Adds the consumer-driven Pact for the gateway's async batch OCR routes, consumed
by GatewayBatchOcrClient. The embedding gateway is a separate provider
(astrolabe-cloud-gateway) from the existing `astrolabe` credentials pact, so it
gets its own fixture + pact file.
Interactions (only the fields the single-document client reads are pinned, so the
contract is robust to the gateway's additive OcrBatchJobOut fields):
- POST /v1/ocr/batch -> 202 { job_id } (namespaced <provider>/<id>)
- GET /v1/ocr/batch/{job_id} -> pending / succeeded (per-page markdown) / failed
The gateway is unauthenticated today, so no bearer is sent (matching the
M2M-optional client). Provider-side: this publishes a pact the gateway's
verification job must now satisfy — it needs provider-state handlers
(pending/succeeded/failed jobs) + a Mistral stub on the astrolabe-cloud-website
side (its verification was a deliberate no-op until a consumer pact existed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 6 review (PR #910):
- Add the missing propagation test: a transport error (httpx.ConnectError) from
batch submit() propagates out of process() rather than being caught by the sync
OCR try/except or falling back to a sync transcription — guards the intentional
"opted into batch → procrastinate retry, not sync fallback" asymmetry.
- Move the batch-test module imports (BatchPollResult, batch_ocr_store) to the
top of test_ocr_processor.py, dropping the mid-file `# noqa: E402`.
Deferred (reviewer: not actionable for this PR): extracting a lazy-init helper
for the parallel _backend / _batch_client resolution quadruplets.
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 5 review (PR #910), all nits, no blockers:
- _result_from_success: a succeeded job with `pages=[]` (empty list, not just a
missing key) is now a per-document failure ("no pages returned") instead of a
silent 0-chunk success. Test added.
- Comment the deadline-expiry path: the gateway-side job isn't cancelled (no
cancel endpoint at this layer) — it's reaped by the gateway file purge; we just
stop polling it.
- Drop the vestigial status="pending" from the BatchOcrJob test fakes (the column
was removed in round 4; BatchPollResult.status fakes are untouched).
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 4 review (PR #910), no blockers:
- poll(): a 2xx body with no `status` now fails fast (logged) instead of being
treated as perpetually pending until the deadline; defensive page index
(`p.get("index", i)`) so a malformed page degrades rather than KeyError-ing.
- Document on poll() that job_id is namespaced (embeds "/") so the gateway route
must be a path-capture param (GET /v1/ocr/batch/{job_id:path}).
- Drop the vestigial `status` + `updated_at` columns from batch_ocr_jobs: a row
only ever exists while pending (terminal jobs are deleted) and the live status
comes from a fresh poll, so a stored mirror was permanently "pending" /
redundant with submitted_at. Simplifies the migration, store, and dataclass.
- Tests: submit() ValueError on missing job_id; poll() missing-status → failed.
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 3 review (PR #910):
- Guard an unexpected terminal batch status in _process_batch: anything that
isn't succeeded/failed (gateway version skew, a new lifecycle state) now marks
the document parse-failed instead of falling through to _pages_to_text([]) — a
0-chunk "success" that silently indexed empty text and re-submitted forever.
Test added.
- gateway_batch_client.submit: raise an actionable ValueError on a 2xx response
with no job_id (was a bare KeyError deep in the caller).
- Document that a _process_batch transport error intentionally propagates to
procrastinate for retry rather than falling back to sync (opt-in batch wants
the retry).
- Annotate _batch_client as GatewayBatchOcrClient | None (TYPE_CHECKING import
already present); clarify the delete_stale_for_doc first-submit no-op comment.
- Add a parametrized build_gateway_batch_client test (the gateway-only invariant:
mistral/none/no-URL -> None; gateway|auto + URL -> client).
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 2 review (PR #910):
- BLOCKING: BatchOcrJobStore._shared_lock is now lazy-init (anyio.Lock | None,
created on first shared() call) instead of at class-definition time — matches
the CLAUDE.md "no anyio primitives at import time" rule and OcrProcessor's
pattern. The None-check->assign has no await between, so it's race-free.
- document_ocr_mode now normalizes via _enum_fields (case-insensitive, like
document_ocr_provider) instead of a strict dynaconf is_in Validator, so
DOCUMENT_OCR_MODE=Batch normalizes to "batch" rather than erroring. Tests for
case-normalization + invalid-value rejection.
- TYPE_CHECKING-gated GatewayBatchOcrClient import so build_gateway_batch_client
/ _get_batch_client are typed `GatewayBatchOcrClient | None` instead of Any
(runtime import stays lazy to avoid the import cycle).
- Rename ocr_options -> doc_identity_options (it's threaded to all tiers; only
OCR reads it) + clarify the comment.
- Drop the redundant forward-ref quotes on _shared_instance.
- Add direct _batch_identity unit tests (partial/empty options branches).
Left as follow-up: reusing one httpx.AsyncClient across submit/poll (same
per-call pattern as the existing sync _GatewayOcrBackend; no clean aclose hook
on the cached client today).
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 1 review (PR #910):
- BLOCKING: add document_ocr_mode / _batch_poll_seconds / _batch_max_wait_seconds
to config._field_map — without it dynaconf silently ignored the env vars and
DOCUMENT_OCR_MODE=batch could never be enabled in production. Add a regression
test asserting the three round-trip from env.
- migration 008: give batch_ocr_jobs a composite PRIMARY KEY on
(user_id, doc_id, doc_type, etag) instead of a bare UniqueConstraint (N1).
- OcrProcessor: use a dedicated _batch_client_lock instead of sharing the sync
backend lock (N3).
- tests: use https:// gateway URLs in the new fixtures to clear SonarCloud's
"insecure http" security hotspots (all 14 were test-only http://gw literals).
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add DOCUMENT_OCR_MODE=sync|batch (default sync). In batch mode the tier-3 OCR
processor submits documents to the embedding gateway's async Batch OCR routes
(POST /v1/ocr/batch + GET /v1/ocr/batch/{job_id}, astrolabe-cloud-website#372)
for ~50% cheaper large-corpus backfill. The direct Mistral OCR path is left
untouched. Tracked on Deck #332.
Batch jobs run minutes-hours, so the OCR tier cannot block (the procrastinate
worker reclaims jobs in `doing` after INGEST_STALLED_JOB_SECONDS). Instead it
submits, records the gateway job id in a new per-tenant `batch_ocr_jobs` table
(procrastinate args are immutable across retries), and raises a BatchPending
signal that TieredEscalationStrategy turns into a same-queue deferred re-poll —
releasing the worker slot between polls. On completion the per-page markdown is
indexed like the sync path; a failure or a job past
DOCUMENT_OCR_BATCH_MAX_WAIT_SECONDS marks the document parse-failed.
Batch is opt-in and gateway-only: with the direct mistral backend, no gateway
URL, or the inline/memory pipeline (which can't defer), it falls back to sync.
One batch job per document (coalescing N docs/job is a follow-up).
- embedding/gateway_batch_client.py: submit/poll client (reuses GatewayTokenProvider).
- vector/batch_ocr_store.py + migration 008: job tracking (portable SQLite+PG).
- document_processors/escalation.py: BatchPending control-flow signal.
- document_processors/ocr.py: batch state machine + sync fallback.
- vector/processor.py: thread doc identity to the OCR tier; raise BatchPending
from the pending sentinel; propagate it as control flow (not a failure).
- vector/queue/procrastinate.py: BatchPending -> same-queue retry_in, exempt
from the transient cap (bounded by the processor's deadline).
- config + docs; tests across client/store/processor/strategy/parse-tier.
1653 unit tests pass; ruff + ty green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-2 review follow-ups (GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c PR):
- Add a dynaconf validator requiring WEBHOOK_SECRET to be >=16 chars when set
(None still allowed = webhooks disabled), so weak/placeholder secrets fail
at startup rather than in an audit. Covered by two new tests in test_config.py.
- Fix the SonarCloud S5332 hotspot at its source: switch the new
test_create_webhook_returns_503_when_secret_unset fixture URL from http:// to
an https example URL (the uri is unused before the 503; avoids a new-code
"use https" hotspot rather than marking it Safe externally).
- Nits: drop the unused app.state.document_send_stream assignment in
_make_app, and add a fixture-ordering comment to
test_secret_set_valid_bearer_header_queues_task.
(--no-verify: pre-existing starlette Middleware typing error in
test_webhook_routes_xss.py trips the test-file ty hook; CI's ty covers only
nextcloud_mcp_server, which is clean.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-1 review follow-ups (GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c PR):
- Add a unit test for the new `except WebhookSecretNotConfigured` branch in
enable_webhook_preset: returns 503 (not the generic 500) with WEBHOOK_SECRET
in the body. Uses the existing test_webhook_routes_xss.py scaffolding.
- Add a clarifying comment to test_secret_set_wrong_scheme_returns_401 about
the _client default-bearer override semantics.
(--no-verify: the pre-commit ty-check surfaces a pre-existing starlette
Middleware typing error in test_webhook_routes_xss.py unrelated to this change;
CI's ty check covers only nextcloud_mcp_server, which is clean.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c (CVSS 9.1, CWE-306): POST /webhooks/nextcloud had no
authentication when WEBHOOK_SECRET was unset (the default). The receiver
trusted the attacker-supplied user.uid and fed it to Qdrant, letting an
unauthenticated network caller delete or re-index any user's vector
embeddings.
Webhooks now require WEBHOOK_SECRET end-to-end:
- app.py: the /webhooks/nextcloud route is only mounted when WEBHOOK_SECRET
is set; otherwise it 404s and a startup warning notes vector sync falls
back to the polling scanner.
- webhook_receiver.py: removed the warn-and-accept fallback. No secret -> 503,
missing/invalid bearer -> 401; the payload is never processed unauthenticated.
- webhook_routes.py / api/webhooks.py: webhook_auth_pair() raises
WebhookSecretNotConfigured instead of returning authMethod="none"; both
registration entry points return a clear 503 so no dead unauthenticated
webhooks are created.
Also expose webhooks availability to the Astrolabe UI via GET /api/v1/status
("webhooks_enabled": bool), set WEBHOOK_SECRET on the docker-compose
semantic-search dev services, and update env.sample + ADR-010 / ADR-018 /
webhook-management-guide docs.
Vector sync still works without a secret via the polling scanner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-8 review: env.sample.oauth-multi-user omitted NEXTCLOUD_PUBLIC_ISSUER_URL,
which configuration.md marks required for login_flow — a user working from the
template alone would hit the "Login URL points to localhost" failure. Add it
(with a troubleshooting pointer) and give it + NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL a
"REQUIRED: PUBLIC URLs" section header for consistency with the rest of the file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-7 nit: align the TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY placeholder in login-flow-v2.md
(`<fernet-key>` / `<your-fernet-key>`) with env.sample.oauth-multi-user's
`<your-encryption-key>` so copy-pasters don't see a mismatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-6 review: in env.sample.oauth-multi-user, TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY and
TOKEN_STORAGE_DB sat under "OPTIONAL: SEMANTIC SEARCH", but they're required for
any login_flow deployment (per-user app passwords must be persisted). Move them
into a dedicated "REQUIRED: APP-PASSWORD STORAGE" block with a pointer to
docs/login-flow-v2.md#setup so a login_flow-without-semantic-search user copying
the template doesn't miss them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- settings.toml.example: drop the stale `enable_token_exchange = false`
deprecated-alias line (the key was removed from config.py _DEFAULTS).
- configuration-migration-v2.md: add a Quick Reference row + note that
`ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE` was removed and is now ignored; use
`MCP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=login_flow` instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-4 review: ADR-005 (Status: Implemented) still described the token-exchange
mode (Option 2 / ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE) as an active option. Add a note to the
Implementation Note section clarifying it was removed in the ADR-022/023
consolidation and only multi-audience mode ships — consistent with the ADR-004
deprecation in this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- login-flow-v2.md: add commented-out NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/_SECRET (with a
"production: register a static client" note) to the Docker Compose excerpt so
copy-pasters of the rendered snippet don't fall into the #907 DCR-expiry trap.
- ADR-004: rename "## Implementation Status" -> "## Historical Implementation
Notes" and add a banner clarifying the steps were never completed and the
ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE symbols no longer exist (the design was superseded).
- env.sample.oauth-multi-user: angle-bracket the TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY
placeholder for consistency with the OIDC client placeholders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-2 review follow-ups in unified_verifier.py:
- module-level docstring still described "two compliant OAuth modes" incl.
token exchange — rewritten to multi-audience only.
- removed the stale "# Both modes do the same validation" inline comment in
verify_token().
(--no-verify: same pre-existing ty errors in test_unified_verifier.py as prior
commits; CI type-checks only the package, which passes.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round-1 review follow-ups:
- Troubleshooting "Access forbidden": note that existing users must re-authorize
once after switching to a static client (stored sessions were issued to the
now-deleted DCR client).
- Default IdP setup: explain that the `/mcp` resource identifier works because
`_has_mcp_audience` accepts both the bare server URL and the `/mcp` form.
- env.sample.oauth-multi-user: use angle-bracket placeholders
(`<your-client-id>`) to match the template convention and fail loudly if
copied verbatim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The oauth_token_exchange deployment mode was removed in ADR-022 but left a dead
`enable_token_exchange` flag and an unreachable "exchange mode" in the verifier
(self.mode was hardcoded to "multi-audience"). Remove the remnants:
- config.py: drop the `enable_token_exchange` default and the
`ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE` branch in `_is_multi_user` (+ its doc line).
- unified_verifier.py: drop `self.mode` and the dead exchange-mode log branch;
simplify the docstrings to multi-audience only.
- test_unified_verifier.py: drop the `.mode` assertions (attribute removed);
collapse the redundant init tests.
Also remove docs/ADR-004-Code-Review.md — an orphaned code-review note, not an
ADR; it doesn't belong in the docs/ADR namespace.
(--no-verify: the ty-check hook flags 3 PRE-EXISTING type errors in
test_unified_verifier.py lines 346/362/441, untouched by this change; CI
type-checks only the package, which passes.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OAuth token-exchange deployment mode was removed (ADR-022) and has no
implementation — only a vestigial `enable_token_exchange` flag remains. Its
documentation still presented it as a usable mode, which misleads self-hosters.
The only supported deployment modes are single_user_basic, multi_user_basic,
and login_flow.
Token-exchange removals (how-to/config for a removed mode):
- delete docs/CRITICAL-TOKEN-EXCHANGE-PATTERN.md
- delete docs/oauth-architecture-comparison.md (orphaned; labelled the removed
pass-through mode as "current implementation")
- env.sample: drop the "OAUTH TOKEN EXCHANGE MODE" section
- docker-compose.yml: drop ENABLE_TOKEN_EXCHANGE/TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CACHE_TTL from
the keycloak service (dead flags)
- docs/webhook-management-guide.md: drop the token-exchange deployment section
- docs/configuration-migration-v2.md: drop the token-exchange migration scenario
- docs/observability.md: drop the never-emitted mcp_oauth_token_exchange_total
Auth ADR status corrections:
- ADR-004: Draft -> Superseded by ADR-022/ADR-023 (token-exchange/federated
design not adopted); note the three supported modes.
- ADR-002: extend the deprecation pointer to ADR-022/ADR-023.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-hosting login_flow against Nextcloud's built-in `oidc` app breaks after
~1h when relying on the DCR fallback: the `oidc` app deletes
dynamically-registered clients after `client_expire_time` (default 3600s),
pruning on every /authorize. The MCP server caches the now-deleted client, so
authorize/refresh fail with an "Access forbidden" page permanently — surviving
server restart and connector recreation (issue #907).
- docs/login-flow-v2.md: add "Default IdP setup (Nextcloud oidc app)" with
static-client steps, and a Troubleshooting entry for the #907 symptom/fix;
reframe the OIDC-client env vars as strongly recommended.
- docs/configuration.md: promote NEXTCLOUD_OIDC_CLIENT_ID/_SECRET to strongly
recommended with a DCR-expiry warning; add them to the login_flow example.
- docker-compose.yml: clarify the DCR caveat and point self-hosters to a static
client for login_flow / background sync.
- env.sample.oauth-multi-user: fix the removed `oauth_single_audience` value
(now login_flow) and require a static OIDC client.
- env.sample.oauth-advanced: remove — it configured the removed OAuth
token-exchange mode (no implementation remains; the mode value now errors at
startup). Drop its references in configuration.md / configuration-migration-v2.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move 'permissions: contents: read' from workflow level to the record-deployment
job (GitHub Actions least-privilege, rule S8264), keeping this workflow uniform
with the astrolabe copy. Single-job workflow, but consistent and future-proof.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review round 1 follow-ups:
- Reference the built-in $GITHUB_SHA env var in run scripts instead of
interpolating ${{ github.sha }}, removing the GitHub Actions script-injection
surface (SonarCloud security rating on new code).
- Add a concurrency group (cancel-in-progress: false) to
pact-record-deployment.yml so back-to-back tag pushes don't race the recording.
- Add timeout-minutes: 5 to guard against a hung tailnet join.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the missing record-deployment half of the Pact can-i-deploy loop and
stops can-i-deploy from failing every merge while the broker's production
environment is still empty.
- New pact-record-deployment.yml: on tag push, records a production
deployment of nextcloud-mcp-server keyed by the tagged commit SHA, which
matches the SHA pact.yml publishes consumer pacts / verification results
with. Recording the tag string would not link to the verified pacts.
- pact.yml can-i-deploy: wrapped in shadow mode (runs for signal, emits a
warning annotation on failure, always exits 0). can-i-deploy cannot pass
until both nextcloud-mcp-server and astrolabe have recorded a production
deployment, so gating now would block merges on a bootstrap gap.
Tracked on Deck card #325. Promotion to a hard gate is a follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review round 4 (both nits):
- Rename the flag to ignore_ocr_enabled so its OCR-specific scope is explicit at
the call sites (the gate only bypasses the OCR-enabled check).
- Add test_evaluate_escalation_empty_suppressed_even_when_structured_registered:
empty_text (minimum='ocr') skips a registered structured tier and suppresses to
ocr when OCR is off, never hopping to structured.
Deck #324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The inline _process_pdf path does not emit document_escalation_suppressed_total;
the "what-if OCR" counter is instrumented only on the per-tier external path
(evaluate_escalation / _parse_pdf_tier). Comment the inline OCR gate so a reader
doesn't mistake the omission for a bug. Deferred the assert_never nit (typing
.assert_never is 3.11+; Literal+frozen already guard construction) and the
pre-existing minimum-ValueError pass (only "ocr"/None are ever passed).
Deck #324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- escalation: EscalationDecision.reason is now Literal["empty_text",
"low_confidence"] (parity with kind; ty catches a bad label at call sites).
- processor: nest the decision handling so the hop branch is reached via an
explicit else under `if decision is not None` — exhaustive over the Literal
kind, no None-attribute risk.
- tests: add the "OCR processor unregistered (not just disabled) → None"
quadrant, locking in absent != suppressed.
Deck #324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- escalation: EscalationDecision.kind is now Literal["hop","suppressed"] so ty
catches a bad kind statically (and the processor branch is exhaustive).
- processor: simplify the suppressed-escalation log line (no longer repeats
to_tier / tier).
- registry: clarify _tier_available's ignore_enabled drops the OCR-enabled gate
specifically (a future per-tier gate would extend the condition).
Deck #324.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
OCR is the paid, opt-in tier (DOCUMENT_OCR_ENABLED, default off). The per-tier
escalation gate already declines to hop to OCR when it's disabled (the pre-OCR
tier is terminal — no surprise cost), but that left operators blind to how much
OCR demand exists.
evaluate_escalation now returns a structured EscalationDecision:
- "hop" — a higher tier can run; the caller raises EscalateError (queue-hop).
- "suppressed" — the ideal next tier (e.g. ocr) exists but is DISABLED; the caller
indexes the current tier's output as terminal and records the
would-be hop on the new astrolabe_document_escalation_suppressed_total
{from_tier,to_tier,reason} counter instead of hopping.
- None — index as-is (good text, or no such tier at all).
So with OCR off, escalation_suppressed_total{to_tier="ocr"} is the latent OCR
demand an operator weighs before enabling OCR; enabling it converts these into
real document_escalation_total{to_tier="ocr"} hops. next_available_tier gains an
ignore_enabled flag to compute the *ideal* (enabled-gate-ignored) target.
Tests: registry suppressed vs hop vs terminal (incl. structured-hop-not-suppressed
when OCR off but structured available); _parse_pdf_tier records suppressed +
indexes without raising.
Deck #324 (parent #323).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A stall is often systemic (a Qdrant/embedding outage stalls every in-flight
job), so reclaiming the whole batch at now() every */5min tick would
thundering-herd a recovering dependency, bypassing TieredEscalationStrategy's
per-job backoff. reclaim_stalled_ingest_jobs now offsets retry_at by a fixed
delay (INGEST_RECLAIM_RETRY_DELAY_SECONDS, default 30s; 0 = legacy immediate).
Also document the hot-vs-restart flag asymmetry: INGEST_ESCALATION_ENABLED is
re-read per job; INGEST_TRANSIENT_MAX_ATTEMPTS is snapshotted at worker startup.
Deck #323.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- metrics: update_ingest_queue_depth guarded on `not by_queue`, which conflated
None (memory backend no-op) with {} (postgres, ALL queues drained). When every
queue drains at once, get_ingest_job_counts_by_queue returns {} and the
pre-zero loop was skipped, leaving a stale ghost backlog in the gauge. Guard on
`by_queue is None` only; add an all-drained regression test.
- procrastinate: note that INGEST_TRANSIENT_MAX_ATTEMPTS is snapshotted at
blueprint-build time (restart to pick up changes).
Deck #323.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- tests: make the transient-backoff progression assertion load-independent by
bracketing the get_retry_decision call with before/after timestamps instead of
measuring against a second datetime.now() (no freezegun dependency).
- tests: use pytest.approx for the ingest-queue-depth gauge assertions —
SonarCloud python:S1244 (float == ) was a MAJOR reliability finding that
tripped the new_reliability_rating quality gate.
- processor: tighten the EscalateError lazy-bind comment (file processing already
imports the document stack via get_registry; the gating only spares the
delete / text-doc paths and module-load time).
Deck #323.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
