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mcp-nextcloud/nextcloud_mcp_server/vector/webhook_receiver.py
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Chris CoutinhoandClaude Opus 4.7 affe29f72e fix(webhooks): escape webhook_uri, lazy logging, document 401 header omission
Address round-5 reviewer feedback on PR #747:

- Escape `webhook_uri` in the admin pane HTML template so an operator-
  controlled env value (`WEBHOOK_INTERNAL_URL`, `NEXTCLOUD_MCP_SERVER_URL`)
  can't inject markup. The sibling `preset_id` and exception messages were
  already escaped — this one was the odd one out.
- Convert the eight remaining f-string `logger.warning`/`logger.error`
  calls in `api/webhooks.py` to lazy `%s` formatting, matching the style
  already adopted by `webhook_receiver.py` and `webhook_routes.py`.
- Document why the 401 from `handle_nextcloud_webhook` deliberately omits
  `WWW-Authenticate`: NC's webhook delivery worker has no auth-flow state
  machine to negotiate against, the bearer is a static shared secret
  configured out-of-band via `WEBHOOK_SECRET`, and a challenge response
  wouldn't change client behaviour. The existing warning log already
  records the rejection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 14:37:34 +02:00

150 lines
5.4 KiB
Python

"""HTTP receiver for Nextcloud webhooks.
Routes inbound webhooks to the same processor send-stream the scanner uses.
The receiver is registered as a Starlette route at ``/webhooks/nextcloud``
in :mod:`nextcloud_mcp_server.app`.
"""
import hmac
import logging
import anyio
from starlette.requests import Request
from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
from nextcloud_mcp_server.config import get_settings
from nextcloud_mcp_server.vector.webhook_parser import extract_document_task
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_warned_about_missing_secret = False
def _warn_missing_secret_once() -> None:
"""Log a one-time WARNING when WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset.
The receiver still accepts unauthenticated POSTs in this case so existing
deployments keep working, but the operator should know they're running
without webhook auth.
"""
global _warned_about_missing_secret
if _warned_about_missing_secret:
return
_warned_about_missing_secret = True
logger.warning(
"WEBHOOK_SECRET is not set; /webhooks/nextcloud accepts "
"unauthenticated requests. Set WEBHOOK_SECRET and re-register "
"webhooks to enable Authorization: Bearer validation."
)
async def handle_nextcloud_webhook(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
"""Receive a Nextcloud webhook and queue a DocumentTask for vector sync.
Returns quickly so NC's webhook worker is not blocked. The send-stream is
read from ``request.app.state.document_send_stream``; when vector sync
isn't running we return 503 so NC retries delivery.
When ``WEBHOOK_SECRET`` is set, the request must carry
``Authorization: Bearer <secret>`` (registered via ``authData`` so NC
forwards it on every delivery); requests without a valid header are
rejected with 401 before any further work.
"""
secret = get_settings().webhook_secret
if secret:
provided = request.headers.get("authorization", "").encode("utf-8")
expected = f"Bearer {secret}".encode("utf-8")
# Use compare_digest to avoid the character-by-character short-circuit
# of `==`. Comparing as bytes is the conventional form and avoids any
# surprise with non-ASCII input. compare_digest still returns False
# for differing lengths but isn't fully constant-time across them;
# that's fine here — a secret length leak is not a sensitive signal.
if not hmac.compare_digest(provided, expected):
# Intentionally omit WWW-Authenticate. RFC 7235 §4.1 says a 401
# SHOULD carry it, but Nextcloud's webhook delivery worker has no
# auth-flow state machine to negotiate against — the bearer is a
# static shared secret configured out-of-band via WEBHOOK_SECRET,
# and a challenge response wouldn't change client behaviour.
# Surfacing it would only mislead operators into expecting a
# renegotiation that doesn't exist.
logger.warning("Webhook rejected: missing or invalid Authorization header")
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "unauthorized"},
status_code=401,
)
else:
_warn_missing_secret_once()
try:
payload = await request.json()
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Webhook payload was not valid JSON: %s", e)
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "error", "message": "invalid JSON"},
status_code=400,
)
task = extract_document_task(payload)
if task is None:
event_class = (payload.get("event") or {}).get("class", "<missing>")
logger.debug("Webhook ignored (unsupported event): %s", event_class)
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "ignored", "reason": "unsupported event"},
status_code=200,
)
send_stream = getattr(request.app.state, "document_send_stream", None)
if send_stream is None:
logger.warning(
"Webhook received but vector sync is not running; rejecting so NC retries"
)
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "vector sync not running"},
status_code=503,
)
try:
with anyio.fail_after(1.0):
await send_stream.send(task)
except TimeoutError:
# Queue is saturated (default 10 000 tasks). Returning 503 lets NC
# retry rather than pinning this handler until its outbound timeout
# fires; the queue-pressure signal also surfaces in metrics.
logger.warning(
"Webhook task drop: queue full for %s_%s",
task.doc_type,
task.doc_id,
)
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "unavailable", "reason": "queue full"},
status_code=503,
)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(
"Failed to queue webhook task for %s_%s: %s",
task.doc_type,
task.doc_id,
e,
)
return JSONResponse(
{"status": "error", "message": "queue unavailable"},
status_code=500,
)
logger.info(
"Webhook queued %s_%s (%s) for user %s",
task.doc_type,
task.doc_id,
task.operation,
task.user_id,
)
return JSONResponse(
{
"status": "queued",
"doc_type": task.doc_type,
"doc_id": task.doc_id,
"operation": task.operation,
},
status_code=200,
)