fix(auth): address PR #758 round-6 medium/low review

Five findings from the latest review on #758 (2 medium, 3 nit):

Medium:
- browser_oauth_routes.oauth_login_callback + oauth_routes.oauth_callback_nextcloud:
  fail closed with 400 when the oauth_session row is unknown/expired. Previously
  both callbacks fell through with code_verifier="" and expected_nonce=None,
  silently bypassing the PKCE + nonce protections introduced in earlier rounds.
  Symmetric unit tests pin both contracts.
- token_utils.verify_id_token: use secrets.compare_digest for the nonce check
  instead of short-circuit !=. Mirrors the sibling PKCE verifier comparison;
  closes the last secret-equality timing-side-channel surface in the auth path.

Nit:
- Tighten the comment at all 4 mcp_authorization_code/code_verifier store +
  retrieve sites so a future refactor sees the field reuse immediately
  (renaming the column requires a schema migration).
- _should_use_secure_cookies: explicit string normalisation instead of
  bool(settings.cookie_secure). Dynaconf normally coerces but tests / direct
  settings.set calls can leave the raw string in place — bool("false") is True.
  New parametrized unit tests cover the coercion matrix + http/https fallback.
- oauth_routes.py:591 f-string log converted to lazy %s formatting (folded into
  the Flow 2 callback rewrite).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Coutinho
2026-05-03 13:03:49 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.7
parent e2955e8246
commit ec9b9b2a75
5 changed files with 182 additions and 77 deletions
@@ -115,10 +115,15 @@ def _should_use_secure_cookies() -> bool:
versa — would otherwise get the wrong answer.)
"""
settings = get_settings()
if settings.cookie_secure is not None:
# Dynaconf auto-coerces "true"/"false" → bool but "1"/"0" → int;
# bool() normalises both.
return bool(settings.cookie_secure)
raw = settings.cookie_secure
if raw is not None:
# Dynaconf normally coerces "true"/"false"/"1"/"0", but tests or
# direct ``settings.set`` calls can bypass that — bool("false") is
# True. Normalise explicitly so an unexpected string never flips
# cookies to Secure on plain HTTP (round-6 review).
if isinstance(raw, bool):
return raw
return str(raw).strip().lower() not in ("0", "false", "no", "off", "")
mcp_server_url = settings.nextcloud_mcp_server_url or ""
return mcp_server_url.startswith("https://")
@@ -189,7 +194,10 @@ async def oauth_login(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | JSONResponse:
state=state,
code_challenge=code_challenge,
code_challenge_method="S256",
mcp_authorization_code=code_verifier, # Store code_verifier here temporarily
# `mcp_authorization_code` field reused to store the PKCE
# code_verifier (one-time-use). Renaming the column requires a
# schema migration.
mcp_authorization_code=code_verifier,
nonce=nonce,
flow_type="browser",
ttl_seconds=600, # 10 minutes
@@ -355,25 +363,30 @@ async def oauth_login_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse | HTMLRespo
oauth_client = oauth_ctx["oauth_client"]
oauth_config = oauth_ctx["config"]
# Retrieve code_verifier, nonce, and redirect URL from session storage
code_verifier = ""
nonce: str | None = None
next_url = "/app" # Default redirect
# Retrieve code_verifier, nonce, and redirect URL from session storage.
# Fail closed when the row is missing/expired: otherwise PKCE +
# nonce verification silently degrade to no-ops (round-6 review).
oauth_session = await storage.get_oauth_session(state)
if oauth_session:
# code_verifier was stored in mcp_authorization_code field
code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
# nonce bound to this auth request — verified against the ID token
# below (PR #758 finding 2).
nonce = oauth_session.get("nonce")
# next_url was stored in client_redirect_uri field re-validate at
# read-time as defense-in-depth (issue #758 finding 3). The session
# row could have been written by an older code path or reused.
next_url = _safe_next_url(oauth_session.get("client_redirect_uri"), "/app")
# One-time-use session: delete eagerly so a replayed callback can't
# be processed and so the oauth_sessions table doesn't accumulate
# completed-but-not-yet-expired browser-login rows.
await storage.delete_oauth_session(state)
if not oauth_session:
logger.warning("OAuth callback received unknown/expired state=%s", state[:16])
return HTMLResponse(
"Unknown or expired session — please try logging in again.",
status_code=400,
)
# `mcp_authorization_code` field reused to store the PKCE code_verifier
# (one-time-use). Renaming the column requires a schema migration.
code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
# nonce bound to this auth request — verified against the ID token
# below (PR #758 finding 2).
nonce = oauth_session.get("nonce")
# next_url was stored in client_redirect_uri field — re-validate at
# read-time as defense-in-depth (issue #758 finding 3). The session
# row could have been written by an older code path or reused.
next_url = _safe_next_url(oauth_session.get("client_redirect_uri"), "/app")
# One-time-use session: delete eagerly so a replayed callback can't
# be processed and so the oauth_sessions table doesn't accumulate
# completed-but-not-yet-expired browser-login rows.
await storage.delete_oauth_session(state)
# Exchange authorization code for tokens
mcp_server_url = oauth_config["mcp_server_url"]
+27 -15
View File
@@ -479,7 +479,10 @@ async def oauth_authorize_nextcloud(
state=state,
code_challenge=code_challenge,
code_challenge_method="S256",
mcp_authorization_code=code_verifier, # Store code_verifier here temporarily
# `mcp_authorization_code` field reused to store the PKCE
# code_verifier (one-time-use). Renaming the column requires a
# schema migration.
mcp_authorization_code=code_verifier,
nonce=nonce,
flow_type="flow2",
ttl_seconds=600, # 10 minutes
@@ -580,22 +583,31 @@ async def oauth_callback_nextcloud(request: Request):
oauth_config = oauth_ctx["config"]
# Retrieve code_verifier + nonce from session storage (PKCE + OIDC
# nonce binding both required for Flow 2 — round-3 finding 1).
code_verifier = ""
nonce: str | None = None
# nonce binding both required for Flow 2 — round-3 finding 1). Fail
# closed when the row is missing/expired so PKCE + nonce verification
# are not silently bypassed (round-6 review).
oauth_session = await storage.get_oauth_session(state)
if oauth_session:
# code_verifier was stored in mcp_authorization_code field
code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
nonce = oauth_session.get("nonce")
logger.info(
f"Retrieved code_verifier for Flow 2 callback (state={state[:16]}...)"
if not oauth_session:
logger.warning("Flow 2 callback received unknown/expired state=%s", state[:16])
return JSONResponse(
{
"error": "invalid_request",
"error_description": (
"Unknown or expired session — please retry the OAuth flow"
),
},
status_code=400,
)
# One-time-use session: delete eagerly so the stored code_verifier
# can't be replayed for the remainder of the oauth_sessions TTL.
# Mirrors browser_oauth_routes.oauth_login_callback (PR #758
# follow-up review).
await storage.delete_oauth_session(state)
# `mcp_authorization_code` field reused to store the PKCE code_verifier
# (one-time-use). Renaming the column requires a schema migration.
code_verifier = oauth_session.get("mcp_authorization_code", "")
nonce = oauth_session.get("nonce")
logger.info("Retrieved code_verifier for Flow 2 callback (state=%s…)", state[:16])
# One-time-use session: delete eagerly so the stored code_verifier
# can't be replayed for the remainder of the oauth_sessions TTL.
# Mirrors browser_oauth_routes.oauth_login_callback (PR #758
# follow-up review).
await storage.delete_oauth_session(state)
# Exchange code for tokens
mcp_server_client_id = os.getenv(
+8 -1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ between server/ and auth/ layers.
"""
import logging
import secrets
import time
from typing import Any
@@ -232,7 +233,13 @@ async def verify_id_token(
f"Unexpected error verifying ID token: {e}"
) from e
if expected_nonce is not None and payload.get("nonce") != expected_nonce:
# Constant-time comparison mirrors the PKCE verifier check
# (oauth_routes.py:1029) — short-circuit `!=` is avoided in
# security-sensitive equality even when the secret is server-generated
# (round-6 review).
if expected_nonce is not None and not secrets.compare_digest(
payload.get("nonce", "") or "", expected_nonce
):
raise IdTokenVerificationError("ID token nonce does not match request nonce")
return payload
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
"""Unit tests for ``browser_oauth_routes`` helpers.
Pins the round-6 review fix that ``_should_use_secure_cookies`` must not
trust ``bool(settings.cookie_secure)`` — Dynaconf normally coerces but
tests / direct ``settings.set`` calls can leave the raw string in place,
and ``bool("false")`` is ``True``.
"""
import pytest
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth import browser_oauth_routes
pytestmark = pytest.mark.unit
def _fake_settings(*, cookie_secure, mcp_server_url=""):
return type(
"S",
(),
{
"cookie_secure": cookie_secure,
"nextcloud_mcp_server_url": mcp_server_url,
},
)()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value,expected",
[
(True, True),
(False, False),
("true", True),
("false", False),
("True", True),
("FALSE", False),
("0", False),
("1", True),
("no", False),
("yes", True),
("off", False),
("on", True),
("", False),
],
)
def test_should_use_secure_cookies_string_coercion(monkeypatch, value, expected):
monkeypatch.setattr(
browser_oauth_routes,
"get_settings",
lambda: _fake_settings(cookie_secure=value),
)
assert browser_oauth_routes._should_use_secure_cookies() is expected
def test_should_use_secure_cookies_falls_back_to_https_scheme(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(
browser_oauth_routes,
"get_settings",
lambda: _fake_settings(
cookie_secure=None, mcp_server_url="https://mcp.example.com"
),
)
assert browser_oauth_routes._should_use_secure_cookies() is True
def test_should_use_secure_cookies_falls_back_to_http_scheme(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setattr(
browser_oauth_routes,
"get_settings",
lambda: _fake_settings(
cookie_secure=None, mcp_server_url="http://localhost:8000"
),
)
assert browser_oauth_routes._should_use_secure_cookies() is False
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
import httpx
import pytest
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.browser_oauth_routes import oauth_login_callback
from nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.oauth_routes import (
ASProxySession,
_as_proxy_sessions,
@@ -136,51 +136,51 @@ async def test_callback_deletes_oauth_session_after_reading_verifier(storage):
)
async def test_callback_no_session_row_does_not_crash(storage):
"""If the row is already gone (e.g. expired), the callback proceeds."""
async def test_callback_unknown_state_returns_400(storage):
"""Unknown/expired state must fail closed with 400.
Pins the PR #758 round-6 review fix: previously the callback fell
through with empty ``code_verifier`` / ``expected_nonce=None``,
silently bypassing the PKCE + nonce protections introduced in earlier
rounds. The handler now returns 400 before any token exchange.
"""
state = "state-missing"
# No store_oauth_session call — the row never existed.
request = _build_request(code="idp-auth-code", state=state, storage=storage)
fake_discovery = {
"token_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/token",
"userinfo_endpoint": "https://idp.example.com/userinfo",
"issuer": "https://idp.example.com",
response = await oauth_callback_nextcloud(request)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert await storage.get_oauth_session(state) is None
async def test_browser_callback_unknown_state_returns_400(storage):
"""Symmetric unknown-state contract for the browser-flow callback.
Mirrors ``test_callback_unknown_state_returns_400`` for
``oauth_login_callback`` — both callbacks must fail closed when the
oauth_session row is missing/expired (PR #758 round-6 review).
"""
state = "state-missing-browser"
request = MagicMock()
request.query_params = {"code": "idp-auth-code", "state": state}
request.cookies = {}
request.url_for = MagicMock(return_value="/oauth/login")
request.app.state.oauth_context = {
"storage": storage,
"oauth_client": None, # Nextcloud-integrated mode
"config": {
"mcp_server_url": "https://mcp.example.com",
"client_id": "mcp-server",
"client_secret": "mcp-secret",
},
}
fake_token_response = MagicMock()
fake_token_response.json.return_value = {"access_token": "ac"}
fake_token_response.raise_for_status = MagicMock(
side_effect=httpx.HTTPStatusError(
"boom",
request=MagicMock(),
response=MagicMock(status_code=400),
)
)
fake_http = MagicMock()
fake_http.post = AsyncMock(return_value=fake_token_response)
fake_http.__aenter__ = AsyncMock(return_value=fake_http)
fake_http.__aexit__ = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
response = await oauth_login_callback(request)
with (
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.oauth_routes.get_oidc_discovery",
new=AsyncMock(return_value=fake_discovery),
),
patch(
"nextcloud_mcp_server.auth.oauth_routes.nextcloud_httpx_client",
return_value=fake_http,
),
):
# We don't care what happens past the deletion — just that the
# missing-row branch doesn't try to delete a nonexistent session.
try:
await oauth_callback_nextcloud(request)
except Exception:
pass
# No crash, no row, no surprises.
assert response.status_code == 400
assert await storage.get_oauth_session(state) is None