletions
@@ -568,30 +568,47 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
token_data.get("scope", "").split() if token_data.get("scope") else None
)
# Store refresh token (for background jobs ONLY)
if refresh_token:
logger.debug(
"Storing refresh token for user_id=%s state=%s... scopes=%s expires_at=%s",
# Store refresh token (for background jobs ONLY). The browser session
# itself is gated on this — without a refresh token, ``SessionAuthBackend``
# would reject every subsequent request and silently bounce the user back
# to ``/oauth/login`` (PR #758 round-7 medium 1).
if not refresh_token:
correlation_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(8)
logger.error(
"No refresh token in token response — cannot establish browser "
"session (correlation_id=%s, user_id=%s)",
correlation_id,
user_id,
state[:16],
granted_scopes,
refresh_expires_at,
)
await storage.store_refresh_token(
user_id=user_id,
refresh_token=refresh_token,
expires_at=refresh_expires_at,
flow_type="browser", # Browser-based login flow
provisioning_client_id=state, # Store state for unified session lookup
scopes=granted_scopes,
return HTMLResponse(
f"<h1>Login Failed</h1>"
f"<p>The identity provider did not return a refresh token, so a "
f"persistent session could not be established. Make sure "
f"<code>offline_access</code> is granted in the IdP configuration.</p>"
f"<p>Correlation ID: <code>{html_escape(correlation_id)}</code></p>",
status_code=400,
)
logger.info(
"Refresh token stored for user %s (lookup key: %s...)",
user_id,
state[:16],
)
else:
logger.warning("No refresh token in token response - cannot store session")
logger.debug(
"Storing refresh token for user_id=%s state=%s... scopes=%s expires_at=%s",
user_id,
state[:16],
granted_scopes,
refresh_expires_at,
)
await storage.store_refresh_token(
user_id=user_id,
refresh_token=refresh_token,
expires_at=refresh_expires_at,
flow_type="browser", # Browser-based login flow
provisioning_client_id=state, # Store state for unified session lookup
scopes=granted_scopes,
)
logger.info(
"Refresh token stored for user %s (lookup key: %s...)",
user_id,
state[:16],
)
# Query and cache user profile (for browser UI display)
access_token = token_data.get("access_token")
+14 -11
View File
@@ -702,16 +702,19 @@ async def oauth_callback_nextcloud(request: Request):
# Some IdPs (e.g. AWS Cognito) return refresh_expires_in as a JSON
# string rather than an int; coerce to be safe.
refresh_expires_at = int(time.time()) + int(refresh_expires_in)
logger.info(" refresh_expires_in: %ss", refresh_expires_in)
logger.info(" refresh_expires_at: %s", refresh_expires_at)
logger.debug(" refresh_expires_in: %ss", refresh_expires_in)
logger.debug(" refresh_expires_at: %s", refresh_expires_at)
logger.info("Storing refresh token:")
logger.info(" user_id: %s", user_id)
logger.info(" flow_type: flow2")
logger.info(" token_audience: nextcloud")
logger.info(" provisioning_client_id: %s...", state[:16])
logger.info(" scopes: %s", granted_scopes)
logger.info(" expires_at: %s", refresh_expires_at)
# Identity-bearing fields stay at DEBUG so they don't reach
# multi-tenant log aggregation on every Flow 2 provision (PR #758
# round-7 minor).
logger.debug("Storing refresh token:")
logger.debug(" user_id: %s", user_id)
logger.debug(" flow_type: flow2")
logger.debug(" token_audience: nextcloud")
logger.debug(" provisioning_client_id: %s...", state[:16])
logger.debug(" scopes: %s", granted_scopes)
logger.debug(" expires_at: %s", refresh_expires_at)
await storage.store_refresh_token(
user_id=user_id,
@@ -722,8 +725,8 @@ async def oauth_callback_nextcloud(request: Request):
scopes=granted_scopes,
expires_at=refresh_expires_at,
)
logger.info("✓ Stored Flow 2 master refresh token for user %s", user_id)
logger.info("=" * 60)
logger.debug("✓ Stored Flow 2 master refresh token for user %s", user_id)
logger.debug("=" * 60)
# Return success HTML page
success_html = """
@@ -101,6 +101,17 @@ class SessionAuthBackend(AuthenticationBackend):
session_id[:8],
user_id,
)
# Proactively evict the orphan so the table doesn't accumulate
# rows that the auth check will keep rejecting until TTL
# cleanup (PR #758 round-7 minor).
try:
await storage.delete_browser_session(session_id)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning(
"Failed to delete orphaned browser session %s…: %s",
session_id[:8],
e,
)
return None
return AuthCredentials(["authenticated"]), SimpleUser(user_id)
+149 -2
View File
@@ -6,9 +6,18 @@ tests / direct ``settings.set`` calls can leave the raw string in place,
and ``bool("false")`` is ``True``.
"""
import pytest
import json
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth import browser_oauth_routes
import httpx
import pytest
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth import browser_oauth_routes, token_utils
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.browser_oauth_routes import oauth_login_callback
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.storage import RefreshTokenStorage
pytestmark = pytest.mark.unit
@@ -71,3 +80,141 @@ def test_should_use_secure_cookies_falls_back_to_http_scheme(monkeypatch):
),
)
assert browser_oauth_routes._should_use_secure_cookies() is False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# oauth_login_callback: missing refresh_token must NOT create a session
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Pins PR #758 round-7 medium 1: when the IdP returns no refresh_token,
# ``SessionAuthBackend`` would silently reject every subsequent request
# (because ``get_refresh_token`` returns None), bouncing the user back to
# ``/oauth/login`` in a loop. The callback now bails with a 400 error page
# *before* any browser_sessions row or Set-Cookie header is created.
@pytest.fixture
def _clear_oidc_caches():
token_utils._discovery_cache.clear()
token_utils._jwks_cache.clear()
token_utils._fetch_locks.clear()
yield
token_utils._discovery_cache.clear()
token_utils._jwks_cache.clear()
token_utils._fetch_locks.clear()
@pytest.fixture
async def _no_refresh_storage():
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
s = RefreshTokenStorage(
db_path=str(Path(tmpdir) / "norefresh.db"),
encryption_key=Fernet.generate_key().decode(),
)
await s.initialize()
yield s
async def test_callback_rejects_token_response_without_refresh_token(
_clear_oidc_caches, _no_refresh_storage
):
storage = _no_refresh_storage
state = "state-norefresh"
await storage.store_oauth_session(
session_id=state,
client_id="browser-ui",
client_redirect_uri="/app",
state=state,
code_challenge="cc",
code_challenge_method="S256",
mcp_authorization_code="cv",
flow_type="browser",
ttl_seconds=600,
)
discovery = {
"issuer": "http://idp.example",
"token_endpoint": "http://idp.example/token",
}
def handler(request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
if request.url.path.endswith("/.well-known/openid-configuration"):
return httpx.Response(
200,
content=json.dumps(discovery).encode(),
headers={"content-type": "application/json"},
)
if str(request.url) == "http://idp.example/token":
# Successful token exchange but no refresh_token (e.g. IdP
# config without offline_access).
return httpx.Response(
200,
content=json.dumps(
{
"access_token": "at",
"id_token": "id-token-stub",
"token_type": "Bearer",
}
).encode(),
headers={"content-type": "application/json"},
)
return httpx.Response(404)
transport = httpx.MockTransport(handler)
def fake_client(**kwargs):
kwargs["transport"] = transport
return httpx.AsyncClient(**kwargs)
request = MagicMock()
request.query_params = {"code": "abc", "state": state}
request.cookies = {}
request.app.state.oauth_context = {
"storage": storage,
"oauth_client": None,
"config": {
"discovery_url": "http://idp.example/.well-known/openid-configuration",
"client_id": "test",
"client_secret": "secret",
"mcp_server_url": "http://localhost",
},
}
request.url_for = MagicMock(return_value="/oauth/login")
fake_userinfo = {"sub": "alice", "preferred_username": "alice"}
with (
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.browser_oauth_routes.nextcloud_httpx_client",
side_effect=fake_client,
),
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.token_utils.nextcloud_httpx_client",
side_effect=fake_client,
),
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.browser_oauth_routes.verify_id_token",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=fake_userinfo),
),
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.browser_oauth_routes._get_userinfo_endpoint",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=None),
),
):
response = await oauth_login_callback(request)
assert response.status_code == 400
body = response.body.decode()
assert "Login Failed" in body
assert "refresh token" in body.lower()
# No browser session row may have been created.
assert await storage.get_browser_session_user("ignored") is None
# Nothing under the verified user_id either.
assert await storage.get_refresh_token("alice") is None
# No Set-Cookie header — the user must not walk away with an unusable
# session cookie.
set_cookie = response.headers.get("set-cookie", "")
assert "mcp_session" not in set_cookie
+9 -1
View File
@@ -586,7 +586,12 @@ async def test_session_backend_rejects_unknown_session(storage):
async def test_session_backend_rejects_session_without_refresh_token(storage):
"""Defense-in-depth: session row exists but user has no refresh token."""
"""Defense-in-depth: session row exists but user has no refresh token.
PR #758 round-7 minor: rejection now also evicts the orphaned
``browser_sessions`` row so the table doesn't accumulate dead entries
that the auth check will keep rejecting until TTL cleanup.
"""
await storage.create_browser_session(session_id="sid-B", user_id="bob")
# Note: NO refresh token stored for bob
@@ -594,6 +599,9 @@ async def test_session_backend_rejects_session_without_refresh_token(storage):
conn = _build_conn(cookie="sid-B", oauth_context={"storage": storage})
assert await backend.authenticate(conn) is None
# Orphan must be evicted on rejection.
assert await storage.get_browser_session_user("sid-B") is None
async def test_session_backend_rejects_when_no_cookie(storage):
backend = SessionAuthBackend(oauth_enabled=True)