🟡 Performance: unified_search's _execute sorted but did not cap the merged
multi-doc_type pool, so N doc_types each fetched at search_limit sent
N*search_limit candidates into verify-on-read (one Nextcloud round-trip each).
Cap to search_limit*2 after the sort, matching vector_search, nc_semantic_search
and the viz_routes pattern — bounding verification cost to O(2*search_limit)
regardless of how many doc_types are requested.
🟡 Consistency: _get_deck_metadata_from_qdrant is the one internal Qdrant lookup
that uses a raw user_id filter instead of build_ownership_filter. This is not a
bug — deck cards are a documented cross-user gap (the Deck API is per-user, so
cross-user context can't be fetched with the caller's credentials) — but the
inconsistency was unexplained. Added a comment documenting the deliberate
self-only scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
get_user_client_basic_auth built a fresh RefreshTokenStorage and ran
storage.initialize() — a full Alembic `upgrade` in a worker thread — on every
call. Once the /api/v1 search endpoints (unified_search, vector_search) and the
chunk-context endpoint were wired to use it, concurrent requests ran concurrent
Alembic upgrades, which race on Alembic's non-thread-safe module-global
EnvironmentContext proxy and intermittently raise `KeyError: 'script'` →
HTTP 500 (seen on multi-user-basic/nc31; nc32 got lucky).
Cache one process-wide, already-initialized storage instance behind a lazily
created anyio.Lock so the one-time migration runs exactly once and never races.
Callers passing an explicit `storage` are unaffected. Also removes a redundant
per-request migration from the search hot path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
🟡 Important: nc_semantic_search's include_context branch did not forward
accessible_owners to get_chunk_with_context, so context expansion for shared
files stayed self-only, found nothing in Qdrant, and silently fell back to the
plain excerpt. Forward accessible_owners (the per-file file_accessible_by_id
gate still enforces access).
🟡 Performance: auth/viz_routes.py's multi-doc_type branch sorted but did not
cap the candidate pool before verify-on-read, so N doc_types × limit*2 went
into verification (N× the Nextcloud round-trips). Cap to limit*2 after the
sort, matching server/semantic.py and the cross-app branch.
Also clear the SonarCloud gate (new_duplicated_lines_density 5.1% > 3%) the
ACL wiring introduced: extract the duplicated /api/v1 client-resolution +
owner-expansion + verify-on-read block from unified_search/vector_search into a
shared _search_with_acl helper, define a constant for the repeated
"Nextcloud host not configured" literal (S1192), and reword the access_filter
move_to_end comment so it isn't misread as commented-out code (S125) while
adding the other-owner count to its debug log (review nits).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1. Don't log unverified result titles: both search algorithms logged top-5
titles at DEBUG before verify-on-read; with owner-level share expansion the
unverified set can contain other users' docs. Algorithms now log a count
only; the verifying callers (server/semantic, viz_routes, api/visualization)
log verified titles after verify-on-read.
2. Cross-user FILE chunk context: get_chunk_with_context + the Qdrant chunk
helpers now take accessible_owners and use build_ownership_filter. For files
the expanded scope is honoured only after a per-file file_accessible_by_id
check (accessible_owners is owner-level, so the gate prevents a one-file
share recipient from reading any of the owner's cached chunks). note/deck/
news stay self-only (per-user APIs) — a documented gap. Both chunk endpoints
pass accessible_owners.
3. Algorithm usage: SemanticSearchAlgorithm is not dead (it backs the dense-only
option on the viz/API surfaces); added a clarifying comment in server/
semantic.py. Additionally wired accessible_owners + verify-on-read into the
/api/v1 search routes (unified_search, vector_search) so the astrolabe
surface is ACL-aware too — degrading gracefully to self-only/unverified for
non-provisioned callers instead of 401.
4. Overlapping conditions: build_ownership_filter no longer lists self in the
owner_id MatchAny branch (self is already covered by the user_id branch);
the owner_id branch carries only the OTHER owners.
Tests: build_ownership_filter dedup + chunk-bbox filter-shape updates; new
ACL-aware get_indexed_doc_types, cached-chunk lookup, and end-to-end cross-user
file chunk-context (recipient gets the chunk, non-recipient denied) tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR #89 (session-derived JWT auth) merged to astrolabe main and released as
v0.16.1; track the released tag instead of the feature-branch commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- get_indexed_doc_types: add optional accessible_owners param and reuse
build_ownership_filter so cross-user doc-type discovery matches the real
search scope (was self-only / ACL-blind); docstring documents the self-only
default. Covered by test_get_indexed_doc_types_is_acl_aware.
- access_filter: build_ownership_filter now omits the owner_id branch entirely
for an empty owner set instead of relying on undocumented MatchAny(any=[])
semantics; updated the empty-list unit test accordingly.
- access_filter: make the uid_owner/owner share-owner extraction explicit
("absent, not empty") to avoid skipping on a falsy-but-present field.
- access_filter: add an operator note that pre-owner_id points need a re-index
to surface to share recipients (ACL search is a no-op for legacy data).
- verification/webdav: lock the file_accessible_by_id(scope="") contract with a
targeted multi-user test (owner + recipient True, non-recipient False).
- viz_routes: comment that verify-on-read eviction runs inline by design (no
lifespan task group available on the Starlette route).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the multi-user-basic regression introduced by the previous bump: the
astrolabe app's hard https-refusal blocked sending the app password to the
in-cluster http MCP endpoint (http://mcp-multi-user-basic:8000), so background
indexing never ran. Now warns instead of blocking; also clears the SonarCloud
S5332 hotspot on the dropped test's http literal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- vector/qdrant_client.py: add owner_id to _PAYLOAD_INDEX_FIELDS (BLOCKING).
Every search applies MatchAny(key="owner_id", ...); without a keyword index
Qdrant full-scans the collection and may 400 on Qdrant Cloud strict mode.
_ensure_payload_indexes is idempotent so existing collections migrate at
startup.
- search/access_filter.py: bound the process-global _owners_cache with an LRU
cap (was one unbounded entry per active user, never evicted); document the
owner-level over-fetch limitation (a prolific sharer floods the recall
buffer with ghost candidates that verify-on-read drops, with no second
Qdrant pass) as a TODO toward per-file filtering.
- search/algorithms.py + semantic.py + bm25_hybrid.py: promote
accessible_owners from **kwargs to an explicit keyword-only parameter on the
SearchAlgorithm ABC and both implementations, so a misspelled keyword is a
type error rather than a silent fall back to self-only scope.
- search/verification.py: document that _verify_files now verifies by global
file id (WebDAV SEARCH), not by path.
- tests/unit/search/test_access_filter.py: add cache-hit, TTL-expiry,
failure-not-cached, and LRU-bound tests.
Bumps the astrolabe submodule with the matching #89 review fixes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the seven §10.2 hook-point modules + five env vars so Astrolabe Cloud can
offload document processing to the external document-processor / embedding
gateway. Purely additive: with every setting unset the server behaves exactly
as today, so self-hosters are unaffected (Deck #92).
Hook points (all default to current monolith behavior):
- config: EMBEDDING_PROVIDER, INGEST_MODE, STATUS_BACKEND,
COLLECTION_METADATA_SOURCE, FACT_EVENT_EMITTER (+ supporting settings),
validated in Settings.__post_init__ (fail-fast STATUS_BACKEND=local with
INGEST_MODE=external); shared canonical.py.
- vector/payload_keys.py + acl_hash.py: cross-impl NAMESPACE/point_id (§2.2)
and BLAKE2b-128 ACL hash (§11), pinned by fixtures shared with the
document-processor repo.
- embedding/gateway_client.py: OpenAI-compatible GatewayProvider authenticating
via M2M OIDC client-credentials (separate realm); manual-only registry entry.
- vector/collection_metadata.py: sentinel-point / API metadata source with env
fallback.
- vector/queue/: hexagonal ingest producer ports + memory/NATS adapters
(Postgres seam); INGEST_MODE=external publishes mcp.ingest.requested.{tenant}
instead of the in-memory stream and skips the in-process processor pool. The
lifespan becomes a composition root across both deployment branches.
- vector/queue/status.py: STATUS_BACKEND=bus subscriber feeding a StatusStore
the vector-sync status endpoint reads.
- admin/payload_backfill.py: POST /api/v1/admin/payload-backfill (admin scope);
processor writes the new payload keys; query-side ACL pre-filter gated behind
ACL_PREFILTER_ENABLED (default off).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tracks astrolabe feat/session-derived-jwt-auth tip (86616d9). Test-only
change (rename a unit-test constant to clear SonarCloud S2068); no functional
or runtime difference from the previously-verified submodule commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bumps the astrolabe submodule to validate the one-click background-sync app
password internally (IProvider::getToken) instead of via an HTTP loopback to
overwrite.cli.url, which is unreachable from inside the app container and broke
the multi-user-basic integration legs (enable_background_sync never succeeded).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- viz_routes: run verify_search_results before returning results. After the
accessible_owners expansion the viz can surface OTHER users' shared docs, so
it must drop ones the caller can no longer access (revoked share) — same as
the nc_semantic_search tool path. (Blocking review item.)
- access_filter: cache list_accessible_owners per user for 30s to keep the OCS
shares round-trip off the search hot path (failures aren't cached); document
the single-page OCS limitation; add a clear_accessible_owners_cache() test
helper. Comment the empty-accessible_owners MatchAny([]) edge case.
- verification: comment why cross-user eviction is a deliberate no-op (eviction
is scoped to the querying user's id, so a recipient's revoked access never
deletes the owner's points; the recipient self-heals via accessible_owners).
- algorithms: declare SearchResult.original_score (set by the viz route) so the
now-precisely-typed result list type-checks.
- tests: cross-user eviction-no-op safety test; autouse owners-cache reset in
the access_filter + shared-search tests; replace async-no-await qdrant fakes
with AsyncMock (clears SonarCloud S7503).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Aligns PR #813's submodule pointer with astrolabe PR #89 tip (05176f9).
No MCP-server runtime change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Aligns PR #813's submodule pointer with astrolabe PR #89 tip (091c68b),
which makes `composer run psalm` clean. No MCP-server runtime change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The remaining SonarCloud S5443 (publicly-writable directory) findings were the
hard-coded /tmp screenshot paths in revoke_background_sync_access, which became
"new code" once the surrounding function was edited. Replace every /tmp literal
in the file with tempfile.gettempdir() (which S5443 accepts), eliminating the
findings consistently rather than per-line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SonarCloud Automatic Analysis does not honour # NOSONAR, so the S6418
(hard-coded token) and S5443 (publicly writable /tmp) findings in the new
tests persisted. Fix them by construction instead:
- test_login_flow: use a trivial poll-token value ("tok") in the rewrite test
(it asserts the URLs, not the token) so it no longer looks like a secret.
- test_astrolabe bg-sync: build the debug screenshot path from
tempfile.gettempdir() rather than a hard-coded /tmp literal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The new-code quality gate flagged test-only mock fixtures as security issues
(new_security_rating E):
- S2068 "hard-coded password" ×2: drop the unused "app_password" value from the
get_app_password_with_scopes mocks (the code under test only reads truthiness
+ "scopes").
- S6418 "hard-coded token": NOSONAR on the Login Flow v2 poll-token test fixture.
- S5443 "publicly writable directory": NOSONAR on the /tmp debug screenshot path
(matches this file's existing convention).
No behaviour change; all are test fixtures, not real credentials.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
No runtime change — keeps the PR #813 submodule pointer aligned with the
astrolabe PR #89 tip (587caa6).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SonarCloud flagged the http:// mock URLs in the new login_url-rewrite test as
clear-text-protocol hotspots, failing the new-code quality gate (they were new
+ unreviewed). They're harmless test fixtures; switch to https mock origins to
match this file's existing convention. The login_url rewrite is scheme-agnostic
so the test still exercises the same internal->public origin replacement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The OAuth provisioning tools (check_provisioning_status, revoke_nextcloud_
access) only consulted the refresh-token store + Astrolabe status, ignoring the
app_passwords store that Login Flow v2 (nc_auth_provision_access) and the
management API write to — the same store require_provisioning / get_client use
to grant tool access. Result: status reported "not provisioned" while tools
worked, and revoke said "nothing to revoke" while the credential persisted.
- _get_provisioning_status: also check storage.get_app_password_with_scopes,
reporting is_provisioned with credential_type=app_password,
flow_type=login_flow_v2.
- _revoke_nextcloud_access: when the credential is an app password, delete it
from storage + invalidate the scope cache (no IdP token to revoke);
refresh-token revocation via the Token Broker is unchanged.
- tests/unit/test_oauth_tools_app_password_provisioning.py: cover status +
revoke for the app-password path.
- bump astrolabe submodule (deprovision MCP on disable); fix a stale assertion
in the migrated bg-sync test (one-click flow has no separate app-password
generation step).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Astrolabe was refactored to mint session-derived JWTs (TokenGenerationRequest
Event) and a one-click background-indexing opt-in, dropping the OAuth
authorize/callback/refresh surface. Bump the submodule and bring the test
suite in line:
- New test_astrolabe_session_jwt_search.py: a logged-in user searches via the
minted JWT with no provisioning (replaces the obsolete login_flow_provisioning
OAuth-authorize test; token_refresh test deleted — refresh flow is gone).
- settings_buttons: assert the new revoke endpoint + that oauth/disconnect is
gone (404).
- multi_user_background_sync / plotly / chunk_context: drop the OAuth authorize
step; provision via the one-click "Enable background indexing" button
(#mcp-enable-background-button -> #mcp-revoke-background-button) instead of
generating + pasting an app password.
- docker-compose.yml: mount the astrolabe submodule into the app container.
- third_party/astrolabe: bump to the one-click opt-in commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two fixes surfaced while testing Login Flow v2 provisioning behind a split
internal/external host (Docker: server↔Nextcloud over http://app, browser
over http://localhost:8080):
1. login_url pointed at the internal host. Nextcloud builds the login URL
from the request host, so the browser-facing URL came back as
http://app/login/v2/flow/... — unreachable from the user's browser. The
poll endpoint was already rewritten to the internal host (correct, the
server polls it); now LoginFlowV2Client also rewrites the login_url origin
to settings.nextcloud_public_issuer_url when set (passed at all 5
construction sites). When unset, behaviour is unchanged.
2. The app-password format guard rejected raw session tokens. core/
getapppassword returns a long alphanumeric token, not the dashed 25-char
Security-settings format, so the dashed-only regex 400'd the one-click
opt-in handoff. Relax APP_PASSWORD_PATTERN to `^[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,256}$`;
the authoritative validation is still the BasicAuth check against Nextcloud.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ACL-aware vector filter (PR #813) expands a user's search to documents
whose owner shared them, but verify-on-read still re-checked each file by
PATH under the *searching* user's WebDAV root. Nextcloud mounts received
shares at the recipient's root by basename, so a nested shared file (e.g.
owner's /docs/report.pdf) 404s for the recipient and was silently dropped —
defeating the filter for everything but root-level files.
Verify files by their global Nextcloud file id instead (the file doc_id IS
that id): WebDAVClient.get_file_info_by_id was insufficient (the dav/meta
endpoint only resolves the user's own storage, not shares), so add
WebDAVClient.file_accessible_by_id which runs a WebDAV SEARCH over the user's
whole tree (incl. mounted shares) filtered on oc:fileid. Empirically this
resolves owned, directly-shared, and folder-shared files; an empty result is
a definitive drop, transport errors are kept as transient.
- search/verification.py: _verify_files now checks file_accessible_by_id.
- client/webdav.py: add file_accessible_by_id (SEARCH by fileid).
- tests/integration/test_acl_owner_filter.py: filter matrix vs real Qdrant.
- tests/integration/test_acl_shared_search.py: real-Nextcloud share -> search.
- tests/integration/test_verify_on_read.py: nested shared file kept for the
recipient; unshared file dropped.
- tests/unit/search/test_verification.py: id-based verifier semantics.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The vector index has always been strictly per-user: every Qdrant payload
carries a `user_id` and the search filter is `user_id == querying_user`.
A file Alice indexed cannot be discovered by Bob even if she has shared
it with him — Bob would have to re-index it under his own user_id to
make it searchable, which means duplicate index entries for every share
recipient.
Switch to ownership-with-ACL-expansion:
- New `nextcloud_mcp_server.search.access_filter` module:
- `list_accessible_owners(sharing_client, user_id)` calls the OCS
Sharing API (`shared_with_me=true`) and returns
`{user_id} ∪ {uid_owner of each share}`. Fails open to `[user_id]`
so a misbehaving Sharing API doesn't black-hole search.
- `build_ownership_filter(user_id, accessible_owners)` returns a
Qdrant `Filter` whose `should` branch matches either the new
`owner_id IN accessible_owners` field or the legacy `user_id` field.
The legacy branch keeps points indexed before this change reachable
without a migration backfill.
- Indexer payload (`vector/processor.py`) now writes `owner_id` alongside
`user_id`. `DocumentTask` gains an optional `owner_id` field; today the
scanner always runs as the owner so the processor falls back to
`user_id`, but the field is plumbed so a future shared-with-me crawler
can set the true owner without reshaping the payload contract.
- `SemanticSearchAlgorithm.search` and `BM25HybridSearchAlgorithm.search`
accept `accessible_owners` via kwargs and use the new ownership filter.
Default behaviour with no kwarg is unchanged (self-only).
- Both user-facing callers — the MCP tool path (`server/semantic.py`) and
the visualization Starlette route (`auth/viz_routes.py`) — compute
`accessible_owners` from the authenticated Nextcloud client before
invoking the search algorithm. Eviction, scanner deletion, placeholder,
and chunk-context paths intentionally keep the legacy `user_id`
semantics (those are "operations on a specific user's records", not
cross-user reads).
- 10 new unit tests in `tests/unit/search/test_access_filter.py` cover
self-only default, owner expansion, dedup, fallback fields, OCS
failure, and the legacy `should`-branch shape.
Pairs with cbcoutinho/astrolabe#89 — together they let an Astrolabe user
find content owners have shared with them without going through any
re-authorization flow or re-indexing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
