Address the two Security findings from PR review: - webhook_receiver: encode Authorization header and expected bearer to utf-8 bytes before hmac.compare_digest. Conventional form; doesn't rely on Python's implicit ASCII encoding. - webhook_routes: html.escape user-influenced and exception-derived strings before interpolating into HTMLResponse content. Covers the preset_id path param echoed in the "Unknown preset" branch and the str(e) text rendered on handler exceptions. Adds regression tests verifying compare_digest is invoked on bytes and that <script> payloads (in preset_id and exception messages) are emitted as escaped entities, not active markup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
143 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""HTTP receiver for Nextcloud webhooks.
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Routes inbound webhooks to the same processor send-stream the scanner uses.
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The receiver is registered as a Starlette route at ``/webhooks/nextcloud``
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in :mod:`nextcloud_mcp_server.app`.
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"""
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import hmac
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import logging
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import anyio
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from starlette.requests import Request
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import get_settings
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.vector.webhook_parser import extract_document_task
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_warned_about_missing_secret = False
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def _warn_missing_secret_once() -> None:
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"""Log a one-time WARNING when WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset.
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The receiver still accepts unauthenticated POSTs in this case so existing
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deployments keep working, but the operator should know they're running
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without webhook auth.
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"""
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global _warned_about_missing_secret
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if _warned_about_missing_secret:
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return
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_warned_about_missing_secret = True
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logger.warning(
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"WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set; /webhooks/nextcloud accepts "
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"unauthenticated requests. Set WEBHOOK_SECRET and re-register "
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"webhooks to enable Authorization: Bearer validation."
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)
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async def handle_nextcloud_webhook(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
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"""Receive a Nextcloud webhook and queue a DocumentTask for vector sync.
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Returns quickly so NC's webhook worker is not blocked. The send-stream is
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read from ``request.app.state.document_send_stream``; when vector sync
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isn't running we return 503 so NC retries delivery.
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When ``WEBHOOK_SECRET`` is set, the request must carry
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``Authorization: Bearer <secret>`` (registered via ``authData`` so NC
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forwards it on every delivery); requests without a valid header are
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rejected with 401 before any further work.
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"""
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secret = get_settings().webhook_secret
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if secret:
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provided = request.headers.get("authorization", "").encode("utf-8")
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expected = f"Bearer {secret}".encode("utf-8")
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# Use compare_digest to avoid the character-by-character short-circuit
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# of `==`. Comparing as bytes is the conventional form and avoids any
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# surprise with non-ASCII input. compare_digest still returns False
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# for differing lengths but isn't fully constant-time across them;
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# that's fine here — a secret length leak is not a sensitive signal.
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if not hmac.compare_digest(provided, expected):
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logger.warning("Webhook rejected: missing or invalid Authorization header")
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unauthorized"},
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status_code=401,
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)
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else:
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_warn_missing_secret_once()
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try:
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payload = await request.json()
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning("Webhook payload was not valid JSON: %s", e)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "error", "message": "invalid JSON"},
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status_code=400,
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)
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task = extract_document_task(payload)
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if task is None:
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event_class = (payload.get("event") or {}).get("class", "<missing>")
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logger.debug("Webhook ignored (unsupported event): %s", event_class)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "ignored", "reason": "unsupported event"},
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status_code=200,
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)
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send_stream = getattr(request.app.state, "document_send_stream", None)
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if send_stream is None:
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logger.warning(
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"Webhook received but vector sync is not running; rejecting so NC retries"
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "vector sync not running"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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try:
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with anyio.fail_after(1.0):
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await send_stream.send(task)
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except TimeoutError:
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# Queue is saturated (default 10 000 tasks). Returning 503 lets NC
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# retry rather than pinning this handler until its outbound timeout
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# fires; the queue-pressure signal also surfaces in metrics.
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logger.warning(
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"Webhook task drop: queue full for %s_%s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "queue full"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(
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"Failed to queue webhook task for %s_%s: %s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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e,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "error", "message": "queue unavailable"},
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status_code=500,
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)
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logger.info(
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"Webhook queued %s_%s (%s) for user %s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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task.operation,
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task.user_id,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{
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"status": "queued",
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"doc_type": task.doc_type,
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"doc_id": task.doc_id,
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"operation": task.operation,
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},
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status_code=200,
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)
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