GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c (CVSS 9.1, CWE-306): POST /webhooks/nextcloud had no
authentication when WEBHOOK_SECRET was unset (the default). The receiver
trusted the attacker-supplied user.uid and fed it to Qdrant, letting an
unauthenticated network caller delete or re-index any user's vector
embeddings.
Webhooks now require WEBHOOK_SECRET end-to-end:
- app.py: the /webhooks/nextcloud route is only mounted when WEBHOOK_SECRET
is set; otherwise it 404s and a startup warning notes vector sync falls
back to the polling scanner.
- webhook_receiver.py: removed the warn-and-accept fallback. No secret -> 503,
missing/invalid bearer -> 401; the payload is never processed unauthenticated.
- webhook_routes.py / api/webhooks.py: webhook_auth_pair() raises
WebhookSecretNotConfigured instead of returning authMethod="none"; both
registration entry points return a clear 503 so no dead unauthenticated
webhooks are created.
Also expose webhooks availability to the Astrolabe UI via GET /api/v1/status
("webhooks_enabled": bool), set WEBHOOK_SECRET on the docker-compose
semantic-search dev services, and update env.sample + ADR-010 / ADR-018 /
webhook-management-guide docs.
Vector sync still works without a secret via the polling scanner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
168 lines
6.4 KiB
Python
168 lines
6.4 KiB
Python
"""HTTP receiver for Nextcloud webhooks.
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Routes inbound webhooks to the same processor send-stream the scanner uses.
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The receiver is registered as a Starlette route at ``/webhooks/nextcloud``
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in :mod:`nextcloud_mcp_server.app`.
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"""
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import hmac
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import logging
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import anyio
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from starlette.requests import Request
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from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import get_settings
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from nextcloud_mcp_server.vector.webhook_parser import extract_document_task
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_warned_about_missing_secret = False
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def _warn_missing_secret_once() -> None:
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"""Log a one-time WARNING when WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset.
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The receiver refuses unauthenticated POSTs in this case (returns 503), and
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``app.py`` does not even mount the route without a secret — this branch is
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defense-in-depth for any caller that wires the handler directly. The
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operator should set WEBHOOK_SECRET to enable webhook-driven vector sync.
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"""
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global _warned_about_missing_secret
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if _warned_about_missing_secret:
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return
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_warned_about_missing_secret = True
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logger.warning(
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"WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set; /webhooks/nextcloud rejects all requests "
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"(503). Set WEBHOOK_SECRET and re-register webhooks to enable "
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"Authorization: Bearer validation and webhook-driven vector sync."
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)
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async def handle_nextcloud_webhook(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
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"""Receive a Nextcloud webhook and queue a DocumentTask for vector sync.
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Returns quickly so NC's webhook worker is not blocked. The task producer is
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read from ``request.app.state.task_producer`` (the in-memory send stream when
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``INGEST_QUEUE=memory``, or the procrastinate producer when
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``INGEST_QUEUE=postgres``); when vector sync isn't running we return 503 so
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NC retries delivery.
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``WEBHOOK_SECRET`` is **required** (GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c). The endpoint is
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only mounted by ``app.py`` when the secret is configured, and every request
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must carry ``Authorization: Bearer <secret>`` (registered via ``authData``
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so NC forwards it on every delivery). The ``user.uid`` in the payload is
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attacker-controllable and is fed to Qdrant, so an unauthenticated request
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could delete or re-index any user's embeddings — never process one. Missing
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or invalid headers are rejected with 401 before any further work; if the
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secret is somehow unset we refuse with 503 rather than fall back to
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unauthenticated processing.
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"""
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secret = get_settings().webhook_secret
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if not secret:
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# Defense-in-depth: the route should not be mounted without a secret,
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# but if this handler is reached anyway, refuse rather than process an
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# unauthenticated, attacker-controlled payload.
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_warn_missing_secret_once()
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return JSONResponse(
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{
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"status": "unavailable",
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"reason": "webhook authentication not configured",
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},
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status_code=503,
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)
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provided = request.headers.get("authorization", "").encode("utf-8")
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expected = f"Bearer {secret}".encode("utf-8")
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# Use compare_digest to avoid the character-by-character short-circuit
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# of `==`. Comparing as bytes is the conventional form and avoids any
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# surprise with non-ASCII input. compare_digest still returns False
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# for differing lengths but isn't fully constant-time across them;
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# that's fine here — a secret length leak is not a sensitive signal.
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if not hmac.compare_digest(provided, expected):
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# Intentionally omit WWW-Authenticate. RFC 7235 §4.1 says a 401
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# SHOULD carry it, but Nextcloud's webhook delivery worker has no
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# auth-flow state machine to negotiate against — the bearer is a
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# static shared secret configured out-of-band via WEBHOOK_SECRET,
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# and a challenge response wouldn't change client behaviour.
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# Surfacing it would only mislead operators into expecting a
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# renegotiation that doesn't exist.
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logger.warning("Webhook rejected: missing or invalid Authorization header")
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unauthorized"},
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status_code=401,
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)
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try:
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payload = await request.json()
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except Exception as e:
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logger.warning("Webhook payload was not valid JSON: %s", e)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "error", "message": "invalid JSON"},
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status_code=400,
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)
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task = extract_document_task(payload)
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if task is None:
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event_class = (payload.get("event") or {}).get("class", "<missing>")
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logger.debug("Webhook ignored (unsupported event): %s", event_class)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "ignored", "reason": "unsupported event"},
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status_code=200,
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)
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producer = getattr(request.app.state, "task_producer", None)
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if producer is None:
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logger.warning(
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"Webhook received but vector sync is not running; rejecting so NC retries"
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "vector sync not running"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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try:
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with anyio.fail_after(1.0):
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await producer.send(task)
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except TimeoutError:
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# Queue is saturated (default 10 000 tasks). Returning 503 lets NC
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# retry rather than pinning this handler until its outbound timeout
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# fires; the queue-pressure signal also surfaces in metrics.
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logger.warning(
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"Webhook task drop: queue full for %s_%s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "queue full"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(
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"Failed to queue webhook task for %s_%s: %s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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e,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"status": "error", "message": "queue unavailable"},
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status_code=500,
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)
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logger.info(
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"Webhook queued %s_%s (%s) for user %s",
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task.doc_type,
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task.doc_id,
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task.operation,
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task.user_id,
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{
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"status": "queued",
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"doc_type": task.doc_type,
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"doc_id": task.doc_id,
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"operation": task.operation,
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},
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status_code=200,
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)
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